Tibet Crisis

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April 29, 2008

An Appeal To All Chinese Spiritual Brothers And Sisters

Published: Thursday, 24 April, 2008

View Appeal in Chinese View Appeal in Tibetan

Today I would like to make a personal appeal to all Chinese spiritual brothers and sisters, both inside as well as outside the People’s Republic of China, and especially to the followers of the Buddha. I do this as a Buddhist monk and a student of our most revered teacher, the Buddha. I have already made an appeal to the general Chinese community. Here I am appealing to you, my spiritual brothers and sisters, on an urgent humanitarian matter.

The Chinese and the Tibetan people share common spiritual heritage in Mahayana Buddhism. We worship the Buddha of Compassion – Guan Yin in the Chinese tradition and Chenrezig in Tibetan tradition – and cherish compassion for all suffering beings as one of the highest spiritual ideals. Furthermore, since Buddhism flourished in China before it came to Tibet from India, I have always viewed the Chinese Buddhists with the reverence due to senior spiritual brothers and sisters.

As most of you are aware, beginning with the 10th of March this year, a series of demonstrations have taken place in Lhasa and across many Tibetan areas. These are caused by deep Tibetan resentment against the policies of the Chinese government. I have been deeply saddened by the loss of life, both Chinese and Tibetans, and immediately appealed to both the Chinese authorities and the Tibetans for restraint. I specially appealed to the Tibetans not to resort to violence.

Unfortunately, the Chinese authorities have resorted to brutal methods to deal with the development despite appeals for restraint by many world leaders, NGOs and noted world citizens, particularly many Chinese scholars. In the process, there has been loss of life, injuries to many, and the detention of large number of Tibetans. The crackdown still continues, especially targeting monastic institutions, which have traditionally been the repository of ancient Buddhist knowledge and tradition. Many of these have been sealed off. We have reports that many of those detained are beaten and treated harshly. These repressive measures seem to be part of an officially sanctioned systematic policy.

With no international observers, journalists or even tourists allowed to Tibet, I am deeply worried about the fate of the Tibetans. Many of those injured in the crackdown, especially in the remote areas, are too terrified to seek medical treatment for fear of arrest. According to some reliable sources, people are fleeing to the mountains where they have no access to food and shelter. Those who remained behind are living in a constant state of fear of being the next to be arrested.

I am deeply pained by this ongoing suffering. I am very worried where all these tragic developments might lead to ultimately. I do not believe that repressive measures can achieve any long-term solution. The best way forward is to resolve the issues between the Tibetans and the Chinese leadership through dialogue, as I have been advocating for a long time. I have repeatedly assured the leadership of the People’s Republic of China that I am not seeking independence. What I am seeking is a meaningful autonomy for the Tibetan people that would ensure the long-term survival of our Buddhist culture, our language and our distinct identity as a people. The rich Tibetan Buddhist culture is part of the larger cultural heritage of the People’s Republic of China and has the potential to benefit our Chinese brothers and sisters.

In the light of the present crisis, I appeal to all of you to help call for an immediate end to the ongoing brutal crackdown, for the release of all who have been detained, and to call for providing immediate medical care to the injured.

The Dalai Lama

Hamilton, NY
April 24, 2008

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April 27, 2008

Tibetan Chinese Youth Dialogue Project

facebook group

http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=11913526595&ref=nf

Online forum

http://www.tibetchinadialogue.org/forum/

Posted by google at 05:58 PM | Comments (0)

April 25, 2008

In Shift, China Offers to Meet With Dalai Lama Envoys

April 26, 2008

By JIM YARDLEY
BEIJING — China appeared to bend to international pressure on Friday as the government announced it would meet with envoys of the Dalai Lama, an unexpected shift that comes as violent Tibetan demonstrations in western China have threatened to cast a pall over the Beijing Olympics in August.

China’s announcement, made through the country’s official news agency, provided few details about the shape or substance of the talks but said the new discussions would commence “in the coming days.” The breakthrough comes as Chinese officials have pivoted this week and moved to tamp down the domestic nationalist anger unleashed by the Tibetan crisis and by the protests at the international Olympic torch relay.

“In view of the requests repeatedly made by the Dalai side for resuming talks, the relevant department of the central government will have contact and consultation with Dalai’s private representative in the coming days,” said an unidentified Chinese official, according to Xinhua, the official news agency.

The Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, was returning to India from the United States on Friday. He has repeatedly called for renewed talks with Chinese officials and last month sent a letter to China’s president, Hu Jintao. Earlier this month, he hinted in Seattle that a back-channel discussion was already under way. On Friday, his spokesman, Tenzin Taklha, said: “Since His Holiness is committed to dialogue, we would welcome this.”

The spokesman added that the Dalai Lama had not yet received any official communication from China. “We also have to look at when the offer does officially arrive,” he said from Dharamshala, India, the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. “We have to look at conditions they are talking about.”

For weeks, Chinese officials have castigated the Dalai Lama in harsh language and blamed him for orchestrating the violent Tibetan protests that erupted March 14 in Lhasa and then spread across other Tibetan regions of western China. The Dalai Lama has denied any involvement in the demonstrations and denounced the violence, if also criticizing China for its crackdown against protesters.

China’s tough stance came as international leaders, including President Bush, have described the Dalai Lama as a man of peace and called on China to resume a dialogue with his envoys that began in 2002 but then broke off last summer after six rounds of talks. Those talks, focused on the future status of Tibet and whether the Dalai Lama will be allowed to return to China, never made significant progress.

The timing of China’s announcement suggests that party leaders hope to defuse the international criticism that has steadily mounted since the Tibetan protests began. In Europe, criticism is particularly strong as several government leaders have announced they will not attend the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games. Anti-China protesters caused violent disruptions to the Olympic torch relay in London and Paris, forcing relay organizers to change the route in other cities out of security concerns. China supporters have responded by flooding to the relay route.

“I believe the important question is whether China is doing this as a public relations maneuver to respond to international pressure before the Olympic Games,” said Wang Lixiong, a scholar in Beijing who has criticized government policy in Tibet. “They want the Dalai Lama to help them relieve pressure before the Olympics. But is it a sincere move, or just a public relations move?”

Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at People’s University in Beijing, said the Chinese government does not want the talks to be “interpreted as a concession under duress.” He predicted that any discussions would be unlikely to bring meaningful breakthroughs.

“I doubt that both sides will change their fundamental positions,” Mr. Shi said. “If there is dialogue, this is dialogue for the sake of dialogue. Maybe both sides only want to impress the Western audience.”

This week, high-level talks aimed at repairing damaged relations have been under way between China and European leaders, notably the French. In recent days, China and France have been working assiduously to defuse the public anger and mutual accusations that began with the Tibetan protests. The Chinese have been enraged by the anti-Chinese protests during the Paris leg of the torch relay and also by threats from President Nicholas Sarkozy of France that he might boycott the Olympic opening ceremony.

On Thursday, President Hu Jintao met in Beijing with the president of the French Senate, Christian Poncelet, and emphasized the value that China places on Sino-French relations, even as he repeated Chinese complaints about the torch. Also on Thursday, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao met with France’s prime minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, in another effort to smooth out the strained ties.

On Friday, hours before the government announced the new talks with the Dalai Lama, Mr. Wen discussed Tibet in a meeting with José Manual Barroso, president of theEuropean Union Commission. The two men also announced a new trade and economic dialogue. State media gave heavy prominence to the meetings as what appeared to be part of a broader effort to defuse public anger and possibly dilute plans for boycotts of French stores in China next month.

China has long condemned the Dalai Lama as a “splittist” who is pursuing Tibetan independence, even as the Dala Lama long ago disavowed Tibetan independence and has instead called for “genuine autonomy” within China. Chinese spokesmen often say the government would be willing to resume dialogue with the Tibetan spiritual leader but only if he shows “sincerity” in renouncing separatism and on other issues.

“It is hoped that through contact and consultation, the Dalai side will take credible moves to stop activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games so as to create conditions for talks,” the unidentified Chinese official said in Friday’s official announcement.

Tenzin Taklha, the Tibetan spokesman, denounced these conditions as “basically baseless,” noting that the Dalai Lama has not sought independence since 1974 and supported holding the Olympics in Beijing, even after the violence erupted last month. “We have no preconditions,” he said. “We’re not saying these are conditions to talk. It’s a cause of concern for us to see repression is still continuing inside Tibet.”

Somini Sengupta contributed reporting from New Delhi and Jake Hooker contributed reporting from Beijing. Huang Yuanxi contributed research from Beijing

Posted by google at 10:55 AM | Comments (0)

April 23, 2008

Dalai Lama asks Chinese president to allow envoys into Tibet

3 hours ago

WASHINGTON (AFP) — The Dalai Lama has written a letter to China's President Hu Jintao offering to send emissaries to Tibet to calm down tensions following Beijing's crackdown, his special envoy said Wednesday.

"His Holiness expressed his deepest concerns about the situation (in Tibet) and offered to send his emissaries to help calm the situation and explain to Tibetans, but that specific offer so far went answered," envoy Lodi Gyari told reporters.

The letter, sent on March 19, was part of efforts "to begin a discussion on a peaceful way forward" following the Chinese crackdown on pro-Tibetan protests, said Gyari, who testified earlier at a US Senate hearing on the turmoil in Tibet.

Gyari pointed out that Beijing had replied to the letter but did not specifically respond to the Dalai Lama's offer.

Asked for details of Beijing's reply, he said, "There was nothing concrete, just rhetoric. Just leave it like that."

Some media reports that the Dalai Lama's side was at present in discussions with the Chinese government was "unfortunately an oversatement of fact," he said.

The 72-year-old Dalai Lama, who has lived in northern India since fleeing Tibet after a failed uprising in 1959, is campaigning for "meaningful autonomy" for his homeland, currently largely under Chinese rule.

Exiled Tibetan leaders say China's clampdown last month left more than 150 dead, while Beijing says "rioters" killed 20.

The incident has overshadowed China's hosting of the Beijing Olympics in August, with protests marring international legs of the ceremonial torch relay.

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5j6TrifJsutvbD9i2RXbG--bIUcvQ

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April 22, 2008

Tibetan Song Aama - Acha Tsendep

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CBC one on one interview of Dalai Lama

http://www.cbc.ca/video/popup.html?http://www.cbc.ca/mrl3/8752/oneonone/2008-04-19.wmv

Posted by google at 05:59 PM | Comments (0)

Dalai Lama to meet with State Dept. official on Tibetan issues

By Niraj Warikoo • Free Press Staff Writer • April 21, 2008

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The Dalai Lama is meeting today in Michigan with the U.S. State Department official in charge of Tibetan issues.

He is expected to talk with Paula J. Dobriansky, State Department undersecretary for democracy and global affairs, about the situation in China, where the government has cracked down on Tibetan protests in recent weeks and killed demonstrators.

The Dalai Lama said at a press conference Friday in Ann Arbor that the Chinese government is committing cultural genocide against Tibetan culture. He said he had recently tried to make contact with China about a dialogue but got a negative response. The Dalai Lama spoke to thousands this weekend at Crisler Arena in Ann Arbor.

He and Dobriansky will appear for media photos at a University of Michigan auditorium before their meeting, said a university spokesman.

In an op-ed in today's Washington Post, Dobriansky wrote that "underlying these tragic events is China's long-standing repression of religious, cultural and other freedoms for the Tibetan people."

She also wrote that:

"When I meet with the Dalai Lama today, I fully expect him to reaffirm his strong commitment to engaging Chinese officials in dialogue."

Contact NIRAJ WARIKOO at warikoo@freepress.com.

Posted by google at 01:50 AM | Comments (0)

April 21, 2008

Dalai Lama: 'Nothing positive' has come from talks with China

Gregg Krupa / The Detroit News

ANN ARBOR -- The Dalai Lama said Friday that he has made contact with the Chinese government since violence broke out in Tibet last month.

"But nothing positive has come from it," he said.

Speaking at a press conference here at the start of a three-day visit, the Dalai Lama said that he had appealed to China's president, Hu Jintao, and had established "private channels."

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The exiled Tibetan leader appeared to hold out little hope that his decades-long struggle for an autonomous Tibet was any closer to reality.

He also reiterated his complete support for the Olympics, which are to take place in Beijing in August.

"Right from the beginning, I fully support the Olympics. A country of four billion people should be very proud and we must respect their dedication."

The Dalai Lama said that "despite a very sad situation inside Tibet, the Olympics should continue.

"I have seen the disturbances when the torch travels the world. I feel very sorry, but I fully understand the frustration," he said.

The Dalai Lama is in Michigan to talk about compassion and the environment. He will give a special address at the University of Michigan on Sunday on sustainability. The environmental issue that addresses preserving the resources of the planet.

Much of his time will likely be spent discussing the tenets and principles of Tibetan Buddhism, but at the press conference Friday, he was questioned more about his role as the head of the Tibetan government in exile.

The Dalai Lama fled Tibet in 1959, nine years after the communist Chinese government invaded Tibet. In India, he has set up a government in exile.

For centuries, all of the Dalai Lamas have been both head of state and spiritual leader of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama is the 14th and the first to travel internationally.

The Dalai Lama's appearances in Ann Arbor are accompanied by heavy security. Forty members of the international press corps traveled with him amid tight security that included a bomb-sniffing dog.

Chinese students say they plan to demonstrate during the weekend. But they say their issues are not necessarily with the Dalai Lama.

"It will be a peaceful demonstration because of the violence that happened in Tibet on March 14," said Youjian Chi, 23, a biology student at Michigan from China's Fujan Province. "We think it has been distorted by a lot of the media. And we just want to make our voice heard. We want peace for Tibet.

"Some people are saying they want to boycott the Beijing Olympics," Youjian said. "We just want to say, 'Keep the politics out of the Beijing Olympics'."

Youjian said several hundred Chinese students are expected to demonstrate outside of Crisler Arena on Sunday, including students from several campuses around Michigan.

"We will not protest the Dalai Lama, but it depends what he says," Youjian said. "If it is compassion and sustainability, that is a good thing. We won't protest that. And the Dalai Lama also says Tibet is part of China, and the Chinese are brothers and sisters. We agreed with that too.

"But a lot of his followers have committed a lot of violence, and that is what we protest."

You can reach Gregg Krupa at (313) 222-2359 or gkrupa@detnews.com.

Posted by google at 04:16 PM | Comments (0)

Dalai Lama draws admirers, protesters to Crisler

Spiritual leader will speak twice more Sunday
By Andy Kroll, Daily Staff Reporter on 4/15/08

PrintEmail Article Tools Page 1 of 1 Posted on April 19.

Crisler Arena's usual Maize and Blue-themed interior was transformed into a sea of burgundy and gold as the Dalai Lama gave his first of four lectures in Ann Arbor this morning.

Souvenir shops on the arena's concourses usually offering basketballs and replica jerseys instead sold Buddhist prayer flags and brightly colored "Victory" and "Good Luck" banners.

In his first lecture with the theme of "Engaging Wisdom and Compassion," the Buddhist spiritual leader said that while different religious views and beliefs are better suited to certain kinds of people, it's important to respect all traditions and practices.

"We cannot say among these different traditions, 'This is best,'" the Dalai Lama said during this morning's lecture, which drew a crowd of about 8,000. "We have to judge according (to) individual case(s)."

Although the Dalai Lama said it was "more suitable" and "safer" for individuals to stick to their own religious traditions, he said that shouldn't preclude them from learning about other religions.

"Efforts to promote genuine harmony on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual respect among the different traditions is very, very essential," he said.

The Dalai Lama, who is a Nobel Peace Prize winner and Tibet's 14th Dalai Lama, cited his own efforts to learn more about Islam, Christianity and Judaism, which he said came through "personal contact" with people who practiced those religions.

"My attitude (is) genuine admiration, respect and appreciation for those traditions," he said.

The Dalai Lama delivered his opening remarks in English, but then slipped into his native Tibetan when he began the lecture. The speech focused on Buddhism's Four Noble Truths, one of the religion's most fundamental set of teachings about the nature of human suffering.

This weekend's lectures, which include the University's annual Peter M. Wege Lecture on Sustainability, mark the Dalai Lama's first visit to Ann Arbor since 1994.

The set-up inside Crisler Arena resembled that of a music concert with a large stage on the floor, where the Dalai Lama sat along with about 30 fellow Buddhist monks.

Large posters depicting Gelek Rimpoche, the founder of Jewel Heart, a local Tibetan Buddhist cultural and educational organization that sponsored the Dalai Lama's visit, hung next to banners commemorating past Michigan All-American basketball players.

Although the purpose of the Dalai Lama's visit to Ann Arbor was to share his teachings on faith and compassion, the exiled Tibetan leader's involvement in the international controversy with China and its alleged suppression of political and religious freedom in Tibet was not felt this morning.

Many in attendance wore T-shirts bearing the message "Free Tibet" in the red and blue colors of Tibet's flag.

Outside of Crisler arena, about 15 pro-Chinese demonstrators carried signs questioning current human rights practices in Tibet and accusing the mainstream media of overly critical, anti-China coverage of recent riots in Tibet's capital, Lhasa. Many of the demonstrators wore T-shirts that read "Support Beijing 2008."

Rackham student Youjian Chi, who was among the demonstrators, said he believed the mainstream media wasn't presenting balanced coverage of the conflict from both the Tibetan and Chinese perspective.

"There is no absolute right and wrong," Chi said. "We should get all the news no matter (whether it is) negative or positive, all of the opinions."

Chi said it's up to the public to decide whether to support Tibet or China, but he said that right now that's almost impossible to do.

"It's fine if you give us all of the information - the positive and negative perspectives on China," he said. "But right now they're only giving the negative perspective on China."

Posted by google at 11:52 AM | Comments (0)

April 20, 2008

In his own words: Quotes from the Dalai Lama in Ann Arbor

Posted by News Staff | The Ann Arbor News April 19, 2008 19:38PM
Categories: Breaking News, State

Related: Complete coverage of Saturday's appearances

What he said:

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"The ultimate awakening mind is the wisdom that directly realizes emptiness."

- The Dalai Lama

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"It's much better to keep one's own tradition."

- The Dalai Lama, on the need to focus on your own faith but respect the faith of others.

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"Self-grasping (or self-focus) gives rise to suffering. It is the root of all afflictions."

- The Dalai Lama, as translated Saturday by Thupten Jinpa.

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"At the root of all our suffering lies a form of ignorance, a form of unknowing."

- The Dalai Lama, as translated Saturday by Thupten Jinpa

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"If we go word by word, I need homework. ... So I'm lazy."

- The Dalai Lama, chuckling while explaining how does not know the texts verbatim.

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Posted by google at 11:57 PM | Comments (0)

April 19, 2008

Pictures about the rally

http://www.xitek.com/forum/showthread.php?threadid=520281

Posted by google at 11:11 PM | Comments (0)

Some comments on Ms. Wang Qianyuan

Hereby we have to question the direction to which the voice should be
heard. We're very fortunate, so is Ms. Wang, to hear different voices
in terms of interpreting double standards. Many friends, again, fall
into the direction of pushing themselves confused the Chinese
government with Chinese citizens ( or in general, Chinese people).
Seriously, it's not my position to judge well-financed, organized
protests representing various single-issue groups that normally do not
even talk with each other or work together. We're not even foreign to
"Free Tibet movement",
Darfur issues, global warming ( or cheap labor) , Burma's
dictatorship, jobless situation in the U.S., the Falun Gong and Taiwan
independence activists, etc. (the weirdest is Manchurians independence
movement), when we're in China, learning mess of information dispersed
all over the Internet. Ms. Wang, unfortunately, moves for a direction
being tortured by unestablished guidelines.

Why the media, as usual, continues pouring fuel onto this unrests? Why
NYT had different sections of opinions published? Why nobody dislikes
same problems in U.S. in terms of invasion of Iraq (or so called Iraq
War), unlawful detention
and mail censorship as endorsed for national security? Do they accept
all those unfairness or intentionally ignore them?

I feel very upset that most Americans or Europeans, even those
educated ones, are not informative of international issues especially
to China, which, finally turn into ignorance, instill fear,racial
hostility, or worse, hatred toward China or Chinese people.

I had confirmed a thought with a few US attorneys, ethnically
speaking, a quarter-native American, AS- American, "Taiwanese
American", and Filipino American, that they treat (believe) China as a
(potential) post-Cold War opponent to U.S. (let alone the lagged
European economy). They have fears on a united China when they think
about this fragmented world or ethnic disparities all around --
thinking about the size of China's population, economy scale and
military capacities. They have
fears (concerns) on China's reaching out to Middle-East, the Africa,
the S. America and most seriously, the reality that more and more "new
Chinese" immigrate to U.S. and Europe. Seriously, I was shocked by
such candid and bold confirmation as hopefully, we, our friends or
colleagues will become the leaders of or dominant powers on this planet
in 20 years. This voice should be heard, as well as Ms. Wang's words
as a "moderator."

True believers of democracy would view Olympics as an opportunity to
attract more and more different voices to China and more visitors to China to
learn about what is going on with this largest emerging economy and
giant country, and ferment the sense of change or nurture freedom of
all kinds with various groups IN China. I have not seen, ever never,
any event like Olympics could make Chinese that dedicated and
collectively mobilized (as we have not had hard experience on Cultural
Revolution).

U.S. and China, like many countries in the world, is flawless. U.S.
still has problems on handling treatment to minorities such as Native
Americans, African-Americans, Latinos, Chinese-Americans and others as
committed in the Constitution. China has yet to learn how to equally
take care of its minorities -- such as Tibetans, Uighurs, Muslims,
Hmongs -- as equal to Han Chinese.

I am against any anti-free-speech and anti-legitimate-protests against
biase including mistakes central Chinese government has suffered.
However, I am more opposed to taking the Olympics to demonize China
and, mostly, its people by using disruptive, confrontational, and
violent tactics. Stop insulting and blackmailing (fist in air?:))))

Neither of us likes the set-backs of openness and development of
China, where our beloved families, relatives and friends are happily
residing. Wang made a mistake, which however, is curable and
tolerable.

Posted by google at 05:02 PM | Comments (0)

Outside Dalai Lama appearance, people protest

Posted by Amanda Hamon | The Ann Arbor News April 19, 2008 10:18AM
Categories: Breaking News
As the Dalai Lama began speaking in Crisler Arena this morning on the subject of "Engaging Wisdom and Compassion," a group of about 150 to 200 protesters formed outside.

They congregated in the area between Michigan Stadium and Crisler Arena and lined Stadium Boulevard. Many had signs with messages like, "Support the Olympics," "Don't Politicize the Olympics," and "Learn the Truth About Tibet."

In remarks yesterday, the Dalai Lama said he understands the sentiments of those protesting the upcoming Beijing Olympics.

University of Michigan graduate student Xiao Ran, one of the protesters, said that although the Dalai Lama says he wants freedom for Tibet, he lives a life of luxury while common people are enslaved.

"We don't want to allow for the violent separatist in our country," Ran said. "What they don't understand is what the Dalai Lama stands for."

Emily Xue, who is from Beijing and lives in Ann Arbor, called the Dalai Lama a "bad guy because he oppresses slaves."

"I hope they can go to Tibet to see for themselves," Xue said. "Don't listen to the lies."

The Dalai Lama said yesterday that protesters are trying to draw attention to China's human rights record, but said he's sorry to see some of the protests have turned violent.

The Dalai Lama's comments follow a month of sporadic unrest in the Tibetan-inhabited areas of western China. That unrest has triggered an outpouring of anti-China sentiment, centering on the Olympic torch. China had hoped the international relay would be a symbol of harmony in advance of the Beijing Games this summer. Instead it's become a lightning rod for protests.

The Dalai Lama said he supports the China Olympics and has reached out to the Chinese government. But he said there's been no positive response.

China has accused him of fomenting rebellion.

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/2008/04/outside_dalai_lama_appearance.html

Posted by google at 01:33 PM | Comments (0)

Dalai Lama leads 1st of 4 weekend talks in Crisler Arena

Posted by Jeff Karoub | The Associated Press April 19, 2008 12:14PM
Categories: Top Photos

Leisa Thompson | The Ann Arbor News
The Dalai Lama appeared on the stage at Crisler Arena for the first of four talks this weekend.
The Dalai Lama on Saturday encouraged people gathered for the first of four weekend talks at the University of Michigan to preserve their own religious traditions while respecting others with differing beliefs.

"As you know, I always believed since all different traditions have the same potential to bring inner peace, inner value ... it is important to keep one's own tradition," he told about 8,000 people at a two-hour morning teaching session at Crisler Arena on "Engaging Wisdom and Compassion."

"In my case, I learn more about Islam, about Christianity, Judaism, ... through personal contact," the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader said. "My attitude (is) a genuine admiration and respect and appreciation for those traditions."

A hush fell over those at the basketball arena as the Dalai Lama walked on the main floor stage. The audience, as well as monks and others sitting cross-legged on the stage floor, rose as he emerged.

Sharon Drews, a 42-year-old lawyer, drove with her mother on Friday night from Elkhart, Ind. to attend the morning teaching session. Drews, who is Catholic, said afterward that she appreciated the Dalai Lama's message.

"The most valuable thing for me was that he said there are so many (religious) traditions leading to the same self-improvement, but we need to allow people to follow the tradition that's most effective for them," Drews said.

The Dalai Lama, who fled to India after a failed uprising in 1959 in Tibet, arrived in the U.S. last week, a day after demonstrators disrupted the Olympic torch run in San Francisco in a protest of China's treatment of his people.

Outside the arena where Dalai Lama spoke, about 100 pro-Chinese demonstrators rallied. They waved Chinese and U.S. flags, and held posters showing support for the upcoming summer Olympics in Beijing.

"When the riots started (in China), our concern was how to tell the truth to the American people," said Jinhui Chen, a 34-year-old University of Michigan graduate student. He added: "We have a peaceful protest. We don't want to incite riots."

Protests have sprung up throughout Tibetan areas of western China after demonstrations in Lhasa turned violent on March 14. While the Dalai Lama has been in the U.S. there have been more reports of unrest among Tibetans.

In Ann Arbor, rallies were planned throughout the weekend to coincide with the Dalai Lama's visit.

Additional teaching sessions at the arena were planned for Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning, and the Dalai Lama is scheduled to deliver a lecture on sustainability on Sunday afternoon sponsored the university's School of Natural Resources and Environment.

The three teaching sessions are sponsored by Jewel Heart Tibetan Buddhist learning center, The Tibet Fund and the Garrison Institute.

Jewel Heart founder Gelek Rimpoche said earlier this week that the Dalai Lama last fall accepted an invitation extended by Buddhist center after his last visit to Ann Arbor in 1994. Once that was in place, Jewel Heart worked with the university in arranging his Sunday speech on sustainability.

The Dalai Lama is scheduled to talk with Undersecretary of State Paula Dobriansky on Monday in Michigan and speak at Colgate University in Hamilton, N.Y., on Tuesday.

Associated Press Writer Natasha Robinson in Ann Arbor contributed to this report

http://blog.mlive.com/annarbornews/2008/04/dalai_lama_leads_1st_of_4_week.html

Posted by google at 01:30 PM | Comments (0)

April 18, 2008

Rimpoche's Statement about Chinese Demonstrators

Rimpoche's Statement about Demonstrators:

I am aware that a group of Chinese Students have applied for permission from the
University to stage a demonstration during this weekend's teaching at Crisler Arena.
We support all non-violent expression of free speech and expect anyone attending
the teaching to respect that right of expression without confrontation. We do not
anticipate these demonstrations to interfere with any of our programs.

His Holiness' Statement about the Olympics

The hosting of the Olympic games this year is a matter of great pride to the 1.2
billion Chinese people. I have from the very beginning supported the holding of
these Games in Beijing. My position on this remains unchanged. I feel the Tibetans
should not cause any hindrance to the Games. It is the legitimate right of every
Tibetan to struggle for their freedoms and rights. On the other hand, it will be
futile and not helpful to anyone if we do something that will create hatred in the
minds of the Chinese people. On the contrary, we need to foster trust and respect
in our hearts in order to create a harmonious society, as this cannot be built on
the basis of force and intimidation

Posted by google at 07:48 PM | Comments (0)

April 17, 2008

I am interviewed!

Ann Arbor area Tibetans, Chinese students prepare for Dalai Lama's appearance at the University of Michigan
Posted by anash April 17, 2008 09:14AM
Alan Warren | The Ann Arbor NewsXu Li, left, Qingyun Shen, center, and Wei Huang, all Chinese graduate students at the University of Michigan, look at posters put together to promote a peaceful protest to keep politics off of the Olympics during the Dalai Lama's visit to Ann Arbor this weekend.
Any visit of the Dalai Lama to Ann Arbor would have special meaning for the small group of native Tibetans who live in this area, but the Buddhist leader's appearance this weekend is particularly significant, they say.

It comes at a time when conflict between Tibet and its ruling power China is gaining worldwide attention, fueled by the focus on the 2008 Summer Olympics, which will be held in Beijing.

"The Olympics have given a jump-start to the problems in Tibet, and that's been positive," said Pema Dorje of Ann Arbor, a doctor at the University of Michigan and native Tibetan.

Dorje fled Tibet with his parents to neighboring India in 1958. After studying in England, he moved to Ann Arbor in 1990 and is now director of the Division of Vascular Anesthesia in the U-M Department of Anesthesiology. He returned to Tibet in 1996, where he was reunited with a sister he hadn't seen in 38 years.

Dorje said he is hopeful about a peaceful resolution to the current political situation in Tibet, but he is not sure what it will take to end what he described as oppression.

ELIYAHU GURFINKEL | THE ANN ARBOR NEWSDr. Pema Dorje is a Tibetan who lives in Ann Arbor with his family.

"(The Chinese communists) just have no knowledge of letting democratic principals prevail," he said. "There's no freedom of religion, and that's affecting people in a big way."

That view will be countered in Ann Arbor this weekend by local Chinese students, who plan to hold a peaceful demonstration at Crisler Arena to call attention to the Chinese view of the Tibet turmoil. Organizers expect hundreds of students to hand out informational material during the Dalai Lama's appearances.

Their main objective, said U-M Ph.D student Wei Huang, is to remind Americans that there are two sides to the conflict in Tibet, and that the Chinese side is seldom heard here.

"You see the news on TV, and they'll have debate about issues, and both sides will appear," he said. "But for the issues related to China, like the Tibetan issue, you won't see any Chinese there."

Gelek Rimpoche, a native Tibetan who is founder of Jewel Heart, an Ann Arbor Tibetan Buddhist center, said the crux of the political conflict in Tibet focuses on the Chinese holding all positions of leadership, which he said is a form of racism. The top leaders in government departments are always Chinese, he said.

"(The Dalai Lama) is very concerned this thing will get out of hand," Rimpoche says of the clash between Chinese authorities and Tibetan citizens.

LEISA THOMPSON | THE ANN ARBOR NEWSJewel Heart founder and spiritual director Gehlek Rimpoche gives a talk at the new Jewel Heart Tibetan Buddhist Learning Center in Pittsfield Township on Tuesday

Tibetans are not a violent people, he said, "but if you chase a dog enough into a corner, every so often the dog has to bite."

Huang said he and the other Chinese students believe that most of the violence in Tibet is caused by the Tibetans in exile, not the Chinese. Huang said cultural differences are sometimes the cause of what is perceived to be human rights violations. He said the reason Tibetans have lower stature in Tibet is attributed to their devout religious beliefs, whereas the Chinese tend to be less religious and more interested in commerce.

Youjian Chi, 23, a U-M graduate student, said the protestors - who are expected to come from universities throughout Michigan - want a more peaceful Tibet.

"It's our responsibility as Chinese students to tell them the facts," said Chi, who has a collection of photographs and news articles full of mistakes made by CNN, showing what he says is bias toward Tibetans and against the Chinese. "We just want our voice heard on the campus."

Graduate student Jinhui Chen said he wants politics kept out of the Olympics.

"We need to improve understanding between the Chinese and American people," he said. "Misunderstanding always causes trouble."

The Dalai Lama almost certainly will address the uprisings in Tibet during his three lectures on engaging wisdom and compassion, said Rimpoche.

He said he welcomes the non-violent protests by the Chinese students because freedom of speech belongs to everyone. He said he does not expect the demonstrations will interfere with the programs.
Reporter Jo Collins Mathis can be reached at 734-994-6849 or jmathis@annarbornews.com.

The number of local Tibetans living in Ann Arbor can be counted on one hand ... or maybe two, if you count Dorje's three children, Rimpoche joked. The local Tibetans see each other occasionally, usually as they celebrate the New Year together, he said.

The political aspects of the Dalai Lama's visit are clearly secondary for some who will attend.

Dawa Dorje Lama, a waiter at Shalimar restaurant in downtown Ann Arbor, has lived in the city two years. He saw the Dalai Lama in India a few years ago and has tickets to hear him both Saturday and Sunday at Crisler.

Asked why he's eager for the Dalai Lama's arrival, he answered simply: "I am Buddhist."

Categories: Top Photos
Comments
halflight says...
Someone needs to ask the Chinese graduate students whether they would be able to organize hundreds of students to protest a speaker in China without permission from the Public Security Bureau. There's the crux of the matter, and the irony can't be lost on them. The Chinese government is only less repressive with the Han than it is with the Tibetans; overall, there's a lack of civil liberties and ways for the common people to express their political opinions. Resentment builds social pressure until the result is violence. Every Chinese citizen needs greater civil liberties, not just the Tibetans.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 11:55AM
mivoice says...
Have you ever been in China? You better go there first before post comment!

Posted on 04/17/08 at 3:37PM
wonwon says...
protest a speaker in US needs a permission from the Public Security Bureau too.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 3:49PM
wonwon says...
Protest in US needs a permission from Public Security Bureau too.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 3:51PM
yandreams says...
http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/faq/tibet.html

This is a link for people who are not quite familiar with Tibet issue and are eager to know more.

I think it is informational and objective.

I am apolitical. I think what Dr. Pema Dorje said about religion freedom in China is bias. It is true that there was no freedom of religion 20 or 30 years ago in China, but it has definitely changed a lot now. What does religion freedom mean? No matter what it means in your definition, it shouldn't mean that you are empowered to build an independent country.

My parents have over 40 years of combined experience working in Tibet.
They have seen the changes with their own eyes. Tibetans' current living conditions are much better than 50 years ago and who can say that it is irrelevant with Chinese government's favorit policy towards Tibet? Chinese government is sure not perfect. But it kept sending lots of engineers in all areas , doctors, and teachers to help Tibetans. Please note, these well educated people are helpers, not invaders. For people who work in Tibet(both Han Chinese and Tibetans), they generally get paid much more than other people who hold the same level, same type of jobs but in other provinces of China. There are numerous policies which were set up specifically to benefit Tibetan. With all that said, I am proud of Chinese government for what it has done for Tibetans. All I have written here are truth, and only truth. They are from my parents' and my own experience.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 3:55PM
yandreams says...
French senator tells you the truth about Tibet
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLTm0xrG-v4

Posted on 04/17/08 at 4:56PM
linhuazhi says...
"Peace", "Non-Violence", "Dialogue", these are beautiful words, right?

But, wait, before read on, let's think about it, what's the meaning of "non-violence"?

Now, let's check with the definition of "Non-violence" defined by Dalai Lama, let's see if it is the same as yours.

[Link: http://www.rfi.fr/actucn/articles/100/article_6734.asp]
On April 2nd, 2008,in an interview with Radio France International's Chinese language program, Dawa Tsering, an Additional Secretary in the Department of Information and International Relations of Dalai's Tibetan Government-in-Exile, answered a question about why the Dalai Lama has not condemned the violent actions of rioters during the unrest. Speaking in Chinese, Dawa Tsering stated that:
"
First of all, I must make it clear that the Tibetan (rioters) has been non-violent throughout (the incident). From Tibetans' perspective, violence means harming life. From the video recordings you can see that the Tibetans rioters were beating Han Chinese, but only beating took place. After the beating the Han Chinese were free to flee. Therefore [there were] only beating, no life was harmed. Those who were killed were all results of accidents. From recordings shown by the Chinese Communist government, we can clearly see that when Tibetan [rioters] were beating on their doors, the Han Chinese all went into hiding upstairs. When the Tibetan [rioters] set fire to the buildings, the Han Chinese remained in hiding instead of escaping, the result is that these Han Chinese were all accidentally burnt to death. Those who set and spread the fire, on the other hand, had no idea whatsoever that there were Han Chinese hiding upstairs. Therefore not only were Han Chinese burnt to death, some Tibetans were burnt to death too. Therefore all these incidents were accidents, not murder.
"

Now, think again. Is it the same "non-violence" in your mind when you heard the beautiful word from Dalai Lama?

Non-Violence, Beautiful, right?

Posted on 04/17/08 at 6:54PM
noignorant says...
yandreams claim to be apolitical but seems to propogate maost international movement and suggest people to get information about tibet from this link. You dont have to go far to get true information about tibet; just google it, now dont say that google is biased too. Actually google helped blocked lot of informations about tibet in china. Religious freedom is religious freedom, it is as simple as that. Religious freedom is definitely not to gain independence of a country. It is basic right to believe, talk and pray ones religion freely. Even reincarnation of high lamas has to be appointed by communist party leaders, just keeping dalai lama picture lands you in jail, where is Penchen lama disappeared since age 6, where is tulku deleck rinpoche and you still say there is religious freedom.

Any country would have improved at least so much for 50 years. China in the name of favoring tibet helped massive migration of population into tibet with every kind of insentives, example for 18 months of work thery 3 months of vacation to go back to china, apart higher pay and housing help, high altitude allowance etc. Naturally locals dont get those. By late early as much as 10 million chinese migrated into the tibet of estimated 6 millions people out of which 1.2 million tibetans died as a direct result of occupation since 1949/50. Where are your doctors? govt budget outlya is only 10% for the rural and 90% for the urban areas where chinese settlers are concentrated. Educational discrimination; just to give an example out of 2450 primary schools only about 450 govt funded. All the developements with infrastructure actually benefited mainly to chinese settlers. Chinese govt always thinks, acts and forces their version as only truth. Why dont you open tibet and let people see and decide themselves but again they will say biased.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 7:44PM
keyword1 says...
Gelek Rimpoche's comment about no tibetans in TAR government is wrong. Actually more than 40% of the leaders are Tibetans.
see here if you can read chinese:
http://www.xizang.gov.cn/getCommonContent.do?contentId=353408
or you can google to find information in english.

Among them, there is the governor of TAR, six lieutenant governors out of a total of 13 lieutenant governors,

There are also tibetans in all levels of government of TAR.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 8:53PM
peace4peace says...
"peace", "non violence" and "dialogue" are indeed beautiful not only in words but deeds. I am sure these people wouldnt have resorted to such desparate acts if dalai lama was in tibet and had control over them. If you dont learn non violence, peace and dialogue from dalai lama, atleast learn from this country, including freedom of speech which you are exercising in this country

Posted on 04/17/08 at 9:02PM
keyword1 says...
noignorant,

Freedom is not unlimited. espically combined with a theocracy government led by Dalai lama.

Dorje Shugden, one god of tibetan buddhism, who actually guided Dalai's flee to india in 1959, now is banned by Dalai Lama.
His followers recently filed a court case in India and accuse Dalai for their right of religious freedom. They will also protest again Dalai lama all around the world according to their claim.

A video shot by swiss is here:
http://youtube.com/watch?v=n5sOm-uQH9Y

We will see if Dalai lama is willing to give them their religious freedom.

By the way, Dorje Shugden can be worshipped in Tibet, China.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 9:07PM
keyword1 says...
noignorant, I believe you have never been to Tibet. did you?
94% of population in TAR is tibetan, only 6% are han and islamic enthnic people. your number is completely wrong. go to look at BBC's " a year in tibet", you will hear a normal tibetan civilian told you how much their medical bill is reimbursed. Now I heard its even better cause they only need to pay 2-5 dollars a year to get medical insurance. How much we have to pay in USA? Tibetan peasants never pay tax while han peasants used to pay pretty heavy tax.

I suggest you go to tibet by yourself if you are really interested in helpping Tibetans.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 9:16PM
keyword1 says...
peace4peace,

Are you suggesting a theocracy in tibet led by Dalai lama. and you think it was Shrigari-La when Dalai lama was in power before 1959?

You are completely wrong. It was a serfdom system back to then. 5% of the population are nobels and slave masters who own all the lands and resources, including monateries, and Dalai Lama himself. The rest of 95% tibetans are serfs (almost slaves). they are born to be serfs hereditarily. if they leave their lands without lord's permission, lord will send people to capture them, and punish them later including but not limited to eye gouging, hand/feet chopping.

Do you think all the tibetans living in TAR, who's fathers and grandfathers were slaves under Dalai lama want Dalai to return?

Some more information, Dalai lama is only the religious leader for one out of eight buddhism sects in Tibet -- yellow hat. I don't think all other people worship other sects want him back to lead the tibet government again if some people in his sect do.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 9:25PM
mivoice says...
noignorant, listen to keyword 1, go to tibet to help tibetans, not just posting here.

Posted on 04/17/08 at 9:50PM
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Posted by google at 10:09 PM | Comments (0)

Chinese Student in U.S. Is Caught in Confrontation

By SHAILA DEWAN
DURHAM, N.C. — On the day the Olympic torch was carried through San Francisco last week, Grace Wang, a Chinese freshman at Duke University, came out of her dining hall to find a handful of students gathered for a pro-Tibet vigil facing off with a much larger pro-China counterdemonstration.

Ms. Wang, who had friends on both sides, tried to get the two groups to talk, participants said. She began traversing what she called “the middle ground,” asking the groups’ leaders to meet and making bargains. She said she agreed to write “Free Tibet, Save Tibet” on one student’s back only if he would speak with pro-Chinese demonstrators. She pleaded and lectured. In one photo, she is walking toward a phalanx of Chinese flags and banners, her arms overhead in a “timeout” T.

But the would-be referee went unheeded. With Chinese anger stoked by disruption of the Olympic torch relays and criticism of government policy toward Tibet, what was once a favorite campus cause — the Dalai Lama’s people — had become a dangerous flash point, as Ms. Wang was soon to find out.

The next day, a photo appeared on an Internet forum for Chinese students with a photo of Ms. Wang and the words “traitor to your country” emblazoned in Chinese across her forehead. Ms. Wang’s Chinese name, identification number and contact information were posted, along with directions to her parents’ apartment in Qingdao, a Chinese port city.

Salted with ugly rumors and manipulated photographs, the story of the young woman who was said to have taken sides with Tibet spread through China’s most popular Web sites, at each stop generating hundreds or thousands of raging, derogatory posts, some even suggesting that Ms. Wang — a slight, rosy 20-year-old — be burned in oil. Someone posted a photo of what was purported to be a bucket of feces emptied on the doorstep of her parents, who had gone into hiding.

“If you return to China, your dead corpse will be chopped into 10,000 pieces,” one person wrote in an e-mail message to Ms. Wang. “Call the human flesh search engines!” another threatened, using an Internet phrase that implies physical, as opposed to virtual, action.

In an interview Wednesday, Ms. Wang said she had been needlessly vilified.

“If traitors are people who want to harm China, then I’m not part of it,” she said. “Those people who attack me so severely were the ones who hurt China’s image even more.”

She added: “They don’t know what do they mean by ‘loving China.’ It’s not depriving others of their right to speak; it’s not asking me or other people to shut up.”

In a flattering profile in 2006, Ms. Wang was described in a Qingdao newspaper as believing she was “born for politics.” She writes poetry in classical Chinese, plays a traditional string instrument called the guzheng, and participated in democracy discussion boards back home, she said.

Ms. Wang said she was not in favor of Tibetan independence, but she said problems could be reduced if the two sides understood each other better.

Since riots in Tibet broke out last month, campuses including Cornell, the University of Washington and the University of California, Irvine, have seen a wave of counterdemonstrations.

When Ms. Wang encountered the two demonstrations last week, the Chinese students seemed to expect her to join them, she said. But she hesitated.

“They were really shocked to see that I was deciding, because the Chinese side thought I shouldn’t even decide at all,” she said. “In the end I decided not to be on either side, because they were too extreme.”

Daniel R. Cordero, a member of the Duke Human Rights Coalition and an organizer of the pro-Tibet vigil, said he was handing out literature when Ms. Wang came up and pointed to the counterprotesters.

“She was like, ‘Why are you focusing on the Duke students? Let’s have a dialogue with these people,’ ” he said. “And I’m thinking, oh come on, seriously, that’s not going to help anything.”

Some of Ms. Wang’s efforts to mediate were met by insults and obscenities from the Chinese students.

“She stood her ground; she’s a really brave girl,” said Adam Weiss, the student on whose back Ms. Wang wrote “Free Tibet.” “You have 200 of your own fellow nationalists yelling at you and calling you a traitor and even threatening to kill you.”

At Ms. Wang’s behest, he ultimately spoke to some of the Chinese contingent, finding, he said, that “we could compromise and say we all wanted increased human rights for all Chinese, and especially for Tibetans.”

Sherry, a Chinese graduate student who declined to give her last name for fear of being harassed, had a less heroic view.

“She claimed she wanted to make communications between both sides, but actually she did nothing before that night. She didn’t communicate with any organizers and actually was just performing,” Sherry said. But she called the backlash against Ms. Wang “horrible.”

“There are a few students that are very angry at her,” she said, “but there are many others who try to protect her, try to speak for her. Actually, the majority didn’t think she did so wrong to be treated like that.”

She said Ms. Wang had squandered some sympathy when, in an article in The Duke Chronicle, she blamed the Duke Chinese Students and Scholars Association for helping to release her information through its e-mail list.

This week, three officers of the association explained in an open letter that the mailing list was public and called the verbal attacks on Ms. Wang “troubling and heinous.” Her personal information and other offensive posts were removed “once they were brought to our attention,” the letter said. Student groups criticized the association for allowing them to be posted at all.

Zhizong Li, the president of the association, referred most questions to the university but said that only about a third of the pro-China demonstrators were association members. Duke has just over 500 Chinese students.

Ms. Wang, who has retained a lawyer, said pulling her personal information off the Web was not enough. “I will be seen as a traitor forever, and they can still harm my parents,” she said.

But for a woman under threat of dismemberment, she seemed remarkably sanguine — even upbeat.

“My parents are very tolerant to me,” she explained. “They were really disappointed in me for a long time, and I persuaded them to think differently.

“If I can change my parents, I can probably change others.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/us/17student.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=wang+tibet&st=nyt&oref=slogin

Posted by google at 01:19 PM | Comments (0)

U-M hosts local site for national China Town Hall forum

U-M hosts local site for national China Town Hall forum
DATE: 7-9 p.m. April 17, 2008.

EVENT: The public is invited to attend and participate in a China Town Hall, a forum for exploring the political and economic scope of China today. Organized by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, this is a national day of programming involving 40 cities throughout the United States.

Each participating city will carry a live webcast from Washington D.C. aired at a designated local venue. In Ann Arbor, the webcast will be hosted at the University of Michigan Alumni Center.

The program will open with the live webcast featuring Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute who will discuss how China figures as an issue in the 2008 presidential and congressional elections. Moderator Stephen Orlins, National Committee president, will moderate this 45-minute portion of the program, comprised of a 15-minute talk and 30 minutes for Ornstein to respond to questions e-mailed in from audience members throughout the country.
Questions at Alumni Center can be submitted through a central question kiosk at the center.

Following this national portion of the program, the Alumni Center will have on-site specialists from U-M faculty—professor Kenneth Lieberthal, former Asia Director on President Clinton's National Security Council, with professors Mary Gallagher and Nicholas Howson—present a panel discussion followed by Q&A.

This is the culminating event for the U-M College China Theme Year.

PLACE: U-M Alumni Center, 200 Fletcher St., Ann Arbor.

SPONSORS: The U-M Center for Chinese Studies and the U-M Alumni Association.

Contact: Carol Stepanchuk
Phone: (734) 936-3961

Posted by google at 01:17 PM | Comments (0)

April 16, 2008

Pro-China demonstrators target Dalai Lama's UW visit

SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER

Pro-Chinese protestors, including Ting Ting Xiao, center, show their disapproval of the Dalai Lama and the news media's coverage of the Tibetan conflict before the religious leader was to receive an honorary degree at the University of Washington. (Joshua Trujillo / P-I)
Pro-China demonstrators target Dalai Lama's UW visit
Last updated April 14, 2008 10:50 p.m. PT

By JOHN IWASAKI AND BRAD WONG
P-I REPORTERS

On Day 4 of the Dalai Lama's tour of compassion in Seattle, the Tibetan Buddhist monk's maroon robe was covered by a purple one.

The University of Washington awarded him an honorary doctorate in a convocation Monday at Hec Edmundson Pavilion, a formal affair that contrasted with a nearby protest staged by pro-China students and professionals.

UW police estimated that 400 protesters participated in the largest demonstration so far in the monk's five-day visit for the Seeds of Compassion conference, which concludes Tuesday.

Demonstrators protested last month's violence in Tibet, a Chinese-controlled territory, and asked that the Summer Olympics in Beijing stay nonpolitical. They expressed concern that some Western media outlets have distorted coverage of the Tibetan unrest by focusing on a brutal crackdown by Chinese troops.

Standing near Hec Ed, protesters waved Chinese and American flags and played a video on a large screen that they said showed Tibetans attacking a person on a motorcycle.

As they marched to the pavilion, several demonstrators shouted "Dalai liar!" and "No violence!"

Inside the building, about 8,000 students from the UW and other Washington universities and colleges gave several standing ovations to the Dalai Lama, the exiled political and spiritual leader of Tibet, as he brought his familiar message of compassion, nonviolence, inner peace and open dialogue.

"He looks very good in purple and gold," quipped UW President Mark Emmert after the monk donned a graduation robe and sat on stage with more than 100 higher education administrators and faculty members in academic regalia.

Emmert said the university awards honorary degrees to "exceptional individuals who make powerful and enduring contributions to the betterment of our world."

Reading the citation accompanying the degree, UW Board of Regents Chairman Stanley Barer said: "Suffering is our common lot, happiness our common goal, and love our most fundamental need. Compassion, therefore, is our universal duty -- the bedrock of all the world's religions and, indeed, of secular ethics as well."

During his 35-minute speech, the Dalai Lama repeated several points he has made in public talks since Friday, when he opened the conference.

"You are the basis for our hope," he told the students, saying that widespread change begins with the individual. "You will create this century, the century of peace, of tranquility."

Peace comes from a compassionate heart and wisdom, the Dalai Lama said, and "though the concepts come from a Buddhist philosophy, I believe the concept is applicable to everyone interdependently."

He also poked fun several times, saying he was getting a degree "without actually having to do any studies" and that he was "shy to speak in front of these big scholars."

After he spoke, eight students from the UW, Seattle University, Edmonds Community College and Pierce College asked questions that had been preapproved by administrators.

All the questions dealt with some aspect of compassion, including one posed by Ryan Mayock, a UW senior, about how to address the international AIDS crisis.

Education is needed, the Dalai Lama said, adding that because the disease is spread through sexual contact, "rubber" needs to be made available. The reference to condoms drew laughter and a burst of applause from the college crowd.

He told UW graduate student Ming Lee a story about how he helped change the attitude of a black South African who thought that blacks couldn't match the intelligence of whites. "I told him, 'At birth we are the same,' " the monk said.

The Dalai Lama told UW senior Sarah Cooke that young children should be provided "maximum affection" to instill compassion.

After the convocation, Seattle U law students Sanjee Senevitatne and Priya Das said the challenge was to incorporate the Dalai Lama's teachings into their daily lives.

Jacquelynn McCarty attended with her husband, Jesse, a UW junior, as they await the birth of their third child next week.

"That kind of hit me," she said. "The biggest thing we can do as citizens of the world is to teach our children to be compassionate."

Protesters said the Dalai Lama galvanized them, too.

"I'm here to support the Olympics and to make clear that Tibet will always be part of China," said Xin Yan, a Seattle resident in her 20s.

The protesters waved American and Chinese flags and sang the Chinese national anthem. One placard, written in Chinese, read simply, "Love Peace."

Wei Zheng, a Seattle computer programmer, said he joined the demonstration "to condemn the violence and riots" in Tibet, which he said are being fanned by "some Tibetan separatists."

"People from Tibet want to wreck the opportunity of the Chinese people to host the Olympics," said Mary Mao, 45, of Seattle.

A small plane circled overhead, pulling a banner that read, DALAI UR SMILES CHARM, UR ACTIONS HARM.

About 1,000 ethnic Chinese in the Seattle area contributed $800 for the flight, said one of the organizers, Kevin Qi, 29, of Seattle.

That didn't matter to UW graduate student Beau Raines, 34.

"I'm here for the once-in-a-lifetime chance to see the Dalai Lama," he said. "It's not about politics for me."

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/358991_dalai15.html

Posted by google at 11:30 AM | Comments (0)

Appeal of 4/19 – 4/20 Rally for No Violence and No Politics in Beijing Olympics

Lately, the torch relay of 2008 Beijing Olympics has been attacked several times by a few extremists. Great indignation has roused around the world since then. To express our condemnation of this violent behavior and appeal for no violence and no political interference in Beijing Olympics, we propose a peaceful rally on April 19 and April 20. We, hereby, call for active participation into the rally of every Beijing Olympics supporter. We need to act! We need to speak up! We need our voice to be heard!

Rally Time: April 19 (9am – noon), April 20 (noon – 5pm)
(The main rally is on April 20, while we strongly suggest participation in the activity on April 19 as well.)
Rally Place: Crisler Arena
333 E. Stadium Blvd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Rally Topic: No Violence in Olympics, No Politics in Olympics
Participation Estimate: 500 – 1000
Volunteer Sign-up: 419420rally@gmail.com
Donation: Paypal account: michiganfund@gmail.com; cash and check donation are accepted too and checks should be payable to MCF (Michigan Chinese Fund).
Rally Info: Please refer to http://www.youmebbs.com/
Online Forum: MITBBS, Michigan Board (http://www.mitbbs.com/bbsdoc/Michigan.html)

Organizing Committee of the 4/19-4/20 Rally for Beijing Olympics at Michigan
Email: 419420rally@gmail.com
URL: http://www.youmebbs.com/

Appendix 1:
1. This rally is a spontaneous-organized event and every participant is attending voluntarily.
2. This rally has been approved by the Department of Public Safety at the University of Michigan. The location is for exclusive use of this rally on April 19 and April 20.
3. During the peace rally, be cautious about personal safety and follow the organizers instructions. Any violent behavior, including burning, abusing, are prohibited. Violators will be sent to the police and will be responsible for their own conduct.
4. Please report any suspicious to the police or the rally safety officers. No private handling is allowed.
5. Student participants please wear clothes with school mark; non-students please pick up the rally T-shirt upon arrival. All rally materials (banners, flyers, etc.) should be cleaned up after the rally.
6. No weapons (including flag pole) or dangerous articles are allowed during the rally. Please report any violation to the rally safety officers.
7. No amplifiers are allowed during the rally.
8. Everyone should leave the location in order after the rally following instructions.
9. The rally spokesperson will be responsible for answering questions from the media. Any other participants cannot express opinions in the rally’s name.

Appendix 2:
1. Flags, banners, etc., will be distributed during the rally by the organizers.
2. Self-made flags, banners, etc., are strongly recommended to bring to the rally.
3. Please prepare enough drinking water.
4. Recommended slogans can be found at http://www.youmebbs.com/.

Posted by google at 11:04 AM | Comments (0)

Just who exactly IS the Dalai Lama?

by Donald S. Lopez, Jr.
published April 2008
In 1578, a Tibetan monk was escorted into the presence of fearsome Mongol khan. The monk did not speak Mongolian and the khan did not speak Tibetan. The monk’s name was Sonam Gyatso, which means “Ocean of Merit” in Tibetan. Perhaps thinking that Gyatso (“ocean”) was a family name, the khan addressed him with the Mongolian word for “ocean,” dalai. He called him “Dalai Lama.” This is the origin of title by which the most famous Buddhist monk in the world is known, the Buddhist monk who will visit Ann Arbor this month.

It is difficult to understand the person of the Dalai Lama without knowing something of the institution of the Dalai Lama. He is the fourteenth in a line of incarnations that stretches back to the fifteenth century. Tibetan Buddhism is unique among the Buddhisms of Asia in its belief that highly evolved spiritual masters return in lifetime after lifetime to teach the truth. This is not the standard form of reincarnation, which all Buddhists accept, where all beings are powerlessly reborn in the realms of existence as a result of their past karma. The so-called “incarnate lamas” of Tibet choose the circumstances of their rebirth, and Tibetans believe that such beings can be identified as children by their former disciples. The Dalai Lamas are the most famous line of such incarnations, but they are far from the only ones; there were several thousand incarnate lamas in old Tibet.

Sonam Gyatso, who met the Mongol khan, was the third in his line of incarnation, and his two predecessors came to be posthumously regarded as the first and second Dalai Lamas. After his death, the fourth Dalai Lama was discovered in the khan’s family. Perhaps the most famous of the Dalai Lamas (apart from the current one), was the fifth, who, with the support of Mongol troops, assumed the Tibetan throne in 1642. He was the first of the Dalai Lamas to also hold secular power; it was the “Great Fifth,” as the Tibetans call him, who built the massive Potala palace in Lhasa. The sixth Dalai Lama was less interested in the life of the Buddhist monk than his predecessors; he is the author of the most famous love poetry in Tibetan. Several of the Dalai Lamas of the nineteenth century died young, perhaps as a result of palace intrigue. The thirteenth Dalai Lama confronted colonialism in the form of both British and Chinese armies, freeing Tibet from Chinese suzerainty in 1913 and striving, with mixed success, to introduce a range of reforms into Tibet, including a modern military.

Which brings us to the fourteenth, and current, Dalai Lama. After the death of the thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1933, the Tibetan government sent groups of monks throughout Tibet in search of his successor. One team eventually arrived in the far northeast corner of the Tibetan cultural domain and knocked at a farmhouse door. The team was led by a prominent monk, disguised as a servant. Around his neck, he wore a rosary that had belonged to the thirteenth Dalai Lama. A woman opened the door, holding a toddler. The child grabbed the rosary and said, “That’s mine.” After performing the traditional tests and divinations, it was concluded that the child was in fact the new Dalai Lama. He was taken on horseback and palanquin across Tibet to Lhasa, a journey of three months. He was enthroned as the fourteenth Dalai Lama on February 22, 1940. Foreign dignitaries, present at the ceremony, marveled at the composure of the four-year-old.

His religious education began immediately, tutored by the leading scholars of the day. That education continued unhindered until 1950, when troops of the Peoples Liberation Army invaded eastern Tibet, determined to “return Tibet to the Chinese motherland.” They marched into Lhasa the following year. The Dalai Lama traveled to Beijing in 1954, where he met with Chairman Mao, who famously confided, “Religion is poison.” Upon the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet, relations between the Tibetan people and the Chinese army of occupation became increasingly tense, culminating in an uprising in March 1959. During the confusion in the capital, the Dalai Lama was able to escape from Lhasa to cross the Himalayas, on foot and on horseback, the Chinese troops who pursued him deterred by Tibetan guerrillas. The Dalai Lama and his party crossed the border into India on March 31, 1959, where he was granted asylum by Prime Minister Nehru. He has not returned to Tibet in the half century since then. Over those fifty years, the Dalai Lama has devoted himself to the cause of independence (he now calls instead for autonomy) for Tibet and the preservation of Tibetan culture in exile; several hundred thousand Tibetans have followed him over the mountains in the intervening decades.

In 1979, he made his first trip to the United States. In 1989, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Especially since 1989, the Dalai Lama, once a figure shrouded in mystery (the “Grand Lama” or “High Lama” of so many Victorian travelogues and novels) has become something of a celebrity, and certainly the world’s most famous Buddhist. Buddhism has no pope or central church; the Dalai Lama’s authority is formally recognized only in Tibetan Buddhism, although he is today widely respected across the Buddhist world. That respect derives in part from his office, but it derives in larger part from his person. Despite the grandeur of his life in Lhasa, in exile he has always worn the robes of a common Buddhist monk. And despite the adulation he evokes, he (unlike so many other gurus, East and West) has maintained high ethical standards, untainted by scandal. He has traveled the world, making the case for Tibet in capitals around the globe. At the same time, he has fulfilled his traditional role as a Buddhist teacher. When he teaches in Tibetan, he reveals his skills as a consummate scholar of Buddhist thought and practice. When he teaches in English, he offers a simpler message, emphasizing the central role that compassion plays in all religions, and in civil society, urging his listeners to act for others, regardless of their religious affiliation, or lack of same. He discourages people from converting to Buddhism.

In July, the Dalai Lama will turn seventy-three; only the first Dalai Lama lived longer. The Chinese government awaits his death, hoping to consolidate their power in the long interregnum between the passing of the fourteenth and the time when the fifteenth reaches his majority. As he grows older, questions about the future abound. Where will he be reborn? If he is born in exile, as he has promised to do, will the Chinese discover their own candidate, resulting in dueling Dalai Lamas? And as he grows older, the Tibetan community in India (where the largest number of exiles live) has implored him to travel less. He himself has expressed the wish to spend more time in meditation retreat.

The Tibetans do not refer to him as the Dalai Lama. Among his epithets, perhaps the most common is Yishin Norbu, the “Wish Granting Jewel.” In Buddhism, a jewel is defined as something difficult to find and, if found, of great value.

Donald Lopez is Arthur E. Link Distinguished University Professor of Buddhist and Tibetan Studies in the Department of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Michigan.

http://www.ecurrent.com/view_article.php?id=1600

Posted by google at 11:02 AM | Comments (1)

April 15, 2008

China's Journey by National Geographic

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/05/table-of-contents

Posted by google at 11:21 PM | Comments (0)

April 14, 2008

Transcript: 'We are not anti-Chinese'

Read the full transcript of the interview with NBC's Ann Curry
NBC News
updated 7:59 a.m. ET, Sat., April. 12, 2008
NBC News' Ann Curry talked today with the Dalai Lama upon his arrival into Seattle for a five-day conference. The interview aired this evening on "Nightly News" and will continue Monday on "Today." Below is the full transcript

ANN CURRY:

You've come to America to encourage compassion, and yet it seems, you come as you are suffering, Tibet is suffering.

In the recent hours you have been troubled, yes?

DALAI LAMA:

Yes. Yes.

ANN CURRY:

Tell me why? What is the burden for you, to see what you are seeing?

DALAI LAMA:

Now, reason be it, after 10th of March-- I had for-- the same experience-- that was-- 10th-- after 10th of March in 1959. It was a week in Lhasa. A lot of sort of anxiety-- a lot of fear.

ANN CURRY:

You felt anxiety--

DALAI LAMA:

At that time, at that time.

ANN CURRY:

--and fear?

DALAI LAMA:

Uh-huh (AFFIRM). So, similar experience now, this time also, after 10th of March. Afternoon, 10th of March, I received information. People in certain area of Lhasa, now moving for demonstrations. As soon as I heard this and that information, then I-- felt, oh, now, our people-- are going to suffer. That's a definite. So, then eventually, not only in Lhasa area, but entire Tibetan sort of area. That means-- beside autonomous region of Tibet, but other four Chinese provinces. My own-- birthplace, Qinghai, and Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Actually, in these four Chinese provinces, around 4 million Tibetans usually exi-- live in this area. So, almost now entire Tibetan population now expressed their deep resentment and angering those student in Peking (PH). They also-- expressed that way. So, sorry, and anyway, I really, eh, uh, feel uh of course, fear, much anxiety, anguish. And the also feeling of helplessness. Only pray.

ANN CURRY:

Helpless?

DALAI LAMA:

Uh-huh (AFFIRM).

ANN CURRY:

China says you're not helpless. China blames you for it. (LAUGHTER) It calls you, "A wolf in monk's clothes. A devil with a human face. A terrorist." Are you a terrorist?

DALAI LAMA:

(LAUGHTER) You should judge. (LAUGHS) Is sometimes you see uh the wolf with Buddhist robe during Cultural Revolution, now these words is used. So, now again, you see they use these uh also they-- these old words. Okay, doesn't matter. But one thing I really consider is-- (SNIFF) uh because of official propaganda, millions of innocent Chinese in mainland China, who have no sort of, I would call access to know through sort of third information or some more, I think realistic information. uh they're only relying, they have to rely on their own, how to say, government sources. So, if those innocent Chinese, very sincere Chinese brothers, sisters-- millions of these people really feel-- how-- is something uh demon. (LAUGHS) Then I feel really sad. But otherwise no problem. Whatever you call me-- people call me-- I'm still a human being. (LAUGHTER) I'm still a simple Buddhist monk, and that's all. No problem. And in fact, as a Buddhist practitioner, this is-- now, this is real sort of test period that I sincerely practicing, sort of Buddhist teaching. Teaching of compassion, tolerance, and these things. If because of such sort of circumstances, if I lose my temper, heated. Then that means I'm not really sincere Buddhist practitioner. So, these are for practitioners, (UNINTEL PHRASE) Golden Period.

ANN CURRY:

A Golden Period?

DALAI LAMA:

Uh-huh (AFFIRM).

ANN CURRY:

Is this a period in which you are, as the Chinese government says, did you or your government encourage any of these protests in Tibet, in London, in Paris--

DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

--in San Francisco?

DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

And elsewhere?

DALAI LAMA:

In fact uh soon after crises happen. I express now, of course the expression of uh defeating is the freedom of expression or speech. However, we must carry these strictly non-violence. If people indulge violence, and violence become out of control, then my option is, my choice is, I resign.

ANN CURRY:

You resign as Dalai Lama?

DALAI LAMA:

uh, Dalai Lama I don't know. (LAUGHTER)

ANN CURRY:

Resign as what?

DALAI LAMA:

Resign from responsibility of our struggle. As early as-- '87, '88 I remember, is-- one of my close friend, Jonathan Mirsky. I think, London Observer, sort of correspondent. He, at that time, ask, "If things become more violent, then what do you do?" And I immediately responded, "If the violence become out of control uh there is no other choice except, resign." I told. So, this once more I repeated this. And it makes uh seems to some effect, some Tibetan. Uh then (pause) then also uh I appeal Chinese community all over the world, and particularly in mainland China. We are not anti-Chinese. We always respect and admire this Chinese civilization and Chinese people. And, as a Tibetan, almost 2,000 years we live side by side. Occasionally, some unfortunate event also there. But most cases we live happily. So, therefore, and also, as a Buddhist monk, I always consider our Chinese Buddhist brothers, sisters as a elder student of uh Buddha. We are younger. Whenever I give some teaching to our Chinese brother, sisters, I always firstly, sharing my respect. I'm junior, or younger student. Or, occasionally, I also make joke. Maybe as I knowledge is concerned, junior student may be little better. (LAUGHTER) So. So, emotionally, also you see, they very close. I always admire. And then, in-- as a matter of fact, some people from China-- most populated nation.

ANN CURRY:

Yes.

DALAI LAMA:

So, we must respect. We must accept that reality. Some kind of negative feeling towards them is useless, unjust. And then, also, they, what say they, what what call they uh Olympic Game. Right from the beginning, I support that ancient nation, most public nation, now, really deserve to host for this uh world famous Olympic game. And then after now this well, what do you want to call uh Olympic to, tore-- torch.

ANN CURRY:

Torch.

DALAI LAMA:

After some uh unpleasant, sort of event in happened in England and Paris, I sent a message to Tibetan in San Francisco area, please don't uh create any violent things. I sent a message.

ANN CURRY:

Is your message that the protests stop? Or, that the violence stop?

DALAI LAMA:

Violence. Violence--

ANN CURRY:

So, you are supporting the protests?

DALAI LAMA:

The protest? Firstly, I myself, fully committed about democracy, the right of expression, the freedom of expression, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, among Tibetan. Those Tibetan who directly criticize me, I respect their expression. (PAUSE) It is part of practice of criticism. And part of, part of democracy. So, therefore, see, I cannot say, "Shut up." (CHUCKLES) Even as a critizi, criticism towards me, or criticism of do-- criticism about Buddhism now among Tibetan. Now, we can't stop these things.

ANN CURRY:

There is a strong feeling though, in China, specifically from its President Hu, who says you are fanning and masterminding the unrest in Tibet. And that you are trying to sabotage the Olympics. Do you want the world to boycott the Olympic--

DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

--Games, to support your--

DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

--efforts in Tibet?

DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

Do you wish the President of the United States, and other world leaders might consider not attending the open ceremonies in support of your efforts in Tibet?

DALAI LAMA:

That's up to them.

ANN CURRY:

Do you wish they would?

DALAI LAMA:

I wish, basically, their world event, game event should be uh should take place smoothly. Uh but whether you see individual leader, go down or not, that also up to them. (LAUGHS) That individual right.

ANN CURRY:

Would it please you if world leaders say, "We care about Tibet, so we want to make a statement, and not attend the opening ceremonies"? Would it please you? Would it be important?

DALAI LAMA:

I heard there is some leaders already decided not to go there.

ANN CURRY:

Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain.

DALAI LAMA:

That...

ANN CURRY:

And Nicholas Sarkozy is considering--

(OVERTALK)

DALAI LAMA:

I tell you--

ANN CURRY:

--of France.

DALAI LAMA:

--it is very important that you see, make clear, not only just the Tibet case. But in China proper, the record of human right is poor. And religious freedom, also very poor. Oh, this reminds us the-- Tiananmen event.

ANN CURRY:

Tiananmen Square?

DALAI LAMA:

Thousands of people, particularly young people was crushed. So, I think that I think. I'm still-- you see, I think thousands of Chinese brother, sisters, particularly-- many ladies, who lost-- either their-- son, or-- or is it their husband, or their friend like that. So many of them still feel very, very sort of sad. I think, now, we should remind some of these things. And after all, the Chinese leaders, I think, last-- now last-- 60 years, if we watch carefully. I usually describe Mao's era, Deng Xiaoping's era, Jiang Zemin's era, Hu Jintao's era, if you look closely, the leaders at different time, I think, they had according to new reality. Now, there's Hu Jintao uh very much emphasis-- the importance of uh build harmonious society. That is, I think, very sort of I think, very-- I think, very right, according to new reality. Now, economy, prosperity, these things are-- and going well. Now, important is this get rich and poor, reduce. And then also, the different ethnic, including Tibetan, including national, I don't know, whatever you call, the unity, harmony is very essential. Now, for that, they equality. I think, the harmony, very much based on trust. Without trust, we fear. Harmony is impossible. A trust must develop. For trust, more freedom, more equality. Let them speak. Or, Chairman Mao, see, often used to say the Communist Party, without self-criticism, and criticism from other cannot survive. Like fish without water. Once, says Chairman Mao, only he himself not very sincerely practice these things. But I think, these are really wonderful. And that also (UNINTEL PHRASE) seeking truth from fact. These are scientific and very realistic. So basically, I think the leadership in these four periods, I think uh their approach, I-- I feel, more realistic. So therefore, now, under the leadership as-- Hu Jintao , present President Hu Jintao. I think China eventually may open more uh open society. I think, that's the interest for everyone. So, I think the people will outside world, in particular these present leaders of nations' leaders, I think, should remind, not only just Tibet case, but they must remind the sitting Chinese, uh People's Republic of China as a a whole. In China, mostly important, most important nation and very very important member of the humanity. Now, in order to carry more, sort of, what's responsibility, more effective responsibility, the Chinese moral authority must improve.

ANN CURRY:

So, to remind China of this, you think that the world must send a message to China--

DALAI LAMA:

That's important--

ANN CURRY:

--that you must rise, not only as an economic power, but one that supports human rights?

DALAI LAMA:

Yes.

ANN CURRY:

So, are you saying then, the answer is yes? That you would wish world leaders, in some way, to make a statement? Whether it's not attending the opening ceremonies, or in some way, you wish world leaders to make a statement to China on this? Is this correct?

DALAI LAMA:

Yes. It reminds them, in order to be a respected, important member of the humanity, in certain field, not only economy impro-- improvement, but in certain field, must improve. That's, I think, important. And Chinese people want that.

ANN CURRY:

Are you saying it would be significant, and that you could support world leaders boycotting the opening ceremonies of the Olympic Games?

DALAI LAMA:

That I don't know. That I don't know. Generally, as I mentioned earlier, in principle, I fully support the-- the Olympic Game. And--

(OVERTALK)

ANN CURRY:

I meant the opening ceremonies.

DALAI LAMA:

--and opening ceremony, all part of that. (PAUSE) That, I feel up to that, those leaders individual. They also have wisdom. Should be, enough wisdom. (LAUGHTER) So, according their wisdom, they should judge.

ANN CURRY:

They should judge?

DALAI LAMA:

Yeah.

ANN CURRY:

But if they don't boycott the opening ceremonies, then you say, they should make some statement to China?

DALAI LAMA:

I think-- publicly or behind scene, I think, from time to time, others-- many leaders do that. I think that is very, very important. And then, not only the, these leaders. Be it, the media, as well as the uh student, and sort of scholar, or is the exchange scholarships, and also, professors, visiting professors. Everybody. And including businessman.

ANN CURRY:

But if not-- but if not to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies, if you're not calling on world leaders to do that. If you're saying, "I leave it up to you," here's the question. For 50 years, you have wanted the world to pay attention to the suffering in Tibet. Now, the world is listening. What do you want the world specifically to do?

DALAI LAMA:

I think, for immediate, uh immediate, firstly, now, at least according, the-- up to date information. Of course, now, this information is difficult to crosscheck. But uh generally, seems to say, few hundred people kept. And a few thousands, I think serious injuries. But these injury - inside Tibet. Now, these, no medical facility. And there are very, very fear to approach the Chinese hospital or these things. So, I think, immense sort of suffering, callousness (UNINTEL PHRASE) injure, injured people. And in some cases-- the people, uh, re, escaped, escaped from the town or monastery, and remain in mountain, without any sort of, what's now, food-- food stuff and these things. So, they are really danger of starvation. I heard there is some starvation already is happen. So-- I-- right from the beginning, I appeal world community, please send some uh medical facilities, some doctors. And then also, media people go there, investigate, including their accusation about me, towards me that those Tibetan outside. Now, please carry terror investigation, on the spot, and including investigators, as a people, who investigate, including some Chinese. Come to Dansala (PH) . Most welcome. Please. Watch. Resources. Check. Investigate.

(OVERTALK)

DALAI LAMA:

Whether we created these problems or not. (LAUGHS)

ANN CURRY:

China--

DALAI LAMA:

So, these are immediate so necessary. Go. Some medical help. Then second, try to investigate, on the spot, what is the reason? What is wrong? Nobody want-- these troubles, Chinese government or Tibetan. We want peace. Peace life. Peaceful life. And stability. We really want stability. Through stability, the prosperity, or various activities regarding preservation of Tibetan culture. All these things. Stability is the basis. So, we must in order to avoid, how you say, crisis. We must-- know that-- that the reasons, the causes, and the conditions. So uh as as I had mentioned earlier, you see, I think, world community have the moral responsibility to help, fact finding, or seeking truth from fact. That's the reporter. I think, unfortunately, some local officials sometimes, I think, they are quite expert, pretend, hide the reality. Showing something artificial. Now, there's the problem. That's problem. Unlike India. They are huge country. Almost, South India and North India, in the different places, almost like, I see, different nation. Different language. There's a different culture. Different behavior. But these problems-- problems there-- and all problems immediately come out. Nothing is (UNINTEL PHRASE) height. In China's case, those totalitarian regions' case. So, officially things looks smooth. But underneath, a lot of resentment. Now--

(OVERTALK)

DALAI LAMA:

--this must come out. And accept that. And then, realistically approach these problem. So, therefore, I think for, to the central government, I think, there's some independent type of investigation. What is going on? What went wrong? I think it is very very useful to help central government, to know the reality.

ANN CURRY:

China says about 20 people were killed during the arrests in Tibet. You just said, hundreds, you believe, were killed? This is information you're getting?

DALAI LAMA:

Uh-huh (AFFIRM). Oh, I-- I mean, you see, the-- I-- I think, maybe when Chinese say, I can only, autonomous region of Tibet, maybe. I don't know. I don't know. But it seems, you see, they-- outside the the autonomous region of Tibet, this area very remote. And many don't, deh, what's it called, what's say, normantic (PH), very remote area. So, I really very much worry, as-- what's-- what is happening in this area?

ANN CURRY:

Let's talk about resolution. This week, President Bush said, quote, "It would stand the government of China, in good stead, if they would begin a dialogue with representatives of the Dalai Lama." What contact do you have with China? Are you now willing to go to Beijing?

DALAI LAMA:

That's (my part??). Anywhere, uh anytime, always ready--(OVERTALK)

ANN CURRY:

You're ready to go to Beijing?

DALAI LAMA:

--not busy. That's uh now, if without sort of proper preparation, just to go Peking. I think Tibetans, I think a Dalai Lama visit uh Beijing-- I think they may, I said, they put a lot of sort of hope, or whatever expectations.

ANN CURRY:

So, you're not resolved about whether you will go to Beijing?

DALAI LAMA:

So, I don't know. You see, if I my go Peking, and nothing happen? Then I think Tibetan I think it may get great disappointment. Therefore, visit to Peking, we need some preparation. But other, otherside, outside. no problem, anywhere, anytime.

ANN CURRY:

Let me put it this way, China is listening to this interview. What is your message to the Chinese leadership?

DALAI LAMA:

(LAUGHTER) I already, you see-- wrote a letter to Chinese leaders, and also I appeal with my whole....

DALAI LAMA:

(LAUGHTER) I already, you see--wrote a letter to Chinese leaders, and also I appeal with my whole--hopeful hand to the millions of Han brother, sisters already. My main point is, we are not-- the Chinese public, they are not against you. Always just respect you, admire you. And so these-- past mistake-- we feel sympathy-- with them.

CURRY:

You have sympathy for China?

DALAI LAMA:

Oh, yes, like Tiananmen event. Same! Now, also is-- I heard is-- some Chinese killed during this-- period. We pray together. No differences. Same human beings. So, now-- so-- the-- secondly, for Olympic-- right from beginning, I already support that. Still, I'm supporting. And I'm not seeking separation. I fully committed-- my-- I call, mid-riff (?) approach. And that means-- we want mutually a good solution. Because we are backward, Tibet area. Backward materially. Spiritually, very advanced. But as-- therefore, as far as material development is concerned, Tibet remains retained-- big country, big nation, people from-- China. We get greater benefit about economy development. But right at-- we must-- have certain subtle, or s-- system-- which can be full guarantee about preservation of Tibetan-- culture, including-- Tibetan language, and Tibetan Buddhist tradition.

CURRY:

You call it genocide, a cultural genocide--

DALAI LAMA:

Yes.

CURRY:

--is happening in Tibet? You describe enormous suffering. Be specific. I mean, you say, "cultural genocide". What is happening in your view, in Tibet, to cause this unrest?

DALAI LAMA:

I usually s-- always say, whether intentionally, or unintentionally, some kind of cultural genocide is taking place. Unintentionally, means because of overwhelming Chinese population, now in Lhasa for example. Lhasa, 2/3s of the population, out of 300,000, are Chinese. Shopkeepers, restaurant-- all these Han Chinese. So, the minority Tibetan in-- in same sort of area. All their daily life they have to speak-- they have to use Chinese more than Tibetan. So, Tibetan language become something useless. Therefore-- some-- or say these-- some parent or the student-- Tibetan, they, although they respect, you see, our language. But in practical reason, they advise their children not better to learn Han-- the Chinese language. Tibetan language is-- in order to seek jobs, or some better sort of-- or s-- opportunities--

CURRY:

Opportunities?

DALAI LAMA:

--the Chinese language is more important. But these are-- because of the overwhelming, sort of, condition, or sort of circumstances, the Tibetan language becoming insignificant, or sometimes deliberately negligent number one. Then also, you see, the-- I met one-- some Tibetan student, who can speak only Chinese, not Tibetan. Now they say, they-- in their native place, they say they-- no opportunity to study Tibetan. So, they ask Chinese authority-- "We want to study Tibetan." That-- authority, in some area-- responded, "Ah, no use learning Tibetan." So, that kind of s-- situation. Not necessarily deliberately. Some-- bad intention. Not necessarily. In meantime, the-- another factor, intentionally. That means-- few years ago, one party secretary in Lhasa, his name, I think, TunGunYa. He mentioned in a party meeting the real source of threat of Tibetan separation from China, is the Tibetan Buddhist faith. So, they consider Tibetan Buddhist faith is dangerous. So, they have political, sort of motivations-- starting, out of the fear. See, that kind of attitude. So, therefore, you see, they deliberately-- put restrictions on Buddhist study. And the student and officials-- banned to keep their Buddha-- in there-- or the others-- Buddha like that. But many of them which is secretly-- keep (LAUGHTER) some Buddhist statue like that. But their officials are like-- it's banning. The officials and the student. And the-- curriculum, text, there's some word which religious significant there. They actually, deliberately is-- removing these things since, I think, last-- a few decades like that. So, these are-- and then, in the monastery, or nunnery, political education. (LAUGHTER) So, these are deliberate sort of methods-- in order to diminish the Buddhist sort of faith, or Buddhist sort of, what is, study like that. So, that's part of intentionally. So, from both sides-- I-- I notice this as Tibetan, who born in India-- and Tibetan who come from Tibet. It clear sort of, what is-- what's the-- the differences. You see, those Tibetan who come from Tibet, from our own land, you see, they-- their behavior, even-- local Indian people are-- sometimes, you see, express. Those Tibetan who come in early '60s, they are very gentle, never quarrel with local population. And after '80s and '90s-- some new Tibetan-- some Tibetan-- new face. These are little bit different. (LAUGHTER) There's some locally there, you see--

(OVERTALK)

CURRY:

Because they've lost themselves?

DALAI LAMA:

Uh-huh (AFFIRM). Their--

CURRY:

They're lost?

DALAI LAMA:

--cultural heritage. More peaceful, more compassionate. Now that damaged, or degenerate. So, these are the sign of-- so-- disappearing Tibetan Buddhist culture-- Buddhist way of thinking.

ANN CURRY:

Throughout history, nations have been absorbed by bigger states. Often those nations which have stood and fight-- Often those nations that have stood and fight have won. What has non-violence given the Tibetan people?

THE DALAI LAMA:

Mahatma Gandhi has a certain method. And also the-- Luther King. Martin Luther King, I think, one of the real admirer of Mahatma Gandhi's philosophy. And he, himself, implement and also Nelson Mandela. Except his early part was different. So, the non-violent and any way, I think non-violent method is something, I mean, not something very unique, I feel non-violent is real human way struggle for our, for certain right. And also, very very realistic according to this reality.

ANN CURRY:

But some young Tibetans say--

THE DALAI LAMA:

Ah.

ANN CURRY:

--this is wrong.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Hmm.

ANN CURRY:

Some young Tibetans say, it is time.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Hmm.

ANN CURRY:

Because of the attention before The Olympics. The world is watching for real change to come to Tibet.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Hmm.

ANN CURRY:

Violence might be required.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Hmm.

ANN CURRY:

Your reaction.

THE DALAI LAMA:

This is too simplified. (CHUCKLES) And this, I think, ideas or talks come from emotion, not from intelligence. Even the United States, super power (CHUCKLES) too much using violence or force. Not really successful. (CHUCKLES) In Iran, or Iraq, and Afghanistan, not really successful. So this is the new reality. And China. Very strong army. This solution relying on using force. It's old-fashioned.

ANN CURRY:

Is violence ever justified?

THE DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

Never.

THE DALAI LAMA:

No. In theoretically, yes. You can say in certain-- under certain circumstances. Provided your motivation is good. Your goal is larger interest for larger people and a just cause. Theoretically, a violent method can be permissible, but in practical level, I feel always better avoid using violence. So, those Tibetans, yes, like some Tibetan youth organizations. Other generally youth organization, they also see, agree non-violent method. But some individual, yes, they criticize about our approach. And very much so are including violent. And they prefer that. But then-- since-- what's it been, now I think, 20, 30 years. They say I have a lot of argument with them. Saying--violence, some kind of very rough sort of method. Words. What are called Mujahadeens. These, like Palestines or some--yes, Mujahedeens in Afghan or like that. It is a word. And a word can easily express. But implementation. Even you want violent method, very difficult. In our case, Tibet case, violent method is almost like suicide. Not only against our principle, but also practically. Suicide. No use. So, if you think then I--I feel, after all, Tibetan problem must of solved between Chinese and Tibetan. Han Chinese brothers and sisters. Their help is immense important.

For that reason, if we take bloodshed method, the laws of the Chinese they will feel something difficult. Because we already, now we prove, we follow sincerely, non-violent method, non-violent principle. And secondly, not seeking independence. Therefore, many Chinese scholars, many Chinese intellectuals, many Chinese history, artists and many officials, deep inside, very sympathetic to us. And very supportive. I feel that is-- a result of our approach. I feel like that.

ANN CURRY:

You are a realist. In your darkest moments, as you have suffered, you said at the beginning of this interview. You, yourself, have suffered, thinking of the suffering.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Hmm.

ANN CURRY:

That's going on. In your darkest moments, do you fear, as a realist, for the survival of Tibet? Do you fear the possibility that you might be the last Dalai Lama?

THE DALAI LAMA:

That's Okay. That is not a-- a problem.

ANN CURRY:

Why is that Okay?

THE DALAI LAMA:

It's not a problem.

ANN CURRY:

It might be a problem for the Tibetan people.

THE DALAI LAMA:

The Tibetan people-- as early as '69, I made clear, whether the Dalai Lama institution should continue or not for the Tibetan people. It doesn't matter.

ANN CURRY:

Then what does matter?

THE DALAI LAMA:

Tibetan nation. Tibetan culture. Tibetan Buddhist culture. I think culture of compassion.

ANN CURRY:

Compassion.

THE DALAI LAMA:

And Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. Or Buddhist-- Buddhist knowledge. I think-- I think one of the ancient treasure of India. Now not only ancient treasure of East, but also relevant to today's world. Now, the next few days here. How do you say--my program.

ANN CURRY:

Yes, Seeds of Compassion.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Actually, some kind of seminar or discussion. How to utilize some of these ancient in-- Indian treasure. You see, to improve our health. Health means not only physical health but also mental health.

ANN CURRY:

And--

THE DALAI LAMA:

And-- and through that way, how to-- how to-- how to become a happier human individual. Happy human family and human community. That is, I think, very, very important. Now-- now to the first century. Inspite of many material development, individual cases, human being, even billionaire or leaders mentally, emotionally, deep inside are not very happy. Very-- too much stress and unhappy person. I-- I can see it is so. Now, for example here-- I-- in spite many difficulties, many sort of anxieties, or fear, and feeling of helplessness. But, at least, since the 10th of March, into-- intellectual level or certain level, lot of worry. Lot of sort of suspicion or lot of sort of expectation. Lots of sort of imagination. Many, many things. Unrest. But-- among the intelligence-- certain intelligence. Now, for example, realistic, realize the situation. The suffering which we are facing. I am facing. We are facing. Including myself, I am facing. If there is way to overcome, then no need worry. If there's no way to overcome. no need worry. I really believe that. So some intelligence side is thinking these lines send some signal on my emotion. So emotion--inspite some sort of turmoil in intelligence side, but the emotional side still calm. As a result, now since tenth of March my sleep never disturbed. (CHUCKLES) So this is practical sort of a benefit!

ANN CURRY:

So you're saying, you realize that no matter what happens, worrying is useless. Fear is useless.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Right. That's right.

ANN CURRY:

No matter what happens, is what you're saying?

THE DALAI LAMA:

That--that's right. So be realistic and without confusion, look at the truth. And then try to find realistic approach. If that fail, no regret.

ANN CURRY:

No regrets. Hmm. Hmm.

THE DALAI LAMA:

That's my view. (LAUGHS)

ANN CURRY:

I think it's a good view. It's a very good view. Do you want when you-- are looking at-- I know you are a humble man. But when you-- but you have also an op-- a way to influence people. Do you want to be remembered as, in your life, when people are coming after you, do you want to be remembered as--

THE DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

What do you want your life to have meant?

THE DALAI LAMA:

No.

ANN CURRY:

Nothing.

THE DALAI LAMA:

No concern.

ANN CURRY:

You don't want to think about this.

THE DALAI LAMA:

As a Buddhist practitioner, should not think that line. So long your life should be something meaningful.

ANN CURRY:

You want to be useful while you're alive.

THE DALAI LAMA:

That what people say.

ANN CURRY:

And what is the greatest use of your life?

THE DALAI LAMA:

To serve.

ANN CURRY:

To serve.

THE DALAI LAMA:

To help other people. You see I have three commitments. Three responsibilities, up to now. Number one, promotion of human value. Now next few days, this is the main sort of, my--interest in the field of interest how to improve human value in order to be better human being. Then, second, as a Buddhist-- promotion of religious harmony. So these two, till my death, I involve. So my death--how soon my death come, I don't know. Perhaps after five years, or ten years, fifteen years, 20 years, 30 years, I don't know. (CHUCKLES) But in any way, as long as I remain, I-- I survive-- alive. I fully committed. The third commitment is about the Tibetan res--Tibetan struggle. Now this is concerned since 2001. We already have elected political leadership. Since then my position is something like semi-retired position. So now I'm looking forward to complete retirement. (CHUCKLES)

ANN CURRY:

Do you think you'll ever see Tibet again?

THE DALAI LAMA:

Yes, I believe. I believe.

ANN CURRY:

Thank you.

THE DALAI LAMA:

Thank you.

ANN CURRY:

Thank you very much. Thank you for that. Thank you.

© 2008 MSNBC Interactive
URL: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24073087/

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Posted by google at 05:14 PM | Comments (0)

Tibetans just want autonomy, Dalai Lama says

Tibetans just want autonomy, Dalai Lama says
'Not seeking independence, nor separation,' from China, he insists

AP
The Dalai Lama addresses a news conference Sunday in Seattle, where he is headlining a five-day conference on compassion.

Interview
April 11: NBC's Ann Curry interviews the Dalai Lama during his first visit to the U.S. since the recent outbreaks of violence in Tibet.
Nightly News

Recent protests in Tibet against five decades of Chinese rule have been the largest and most sustained in almost two decades and have fueled protests that have disrupted the global torch relay for this summer’s Olympic Games in Beijing.

“Our struggle is with a few in the leadership of the People’s Republic of China and not with the Chinese people,” the Dalai Lama said in a statement released after the news conference. “If the present situation in Tibet continues, I am very much concerned that the Chinese government will unleash more force and increase the suppression of Tibetan people.”

He said that if the Chinese stop such suppression and withdraw armed police and troops, he would advise all Tibetans to stop their protests.

Monks detained
A Chinese official said Sunday that the government had detained nine Buddhist monks and accused them of planting a homemade bomb that reportedly detonated March 23 in a government office building in eastern Tibet, according to China’s official Xinhua News Agency.

There were no known deaths or damage from the first reported bombing since anti-government demonstrations by monks began March 10 in the Tibetan capital, Lhasa.

Xinhua reported that the monks from the Tongxia monastery fled after a bomb exploded March 23. They later confessed to planting the explosive, Xinhua said. The agency did not explain why the incident was not reported earlier.

The Dalai Lama, visiting Seattle for the five-day Seeds of Compassion conference, told journalists Sunday that there have been some talks between representatives of his government-in-exile and Chinese officials.

The talks date to 2002 and some progress was made, but by July 2007 the discussions had deteriorated, he said. He did not elaborate.

The Dalai Lama repeated his promise to resign should the violence in Tibet continue. But he criticized China’s attempt to suppress demonstrations and encouraged any Tibetan protesters to conduct nonviolent demonstrations.

The Olympic torch is scheduled to pass through Tibet and India in a few weeks, and he said that if demonstrations are carried out, more hardship might come to the Tibetan people.

Superpower status and trust
The Dalai Lama said he supports China’s ambitions to become a world superpower, saying that the country has achieved the economic and military might to do so but lacks transparency. If China wants to be a superpower, he said, it needs the world’s trust.

The economic rise of China has widened the gap between the rich and poor, he said. Along with issues coming from a “totalitarian regime,” China is seeing problems not only in Tibet, but also throughout the country.

“Particularly in China, everything is state secret; I think these practices are outdated,” he said.

The Dalai Lama fled to India after a failed uprising in 1959 in Tibet, but he remains the religious and cultural leader of many Tibetans. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.

In Beijing, Xinhua on Sunday denounced the Dalai Lama and his supporters as "anti-human rights," and slammed top U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, D-Calif., as "the least popular person in China" for her stance on Tibet.

A Tibetan source with strong contacts in Lhasa said the city was also swirling with rumors of fresh clashes between monks and security forces at the important Drepung monastery. No one at the monastery or the local police station could be reached for comment.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24097313

Posted by google at 05:10 PM | Comments (0)

The reason for the protest on March 10th

http://www.tchrd.org/press/2007/pr20071023.html

Posted by google at 01:18 AM | Comments (0)

The past of Tibet

http://english.cctv.com/english/special/pasttibet/01/index.shtml

Posted by google at 01:14 AM | Comments (0)

The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War

C Melvyn C. Goldstein

U.S. policy toward Tibet has operated on two levels. At the strategic level, the United States has consistently supported the Chinese position that Tibet is part of China. At the pragmatic or tactical level, Washington has been opportunistic in its dealings with Tibet and has been prone to wide fluctuations, ranging from the provision of financial and military aid to Tibetan guerrilla forces in the 1950s and 1960s to neglect and almost no official contact in the 1970s and 1980s.

The first phase of the U.S.-Tibetan relationship encompassed the period from World War II to the fall of the Guomindang government in China in 1949. During these years, Tibet was de facto an independent state. China had exercised no authority in Tibet since 1913, and Tibet controlled not only its internal affairs but also its territorial defense and foreign relations.

The first statement of U.S. policy toward Tibet appeared in July 1942 in a memorandum to the British government:

For its part, the Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims.1
At about the same time, the United States established direct contact with Tibet, sending two reconnaissance specialists from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the wartime intelligence agency) into Tibet to travel overland to China and assess the potential for construction of roads and airfields. The U.S. government first asked its close ally, the Chinese Nationalist leader Jiäng Jièshi, to arrange this visit, but he was unable to do so because of the lack of Chinese control over Tibet. Hence, Washington asked the British (who had a representative in Lhasa) to secure permission from the Tibetan government. [End Page 145] After British envoys assured the Tibetan authorities that this was an official U.S. mission that could benefit Tibet, the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau granted transit permission to the two OSS officers. They entered Tibet from India carrying presents and a letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to the 14th Dalai Lama asking him to assist the officers. Dated 3 July 1942, the letter read:

Your HOLINESS:
Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such an opportunity.

As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of twenty-seven other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the world by nations bent on conquest who are intent on destroying freedom of thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The United Nations are fighting today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our determination is unshakable.

I am asking Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token of my friendly sentiment toward you.

With cordial greetings
Franklin D. Roosevelt2

Following this visit, the United States sent several wireless radios to Tibet, also without going through China.

These contacts, however, did not amount to government-to-government relations, at least from Washington's perspective. Although U.S. officials were dealing directly with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government, the Roosevelt administration did not regard this as in any way legitimizing Tibetan claims to independence from China. William Donovan, the director of OSS, explained this point to President Roosevelt at the time: "This letter is addressed to the Dalai Lama in his capacity of [sic] religious leader of Tibet, rather than in his capacity of secular leader of Tibet, thus avoiding giving any possible offense to the Chinese Government which includes Tibet in the territory [End Page 146] of the Republic of China."3 The United States, however, refrained from mentioning this interpretation of Tibet's status to the Tibetan authorities.

In July 1948, the situation was reversed when the Tibetan government sent an official trade delegation to the United States. The U.S. State Department informed its embassy in New Delhi that because the United States did not recognize Tibet as a country the trade mission could be received only on an informal basis. Moreover, rather than referring to Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet as in 1942, the State Department at this point used the more anodyne term "sovereignty":

It should be recalled that China claims of sovereignty over Tibet and that this Government has never questioned that claim; accordingly it would not be possible for this government to accord members of the projected mission other than an informal reception unless the missions enjoyed the official sanction of the Chinese Government.4
Nevertheless, at the tactical level, the United States was again willing to deal with Tibet independent of China and in fact tried to ensure that the Tibetan trade delegation's visit enjoyed a modicum of success. For example, under strong pressure from China, the State Department insisted that the Tibetans could not meet President Harry Truman unless they were accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to the United States. But when the Tibetans refused, the Truman administration allowed them to meet with Secretary of State George C. Marshall without being accompanied by the Chinese ambassador.

The rapid disintegration of the Guomindang regime in the first half of 1949 pushed the Tibet question into the realm of Cold War politics. In April 1949 the U.S. embassy in New Delhi urged the State Department to conduct a review of U.S. policy toward Tibet. The embassy suggested that if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) succeeded in taking control in Beijing, the United States should be prepared to treat Tibet as an independent country. The embassy concluded that keeping Tibet friendly to the United States and other Western countries was useful so long as it did not "give offense" to the sensibilities of Jiäng Jièshi and his government on Taiwan:

It is believed to be clearly to our advantage under any circumstances to have Tibet as a friend if possible. We should accordingly maintain a friendly attitude toward Tibet in ways short of giving China [the Guomindang] cause for offense. We should encourage so far as feasible Tibet's orientation toward the West rather than toward the East. [End Page 147]
For the present we should avoid giving the impression of any alteration in our position toward Chinese authority over Tibet such as for example steps which would clearly indicate that we regard Tibet as independent, etc. . . . We should however keep our policy as flexible as possible by avoiding references to Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty unless references are clearly called for and by informing China of our proposed moves in connection with Tibet, rather than asking China's consent for them.5
Despite this recommendation, the State Department ultimately decided not to change the U.S. position. In late December 1949 the Tibetan government requested permission to send a special delegation to the United States to seek aid and support against the victorious CCP. The State Department turned down the request and instructed the U.S. ambassador in India to dissuade the Tibetans from sending such a delegation.6

Events on the ground changed quickly after the inauguration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. The CCP promptly set out to "liberate" Tibet—that is, to incorporate Tibet into China. In October 1950, after the Chinese had tried but failed to persuade the Dalai Lama to negotiate Tibet's "liberation," the PRC invaded Tibet's easternmost province. The Dalai Lama shifted his residence from Lhasa to a town near the Indian border so that he could easily flee into exile if the Chinese pressed further with their military occupation, and he appealed for help from the United States, Western Europe, and the United Nations (UN). When none was forthcoming, he sent a delegation to Beijing to negotiate Tibet's return to China. In May 1951 the two sides signed what became known as the "Seventeen-Point Agreement" (Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet), a document that for the first time formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama himself, however, had not signed the agreement, nor was he even aware of its terms when it was signed. Consequently, the U.S. government urged him to declare the accord invalid and to flee into exile. This effort was unsuccessful, and the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa to try to live under the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and Chinese rule. At the heart of his decision was his perception that the United States, though it might express sympathy for Tibet and offer some limited support, was unwilling to endorse Tibetan independence and would not provide substantial military aid or political backing for a government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama that would aspire to independence. In September 1951, after the Dalai Lama had [End Page 148] already returned to Lhasa to live under the terms of the new agreement, the U.S. government sent the last, and most forthcoming, of a series of messages to the Tibetan leader. The message called on him to flee Lhasa and stated that if he left Tibet, publicly disavowed the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and agreed to cooperate in opposing Communist aggression, the United States would officially adopt the position that the Dalai Lama is the "head of an autonomous Tibet" and would "support your return to Tibet at the earliest practicable moment as the head of an autonomous and non-communist, country."7

Thus, even at this late juncture, the U.S. government was unwilling to accommodate the Dalai Lama's fundamental desire to gain international support for Tibetan independence. Consequently, the Tibetan leader opted to remain in Lhasa as part of the PRC, dashing U.S. hopes of enlisting him in its anti-Chinese Communist crusade.8

Tibet remained in this uneasy situation for the next five years, lacking any further contact with the United States. But in 1956 the U.S. government again became actively involved in Tibet when a series of revolts broke out in Kham, the areas of western China inhabited by ethnic Tibetans. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) immediately made contact with the resistance leaders and by 1957 had begun to train and provide weapons to Tibetan guerrilla forces.9

Over the next three years, the situation within Tibet proper deteriorated, culminating in an uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 that sent the Dalai Lama into exile in India. The United States now had achieved what it so energetically sought without success in 1950–1951. Faced with this unexpected turn of events, U.S. officials had to decide how to proceed.10 [End Page 149]

At the operational level, the CIA continued its covert support for a Tibetan guerrilla force and received high-level approval to set up a new training base in northern Nepal for resistance fighters who could be infiltrated into Tibet. The CIA also provided funds and other forms of non-military support for the Dalai Lama.11 With regard to the international status of Tibet, however, the United States was much less forthcoming.

In late April 1959, just after the Dalai Lama fled into exile, he sent a message to the U.S. government that was summarized in a memorandum from Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Dalai Lama asked that "the United States recognize the Free Tibetan Government and influence other countries to do so. In this connection, he [the Dalai Lama] emphasizes his determination to work for complete independence, regardless of the time required for ending the opposition of India, and declares that autonomy is not enough."12 The memorandum addressed this issue succinctly:

Recognition is a political act and we could grant recognition when publicly asked if such a step is in the national interest. In response to previous approaches from the Dalai Lama in 1949–51 we refrained from committing ourselves to recognition of Tibet as an independent state. We continue to recognize both the claim of the Republic of China to suzerainty over Tibet and Tibet's claim to de facto autonomy.13
Dillon was averse to making any change in this policy. He warned Eisenhower that the United States must "avoid taking a position which might appear to encourage the Dalai Lama to seek international recognition."14

In subsequent months, the Eisenhower administration reexamined its policy vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama and Tibet but decided once again not to advocate Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, U.S. officials did offer stronger support for Tibet by starting to refer to it as an autonomous "country" under Chinese "suzerainty" and by also indicating that if unspecified conditions occurred in the future that made self-determination possible, the United States would support this. These nuances were made explicit in September 1959:

As to the position which the U.S. government takes with regard to the status of Tibet, the historical position of the U.S. has been that Tibet is an autonomous [End Page 150] country under Chinese suzerainty. However, the U.S. government has consistently held that the autonomy of Tibet should not be impaired by force. The U.S. has never recognized the pretension to sovereignty over Tibet put forward by the Chinese Communist regime.15
The revised U.S. position was laid out even more clearly in a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons to Secretary of State Christian Herter dated 14 October 1959:

That you inform him [the Dalai Lama] that, while the United States cannot accord recognition to the Dalai Lama's government under present circumstances, it
(a) fully supports the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny,

(b) would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to this end should a change in the situation make this practicable, and

(c) would be prepared to make a public statement, after completion of the [U.N.] General Assembly consideration of the Tibetan item, affirming our support of Tibetan self-determination.16

A few months later, on 20 February 1960, Herter conveyed this message in a letter to the Dalai Lama.17

These indications of greater political support for Tibet were carefully couched. On the one hand, U.S. officials wanted to placate Tibetan sensibilities and assist the Tibetans in keeping their cause alive; on the other hand, they wanted to avoid any change in the international political status of Tibet as part of China. Consequently, rather than launching a campaign to secure international recognition of Tibet as an independent state (as the Tibetans themselves hoped to do), the Eisenhower administration actually constrained the Tibetans from presenting a political case to the United Nations (UN) that would have accused the PRC of aggression against an independent country. Instead, the United States pressured the Dalai Lama to refer to the suffering of the Tibetan people and human rights issues when making his case against [End Page 151] China. This distinction was emphasized by CIA Director Allen Dulles at a meeting of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) on 10 September 1959. The notes from the meeting indicate that "Mr. Dulles then took up Tibet. . . . The U.S has felt that he [the Dalai Lama] should not, in his presentation to the U.N. emphasize aggression, since Tibet was for many years a part of China. In our view, his case is stronger on a human rights basis."18 The same point was conveyed by Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama in a letter dated 6 October 1959: "Consultation with other United Nations Members on this subject [the record of Chinese Communist activities in Tibet] have confirmed our view, made known to you earlier, that wider support can be obtained for a hearing of Tibet's case if the suppression of human rights aspects of it are stressed rather than matters relating to sovereignty."19

For the Dalai Lama, this was a crucial issue. Two days after the Tibetan leader received Herter's letter, Gyalo Thondup (the Dalai Lama's older brother who had led a Tibetan delegation to the UN headquarters in New York to lodge an appeal with the UN General Assembly) met with the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge. The Tibetans' lawyer, Ernest Gross, left no doubt that "Thondup had arrived with instructions . . . to raise question of independence."20 Lodge reported to the State Department that Gyalo Thondup "questioned US repeatedly as to whether action on human rights basis would in some way affect adversely cause of Tibetan independence. He clearly continued hope GA [General Assembly] might address itself to question of Tibetan independence."

A few days later, on 14 October 1959, Assistant Secretary of State Parsons sent a memorandum to Herter summarizing the conclusions of a policy review undertaken by the Far Eastern Affairs division (FE). Parsons recommended that no change be made in the long-standing U.S. strategic position on Tibet:

Our Embassy in India has reported that the Dalai Lama has requested United States support for hearing the Tibetan case in the United Nations on the basis of aggression and that the Tibetans are pressing for recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tibet. . . . FE has completed a study . . . of the question of United States recognition of the independence of Tibet in which the considerations both for and against such action are examined in detail. Taking these factors into account, we have concluded that on balance the arguments against recognition of Tibetan independence under present conditions are stronger than [End Page 152] those in favor. I consider this conclusion valid from the standpoint of both the United States national interest and from that of the Tibetans. We share with the Tibetans the objectives of keeping the Tibetan cause alive in the consciousness of the world and maintaining the Dalai Lama as an effective spokesman of the Tibetan people. I believe that United States recognition of the Dalai Lama's government as that of an independent country would serve neither purpose well.21
Consequently, despite the Cold War and the flight of the Dalai Lama into exile, the U.S. government continued to believe that American interests were best served by adhering to the position that Tibet was part of Communist-controlled China. The United States at the tactical level supported a Tibetan insurgency force and financially assisted the Dalai Lama, but it would not support the Tibetans' political aims. Moreover, U.S. officials repeatedly exhorted the Dalai Lama to shift the main focus of his campaign against the PRC, basing it not on the question of Tibet's independence but on issues of human rights violations. The public U.S. expressions of support for Tibetan self-determination if conditions ever became appropriate were, therefore, mainly an attempt to placate the Dalai Lama in the face of Washington's refusal to support his requests for help on the political front. Parsons acknowledged the gap between rhetoric and reality in his memorandum to Herter:

The Tibetans will probably be unhappy at our failure to go all the way toward recognition of Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, I think Thondup could be made to see that recognition under present conditions would not serve the best interests of the Tibetan people and that in offering to state publicly at an appropriate time in the future our support of the right of the Tibetans to self-determination we are moving in the direction he desires us to take. However, so long as the Chinese Communists occupy Tibet self-determination is not practicable and the struggle of the Tibetan people for control of their own political destiny is likely to be a long one.22
The rapprochement between the United States and Communist China in the early 1970s changed U.S. Cold War strategy and created a new set of foreign policy conditions that quickly marginalized the U.S. government's "pragmatic" interest in Tibet. Consequently, for more than a decade after the restoration of U.S.-China relations in 1969–1971, Tibet remained an obscure issue in U.S. foreign policy. The United States halted all remaining support for the Tibetan guerrillas and ceased to use terms such as "autonomous country."23 U.S. officials also stopped talking about vague support for the Tibetans' [End Page 153] right to self determination if conditions changed. Although the Cold War continued, Tibet ceased to be a part of it and faded into the shadows.

The early record of U.S. involvement with Tibet is thus relatively clear. Despite rhetoric about promoting freedom and democracy, the United States was unwilling in the case of Tibet to compromise its larger interests in China and Asia. Although in one sense the United States was clearly a friend and supporter of Tibet, in a more basic sense it was not a "good friend" and might even be described as a cynical and deceptive friend.24 Tibet's quest for independence ran up against the pragmatic side of U.S. foreign policy. On this issue, the triumph of realpolitik over what Henry Kissinger called America's "pursuit of its historic moral convictions" is particularly striking when we compare U.S. support of Tibet with the Soviet Union's support of Mongolia.25 Although Tibet and Mongolia were of a politically equivalent status at the time of the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911–1912, Mongolia has long been an independent state and a member of the UN. The reason is simple: At the Yalta conference in early 1945, the Soviet leader Josif Stalin persuaded Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to support a plebiscite for Mongolia, a demand that the Chinese Nationalist government was forced to accept. Mongolia was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for decades but is today an independent country.

Tibet and the United States in the Deng Xiaoping Era
From the time of the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in 1959 until the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, the Tibetan government-in-exile had no official contact with the Chinese authorities. The situation changed in 1978 after Deng Xiaoping initiated a new Chinese external and internal initiative [End Page 154] to resolve the Tibet question. The external initiative sought to induce the Dalai Lama to return from exile. Deng invited the Tibetan leader to send delegations from India to observe the situation in Tibet, and these overtures quickly led to secret face-to-face meetings in Beijing in 1982 and 1984.

At the same time, Beijing launched a parallel strategy to reverse the policies of the Cultural Revolution and meet Tibetans' ethnic sensibilities by making the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) more Tibetan in overall character. This initiative, led by Hu Yaobang, essentially gave the green light for a revitalization of Tibetan culture and religion, including the reopening of monasteries, permission to recruit new monks, greater leeway to use written Tibetan, and the replacement of large numbers of ethnic Chinese cadres with Tibetans. Deng Xiaoping also sought to foster accelerated economic development in Tibet that would rapidly improve the inhabitants' living standards.

Despite these promising signs, the reconciliation talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's representatives were unsuccessful. The Chinese authorities wanted to persuade the Dalai Lama and his officials in exile to set aside past animosities and exhibit a new friendship toward China—an acceptance of being part of the "motherland" and being loyal citizens of China. To achieve this, Deng was willing to allow a substantial degree of cultural autonomy, but he was unwilling to yield any real political power to the Dalai Lama or his officials. The CCP under the new initiative would remain in power in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The Tibetans quickly realized that Beijing was not even going to consider granting them independence. With that overriding goal still out of reach, the key question in Dharamsala was how much less than independence—if anything—they were willing to settle for. After considerable discussion, the Dalai Lama's government in 1984 proposed that China should grant Tibetans in all parts of China complete internal political autonomy—in essence self-rule. Tibet could then adopt a political system different from that in the rest of China, presumably something closer to a Western-style democracy. This proposal was along the lines of the "One Country Two Systems" offer the CCP had been floating for Taiwan. But in Beijing the Tibetan proposal met a hostile reception. The Chinese authorities argued that the two situations were not comparable because Tibet, unlike Taiwan, was already an integral part of the PRC. The talks collapsed because the Dalai Lama's bottom line was far above what China was willing to contemplate.

The Launching of the Pro-Tibet International Campaign
As officials in both Beijing and Dharamsala assessed these failures, the PRC increased its effort to stimulate economic development in Tibet in the hope of [End Page 155] winning over ordinary Tibetans who would be induced to accept limited autonomy. The Dalai Lama, for his part, launched an international campaign to win worldwide support and assistance for his cause. The Tibetan leader realized that he needed new sources of leverage if he was to have any hope of prying the concessions he wanted from Beijing. A full-scale international campaign, he believed, was the only means by which he could gain the requisite level of support.

The U.S. government was central to this new international campaign. Of all the Western democracies, the United States had provided the most extensive support for Tibetans during the difficult times of the 1950s and 1960s. However, the U.S. relationship with Tibet had changed a great deal in the 1970s when the U.S.-PRC rapprochement made the Dalai Lama and the Tibet question an issue that ranked low among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The exiled leader's new campaign, therefore, sought to regain U.S. attention and support by working through the backdoor of U.S. foreign policy—Congress. The key innovation in this strategy was that the Dalai Lama for the first time carried his political message to the United States and the world. Prior to this the Dalai Lama had traveled and spoken only as a religious leader.26

With the help of Western supporters and donors and of sympathetic members of the U.S. Congress and their aides, the Tibetans launched a campaign in the United States to gain support for the Dalai Lama's cause, in essence recasting the Tibet question not in geopolitical terms but in terms of the U.S. commitment to freedom and human rights. The goal was to highlight China's human rights violations in Tibet and to present the Dalai Lama as a champion of Western values.27

In 1987, the campaign achieved several major breakthroughs. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a bill that condemned human rights abuses in Tibet, instructed the president to express sympathy for Tibet, and urged China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.28 In September the Dalai Lama was invited to speak to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, DC. In his speech, the first he had given [End Page 156] in the United States, he argued that Tibet had been "fully independent" at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1950. The Dalai Lama claimed that the invasion had begun China's "illegal occupation of the country" and that "although Tibetans lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation."29 The speech also raised human rights charges in provocative terms, referring twice to a "holocaust" against the Tibetan people.

The Dalai Lama called on China to resolve the Tibet problem through five specific steps:

transforming the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace—this would include not only Tibet proper but also ethnographic Tibet (the ethnic Tibetans in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan) and would require the withdrawal of all Chinese troops and military installations;
abandoning the policy of forced population transfers, which, according to the Dalai Lama, threatened the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
respecting the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms (the Dalai Lama asserted that Tibetans are "deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms [and] exist under a colonial administration in which all real power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army");
restoring and protecting Tibet's natural environment and halting China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and
holding negotiations about the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.30
The speech was received well in the United States, and three weeks later, on 6 October 1987, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the earlier House bill. On 22 December 1987, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989, which contained a sense of the Congress resolution affirming that

the United States should express sympathy for those Tibetans who have suffered and died as a result of fighting, persecution, or famine over the past four decades;
the United States should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an important [End Page 157] factor in its conduct of relations with the People's Republic of China;
the Government of the People's Republic of China should respect internationally recognized human rights and end human rights violations against Tibetans;
the United States should urge the Government of the People's Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama's efforts to establish a constructive dialogue on the future of Tibet;. . . [and]
the United States should urge the People's Republic of China to release all political prisoners in Tibet.31
The resolution also contained a provision about the sale of defense-related articles to the PRC, indicating that the United States should take into consideration "the extent to which the Government of the People's Republic of China is acting in good faith and in a timely manner to resolve human rights issues in Tibet." Finally, it authorized funding for fifteen scholarships that would allow Tibetans to attend American universities.32

After the Cold War ended, congressional support for Tibet grew. In 1990, Congress authorized the creation of a Tibetan-language broadcast unit at the Voice of America, and in 1991 Congress included a number of tough though non-binding provisions on Tibet in a State Department authorization act that was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush later that year. The provisions described "Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai," as an "occupied country" and declared that the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile were "Tibet's true representatives."33

Although the pro-Tibet statements in the legislation were only a non-binding "sense of Congress" resolution, they were seen in Dharamsala as a major victory and the start of a congressional move to establish a new policy that would actively pursue a settlement favorable to the Dalai Lama and his government. In that sense, the United States was again actively involved in Tibetan affairs, albeit primarily through Congress rather than the executive branch.

The Impact of the Pro-Tibet International Campaign
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the pro-Tibet sentiment in Congress was supported by the growth of a number of Tibet lobbying groups such as the [End Page 158] Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, the Tibet Justice Center, Students for a Free Tibet, and broader human rights groups like Asia Watch and Amnesty International. As the Cold War drew to an end, policy vis-à-vis Tibet had to be made with an eye not just to U.S. global and economic interests but also to domestic political concerns.

The Dalai Lama himself became a major public advocate for his cause. On 15 June 1988, nine months after his successful speech to the U.S. congressional caucus, he spoke explicitly about political issues when he addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg. In the speech he set forth, for the first time publicly, his conditions for settling the Tibet question and for his return to Tibet. The main points were:

The whole of Tibet [political and ethnographic Tibet] . . . should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China.
The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned with such activities.

The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of government. . . . This means that the Government of Tibet will have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and Tibetans.

As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice.

The Government should be composed of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be Lhasa.

The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population.

. . . A regional peace conference should be called to ensure Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China [End Page 159] could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defense purposes.34

The Strasbourg proposal did not seek complete independence, but it also did not accept limited autonomy within the Chinese political system. Rather, it called for Tibet to have a new status as a kind of autonomous dominion that conceivably could even field its own sports teams in international competitions. The Dalai Lama would accept being part of the PRC, but the Chinese authorities would have little authority over affairs in Tibet, and the Communist Party would not rule Tibet. Because this proposal had in essence been presented to Beijing at the secret 1984 talks, it did not represent anything new to the Chinese. But it did seem new to everyone else because it was the first time that the Dalai Lama had openly stated his willingness to settle for something less than independence. The proposal was well received around the world, solidifying the Dalai Lama's reputation as a leader who was reasonable and seeking a compromise solution.

In subsequent years the international campaign for Tibet did, in one sense, enjoy extraordinary success. It generated new visibility and sympathy in the West for the Dalai Lama's cause, made the Tibet question a part of U.S. domestic and international politics, and helped the Dalai Lama win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. In the process, he became an international symbol of peace and justice and a powerful spokesman for Tibet.

The Dalai Lama's international campaign also had an enormous impact in China. Tibetans in Lhasa knew about the Dalai Lama's visit to the United States in 1987 because of foreign short-wave broadcasts and because of attacks on the Dalai Lama's visit that appeared in the official Chinese media. As a result, less than a week after the Dalai Lama's first speech in Washington, a small group of nationalistic monks from Drepung monastery in Lhasa staged a political demonstration supporting Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama. The monks were arrested, but four days later a second demonstration that was held to demand the release of these monks ended in a full-scale riot, killing several people.

Although China had liberalized its religious policies and allowed monasteries to reopen in Tibet, thousands of average Tibetans by this point were angry enough to face death and prison by rising up against Chinese rule in Tibet. The Dalai Lama's international campaign had stirred up Tibetan nationalist sentiment and focused it on the Dalai Lama and the West as the answer to Tibet's problems. Many Tibetans saw the visible U.S. support for the Dalai Lama as a sign that a turning point had been reached in Tibetan history and that this was the time to support the Dalai Lama's efforts by engaging [End Page 160] in active political dissidence. Two further riots erupted in Lhasa in 1988, and on 5 March 1989 a fourth riot occurred in the Tibetan capital. The Dalai Lama's international initiative had successfully turned the tables on China, placing Beijing on the defensive both internationally and within Tibet. In March 1989, three months before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese authorities imposed martial law in Tibet, a status that lasted more than a year.

The martial law declaration signaled a shift by the PRC to a more repressive, integrationist policy in Tibet. In Beijing, hardliners who gained ascendance after the Tiananmen Square massacre were able to make the case that China had to stop "coddling" Tibet lest matters get completely out of hand. Many officials in Lhasa and Beijing had believed from the start that liberalizing the practice of religion and allowing the reopening of monasteries in Tibet would only increase nationalistic and separatist sentiments, and their view now prevailed.35

Beijing's new policy in Tibet led to more effective security measures that prevented further riots. At the same time, the hardline policy constrained institutions that could potentially strengthen Tibetan ethnic identity, notably language and religion. To be sure, the Tibetan language and Buddhist religion were not prohibited, and Tibetans still spoke their own language and studied it in primary school. Moreover, monasteries and nunneries remained open. Nonetheless, the new policy placed increasingly sharp restraints on how such institutions could operate and develop. In particular, it shelved a number of plans to increase the Tibetanization of Tibet. These reversals angered many Tibetans who, for example, wanted Tibetan to be the language used not only at home but also in government and higher education (including science) and who wanted monasteries and nunneries to be free of government limits on the number of monks and nuns they could have and the age of boys and girls who could enter. In addition, many Tibetans were offended by the tone of the new campaigns and their demeaning comments about Tibetan religion and culture, particularly by a wave of personal attacks on the Dalai Lama.

The new Chinese policy also accelerated the existing program of rapid economic development in Tibet, including much closer economic integration of the region with the rest of China. This was accomplished by further opening up Tibet for commercial development and resulted in a growing influx of non-Tibetan (Han Chinese and Hui Chinese Muslim) entrepreneurs and laborers, who were eager to receive some of the massive funds being poured into [End Page 161] Tibet and to take advantage of new economic opportunities. These non-Tibetans were not colonists in the normal sense of the term, inasmuch as their official residency permits did not refer to Tibet and they were expected eventually to return to their home areas. They were temporary migrants, or what is known in China as the "floating population." Nevertheless, their numbers and increasing ability to take control of Tibet's growing economy sparked widespread resentment.

A bittersweet joke making the rounds of minority officials in Lhasa conveyed these popular sentiments by sarcastically summarizing four periods of Tibetan history under the PRC:

In the first 10 years [1950–1960] we lost our land [i.e., Chinese troops entered and took control of Tibet];
In the second ten years [1960–1970] we lost political power [i.e., the traditional government was replaced by a Han dominated Communist government];

In the third ten years [1970–1980] we lost our culture [i.e., the Cultural Revolution destroyed religion and other traditional customs];

In the fourth ten years [1980–1990] we lost our economy [i.e., the open door economic policy allowed non-Tibetans to dominate the autonomous region's economy].

Despite much criticism both within Tibet and internationally, China's huge investment in rapid economic development in Tibet is having a major impact in rural Tibet, where the standard of living in recent years has increased markedly. At the same time, Beijing has been able to implement its hardline policy with impunity. Neither the United States nor the UN took any concrete steps, such as economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, to try to compel China to moderate its policies in Tibet. In fact, a 1994 State Department report to Congress clearly reiterated the long-standing U.S. strategic position on Tibet:

Historically, the United States has acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Since at least 1966, U.S. policy has explicitly recognized the Tibetan Autonomous Region . . . as part of the People's Republic of China. This long-standing policy is consistent with the view of the entire international community, including all China's neighbors: no country recognizes Tibet as a sovereign state. Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United States does not conduct diplomatic relations with the self-styled "Tibetan government-in-exile." The United States continues, however, to urge Beijing and the Dalai Lama to hold serious discussions at an early date, without preconditions, and on a fixed agenda. The United States also urges China to respect Tibet's unique religious, linguistic and cultural traditions as it formulates policies for Tibet.
Internationally revered for his spiritual and moral leadership, and honored with the Nobel Prize for Peace, the Dalai Lama has been a committed advocate [End Page 162] of nonviolent change and resolution of disputes. To show respect for his religious leadership and courtesy to adherents of Tibetan Buddhism, senior U.S. officials—including the President of the United States—have met from time to time with the Dalai Lama. In addition, administration officials at appropriate levels occasionally meet the Dalai Lama's representatives informally, to exchange views about conditions in Tibet. These informal meetings are a routine part of informal U.S. diplomacy, and do not imply recognition of the political goals of Tibetan exile groups.36

Beijing therefore, in a sense, turned the tables back on the Dalai Lama. The triumphs won by the Dalai Lama's international campaign and its Congressional supporters looked more and more like pyrrhic victories. The international initiative won significant symbolic gains for the exiles in the West, and it spurred Tibetans in Tibet to demonstrate their support for the Dalai Lama, but it did not compel China to yield to its demands. To the contrary, it played a major role in precipitating the new hardline policy that the exiled leaders argued was destroying Tibet by changing the demographic and ethnic nature of the region. Ironically, by threatening China's political hold over Tibet, the Dalai Lama and his Western supporters provided the advocates of a hardline policy in China the leverage they needed to shift Beijing's Tibet policy away from the more ethnically sensitive approach pursued by Hu Yaobang in the early 1980s.

The Dalai Lama's international campaign, moreover, also heightened China's distrust of the Dalai Lama, who, it was felt, was not serious about ceasing separatist activities and making the kind of political compromises China could agree to. Many in China came to believe that the Dalai Lama was unnecessary and that the policy of rapidly developing and modernizing Tibet would solidify China's position there regardless of what the Dalai Lama or nationalistic Tibetans thought or did. The Chinese leaders were confident that a new generation of Tibetans would emerge who would be less influenced by religion and lamas and would genuinely consider themselves patriotic citizens of China.

Conclusion
From the time the United States first made contact with Tibet, in 1942, through the end of the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations consistently refused to accept Tibet's claim to independence and, after the Dalai fled Tibet in 1959, to regard him as the head of a government-in-exile. Consequently, although many in the West (and Tibet) viewed the United States as a friend of [End Page 163] Tibetans, U.S. policy in reality played a significant role both in undermining the Dalai Lama's case that Tibet was an independent state before 1950–1951 and in validating the legitimacy of China's dominion over Tibet. At the strategic level, U.S. policy remained constant, even at the height of the Cold War. Tibet was never seen as part of America's core national interests, and when American policy toward China changed in the early 1970s, the U.S. government abandoned its erstwhile tactical support for Tibetan guerrilla forces and exiled leaders.

The end of Maoism in China led to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC in 1979 as well as the opening of a new chapter in Sino-Tibetan relations. These changes prompted the Dalai Lama to send delegations to hold secret talks in Beijing in 1982 and 1984. Optimism abounded that this renewal of face-to-face talks would yield a peaceful solution to the longstanding conflict. Unfortunately, it did not. Coming together to talk was far easier than making painful compromises to reach a solution, and by 1984 the talks collapsed. The Tibetan and Chinese objectives were too far apart to allow a settlement of the conflict.

This failure led the Dalai Lama and his supporters to launch an international campaign to try to secure U.S. and international support for Tibet in its dealings with Beijing. The campaign was successful insofar as it created a powerful, Congress-driven Tibet lobby that the White House could not ignore and that inserted Tibet into American domestic politics. The campaign successfully pressured the White House and State Department to criticize China's actions in Tibet and even, in the post–Cold War era, to take actions that treated Tibet as being partly separate from China (e.g., by having special Tibet reports and a coordinator for Tibetan affairs). Those successes, however, were essentially symbolic. They did not provide the Dalai Lama with leverage to force Beijing to make concessions or to moderate its hardline policy in Tibet.

The gains achieved by the international campaign had to be carefully crafted to appear responsive to Congress and the Tibet lobby without crossing a line that would threaten basic Chinese interests or the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. The international campaign and the Tibet lobby were able to restore Tibet as a component of Sino-American relations, but only as an irritant and only in terms of human rights issues. Moreover, the Dalai Lama's role in the international campaign had the unintended consequence of helping the hardline faction in China to implement its policies. The victories of the campaign were ultimately pyrrhic.

Even so, the Tibet question has not faded away. For the foreseeable future, this issue will likely remain an irritant to the Chinese in the international arena and a potential danger-point in Sino-American relations.

Melvyn C. Goldstein is the John Reynold Harkness Professor of Anthropology at Case Western Reserve University and co-director of the Center for Research on Tibet.
Footnotes
1. Aide-mémoire from U.S. State Department to the British Embassy, 13 July 1942, FO371/35756, British Foreign Office Records, The National Archives of the United Kingdom (UKNA).

2. Letter from President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama, 3 July 1942, in U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, Vol. VII, p. 113 (hereinafter referred to as FRUS, with appropriate year and volume numbers). See also Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 392.

3. Memorandum from OSS Director Donovan to President Roosevelt, 1 July 1942, in FRUS, 1942, Vol. VII, p. 115.

4. Tibet/8–2147, Dispatch No. 46, 28 October 1947, 693.0031, Record Group (RG) 59, U.S. National Archives (NARA).

5. Tibet/1–849, Dispatch No. 108, 12 April 1949, 693.0031, RG 59, NARA.

6. Goldstein, History of Modern Tibet, p. 631.

7. Message from State Department to Dalai Lama, 7 September 1951, 793B.00/9–1851, RG 59, NARA: quoted in Goldstein, History of Modern Tibet, pp. 808–810.

8. Although the Dalai Lama did not want to leave Tibet for exile, he did not completely sever contact with the United States. In June 1952, Princess Cocoola of Sikkim (Mrs. Phunkhang) told the U.S. consul in Calcutta that the Dalai Lama had sent an oral message to the U.S. government via his brother-in-law, Pakla Phüntso Tashi. The Tibetan leader had asked her to convey the same message. The four main points were: (1) "The Dalai Lama appreciated greatly the U.S. Government's feelings and attitudes toward him personally and toward his Tibetan subjects"; (2) "He sincerely hopes that when the time is propitious for the real liberation of Tibet from the Chinese, the United States will find it feasible and possible to lend material aid and moral support to the Tibetan government"; (3) "The Tibetan people have not changed; they are not pro-Chinese; they are Tibetans first and last"; and (4) "He hopes to get a written message 'down' soon." Cited from "Memorandum of Conversation between Consul Garrett Soulen and Princess Cocoola of Sikkim," 24 June 1952, in 7936.00/7-252, RG 59, NARA. The Dalai Lama, however, denies having sent such a message. See Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, Vol. II: 1951–1955, in press.

9. The CIA did this without seeking the approval of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government.

10. A case can be made that U.S. active involvement in the 1950s, particularly from 1956, played a significant role in destabilizing Tibet and inadvertently fostering the uprising in 1959, but that will have to be the topic for another article.

11. In 1964, for example, the CIA provided a total of $1,735,000 in support, including $500,000 for the support of 2,100 Tibetan guerrillas in Nepal; $180,00 as a subsidy for the Dalai Lama; $225,000 for equipment, transportation and training; and $400,000 for covert training in Colorado. See "Memorandum for the Special Group," 9 January 1964, in FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XXX, p. 731.

12. This was cited in a memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State Dillon to President Eisenhower, 26 April 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, p. 763.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 764.

15. U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Official Text, 14 September 1959 (statement read to reporters on 11 September 1959). Contrary to the USIA statement, the use of the word "country" was not the historical U.S. position. On 3 November 1959 the director of the U.S. State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs and the assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs sent a joint note to George Yeh, the ambassador in Washington of the exiled Chinese Nationalist government, informing him that "the United States had made a decision to go somewhat beyond its previous position with regard to Tibet, namely that it is an autonomous country under the suzerainty of China." See "Memorandum of Conversation," in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, p. 801.

16. Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Parsons to Secretary Herter, 14 October 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, p. 794.

17. Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama, 20 January 1960, FO371 150710, UKNA: quoted in Goldstein, History of Modern Tibet, p. 56.

18. "Notes from NSC Meeting," 10 September 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, p. 784.

19. Letter from Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama, 6 October 1959, in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, p. 790.

20. Telegram from UN Delegation to State Department, 8 October 1959. in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, pp. 790–791.

21. "Memorandum of 14 October 1959," in FRUS, 1958–1960, Vol. XIX, pp. 792–793.

22. Ibid.

23. The cessation of support for the Nepal-based Tibetan guerrilla force was a symbolic blow but did not affect the concrete political or military situation in Tibet. During the thirteen years of active U.S. support for the resistance, the guerrilla operations had no significant impact in Tibet.

24. It is interesting to note that Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's older brother who oversaw the Tibetans' activities with the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, has a similar view. In a phone interview with me in April 1994 he said, "After 1956 the Americans gave us lots of empty promises. They said that after the Dalai Lama comes into exile they will help Tibet get its independence. These were said in secret talks with me by various American organizations. All these things were betrayed. The Indians betrayed the Tibetans and the American also did so." The available documentary evidence does not support Gyalo Thondup's claim that the United States ever promised to help Tibet gain independence. One possibility is that a CIA officer in the field made an unauthorized statement to this effect. Another possibility is that higher-level authorization for such a statement was issued but is contained in documents not yet released by the State Department and the CIA. A final possibility is that Thondup misunderstood something that was said or attached undue significance to a comment that did not actually depart from previous U.S. positions.

25. Henry Kissinger. Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 18.

26. In fact, he was not able to visit the United States until 1979, having previously been denied a visa for ten years. See Thomas A. Grunfeld. "The Internationalization of Tibet," unpub. ms.

27. The parallel program in Europe will not be discussed here.

28. News Tibet, Vol. 22, No. 3 (May–August 1988), p. 8. The Tibetan exiles received their first explicit support from the U.S. Congress in July 1985 when ninety-one representatives signed a letter to Li Xiannian, president of the PRC, expressing support for continued direct talks and urging the Chinese government to "grant the very reasonable and justified aspirations of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and his people every consideration." See Point 14 of Section 1243 of Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, cited in Congressional Ceremony to Welcome His Holiness the Dalai Lama of Tibet (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 13.

29. Office of Tibet, Tibet Briefing: His Holiness the Dalai Lama's Spring Visit to USA (New York: Office of Tibet, 1994), p. 19.

30. Ibid., pp. 18–22.

31. Congressional Ceremony to Welcome His Holiness, pp. 95–96.

32. Ibid., p. 96.

33. Tibet Press Watch, Vol. 3 (1), No. 17 (1991), pp. 1–2.

34. Office of Tibet, Tibet Briefing, p. 24.

35. On the leftist, pro-CCP orientation of officials in Lhasa in the 1980s, see the biography of Phüntso Wangye, the founder of the first Tibetan Communist Party, by Melvyn C. Goldstein, Dawei Sherap, and William Siebenschuh, A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), pp. 285–306.

36. Report mandated by Section 536(a)(2) of Public Law 103–236, Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994–1995: "Relations of the United States with Tibet."

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What are the major events of Tibetan history (timeline)?

Year Description of Event

416 BC Nyatri Tsenpo founds a dynasty in Yarlung valley, according to legend
602 AD Tibet is unified under King Namri Songtsen of the Yarlung dynasty
641 King Songtsen Gampo marries Princess Wencheng of China, his 2nd wife
670 Tibet conquers Amdo, Tarim Basin; prolonged warfare with China begins
747 King Trisong Detsen invites Padmasambhava, yogin of Swat, to Tibet
763 Tibet captures Changan, capital of Tang China; tribute paid to Tibet
779 Samye, Tibet's 1st monastery, built by Trisong Detsen & Padmasambhava
792 Exponents of Indian Buddhism prevail in debate with Chinese at Samye
821 Tibet signs its last peace treaty with Tang China: "Tibetans shall
be happy in Tibet and Chinese shall be happy in China." [Walt1]
842 King Langdarma murdered by a monk; Tibet splits into several states
1040 Birth of Milarepa, 2nd hierarch of Kagyupa order and a renown poet
1073 Founding of Sakya, the first monastery of the Sakyapa monastic order
1206 An assembly names Genghis Khan first ruler of a unified Mongol nation
1227 Mongols destroy Xixia, a Tibetan-speaking kingdom of northwest China
1247 Sakya Pandita submits to Godan Khan; beginning of the first priest/
patron relationship between a Tibetan lama and a Mongol khan
1261 Tibet is reunited with Sakya Pandita, Grand Lama of Sakya, as king
1279 Final defeat of Song by Mongols; Mongol conquest of China complete
1350 Changchub Gyaltsen defeats Sakya and founds the secular Sitya dynasty
1368 China regains its independence from the Mongols under Ming dynasty
1409 Ganden, 1st Gelugpa monastery, built by monastic reformer Tsongkhapa
1435-81 In prolonged warfare, Karmapa supporters gain control of Sitya court
1578 Gelugpa leader gets the title of Dalai ("Ocean") from Altan Khan
1635 Sitya dynasty is overthrown by the ruler of Tibet's Tsang province
1640 Gushri Khan, leader of Khoshut Mongols, invades and conquers Tibet

1642 Gushri Khan enthrones the 5th Dalai Lama as temporal ruler of Tibet
1644 Manchu overthrow Ming, conquer China, and establish the Qing dynasty
1653 "Great Fifth" Dalai Lama meets Qing Emperor Shunzhi near Beijing
1682 Fifth Dalai Lama dies; regent conceals death for the next 14 years
1716-21 Italian Jesuit priest Ippolito Desideri studies and teaches in Lhasa
1717 Dzungar Mongols invade Tibet and sack Lhasa; 5th DL's tomb looted
1720 Dzungars driven out; Qing forces install Kesang Gyatso as the 7th DL
1721 The position of Amban is created by a 13-point Qing decree on Tibet
1724 A Chinese territorial government is created for Qinghai (Amdo)
1750 Ambans murder regent; rioters kill Ambans; Qing troops sent to Tibet
1792 Qing troops enter Tibet to drive out Gorkha (Nepalese) invaders
29-point Qing decree prescribes "golden urn" lottery for picking DL
and PL, bans visits by non-Chinese, and increases Ambans' powers
1854-56 Nepal defeats Tibet; peace treaty requires that Tibet pay tribute
1876 China agrees to provide passports for a British mission to Tibet
1885 Tibet turns back British mission, rejects Chinese-granted passports
1893 China and Britain agree to regulations on trade between India & Tibet
1894 Tibetans build a wall north of Dromo to prevent trade with India
The 13th Dalai Lama takes control of the Tibetan government at age 18
1904 British troops under Colonel Younghusband enter Tibet & occupy Lhasa
A treaty signed which required Tibet to pay an indemnity to Britain
1906 The 1904 Anglo-Tibetan treaty is "confirmed" in Anglo-Chinese treaty
1907 "Suzerainty of China over Thibet" recognized in Anglo-Russian treaty
1910-12 Qing troops occupy Tibet, shoot at unarmed crowds on entering Lhasa
1912 Last Qing emperor abdicates; Republic of China claims Mongolia,Tibet
1913 13th Dalai Lama proclaims Tibet a "religious and independent nation"
Mongolia and Tibet recognize each other in a treaty signed in Urga
1914 Britain and Tibet agree to McMahon Line in a treaty signed in Simla
1917-18 Tibet defeats Chinese forces in Kham, recovers Chamdo (lost in 1910)
1921 Britain recognizes Tibet's "autonomy under Chinese suzerainty"
1924 At a KMT congress, Sun Yat-sen calls for "self-determination of all
national minorities in China" within a "united Chinese republic"
1924-25 Pressure from monks causes DL to dismiss his British-trained officers
1928 Chiang Kai-shek defeats northern warlords, reunites China under KMT
1930-33 China captures Derge in Kham in first Sino-Tibetan clash since 1918
1933 Truce ends China/Tibet fighting; the 13th Dalai Lama dies at age 58
1934 Reting Rimpoche named regent; China permitted to open Lhasa mission
1940 The five-year-old Tenzin Gyatso is enthroned as the 14th Dalai Lama
1941 Unable to keep celibacy vow, Reting is replaced as regent by Taktra
1942 U.S. army officer goes to Lhasa to present a letter for DL from FDR
1944 U.S. military aircraft crash lands near Samye; crew escorted to India
1945 Newly opened English-language school is closed after monks protest
1947 ex-Regent Reting attempts to kill Regent Taktra with a package bomb
Reting dies while under house arrest; he was apparently poisoned
British mission in Lhasa is transferred to a newly independent India
1947-49 Tibetan Trade Mission travels to India, China, U.S., and Britain;
mission meets with British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee
1949 People's Republic of China is proclaimed by Chinese Communist Party
PRC recognizes Mongolia, announces its intention to "liberate" Tibet
1950 Red China invades Tibet; Tibetan army destroyed in battle at Chamdo
1951 17-point agreement between China and Tibet; Chinese occupy Lhasa
1955 Tibetans in Kham and Amdo (Qinghai) begin revolt against Chinese rule
1956 Dalai Lama visits India for 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's birth
The United States begins to arm the Tibetan resistance via CIA
1959 DL flees to India; 87,000 Tibetans die in anti-Chinese revolt [Walt2]
1960 International Commission of Jurists: "acts of genocide [have] been
committed...to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group." [ICJ1]
1960-62 Tibet experiences its first famine as grain is requisitioned by PLA
1962 China-India War: China advances beyond McMahon Line, then withdraws
1962-75 TAR's peasants are herded into communes by collectivization campaign
1963 DL approves a democratic constitution for the Tibetan exile community
1964 The Panchen Lama is arrested after calling for Tibetan independence
1965 China sets up Tibet Autonomous Region in U-Tsang and western Kham
1966 The United States America recognizes China's sovereignty over Tibet
1966-69 Cultural Revolution: Red Guards vandalize temples, attack "four olds"
1969-71 Tibet is put under PLA military rule in order to suppress Red Guards
1971 The United States cuts off military aid to the Tibetan resistance
1974 Nepal forces the Tibetan resistance to abandon its base in Mustang
Sikkim votes overwhelmingly to join India; Ladakh opened to tourists
1976 The first permanent ethnic Chinese settlers arrive in TAR [Donnet94]
1977 Resistance burns 100 PLA vehicles in last major military operation
1978 Visitors find 8 temples left in TAR, down from 2,700 in 1959 [Far95]
1979 Tibet is opened to non-Chinese tourism for the first time since 1963
1979-80 China allows a series of three delegations from DL to visit Tibet
1980 CCP leader Hu Yaobang visits Lhasa; he promises to "relax" controls
and "restore the Tibetan economy to its pre-1959 level."[Strauss]
"Responsibility system" distributes collectivized land to individuals
1982 Writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn calls CCP regime in Tibet "more brutal
and inhuman than any other communist regime in the world."[Walt3]
1985 Bomb defused in Lhasa during the TAR 20th anniversary celebration
1987 Police fire on a massive pro-independence demonstration in Lhasa
1988 Qiao Shi, politburo member and internal security chief, visits Tibet
and vows to "adopt a policy of merciless repression." [Asia90]
Speaking in Strasbourg, France, the Dalai Lama elaborates on his 1987
"five point" proposal for Tibetan self-government within China.
1989 Police kill 80-150 in Lhasa's bloodiest riots in 30 years[Schwartz94]
Martial law imposed in Lhasa; Dalai Lama receives Nobel Peace Prize
1990 China lifts martial law in Lhasa 13 months after imposing it
The Voice of America initiates a Tibetan-language broadcast service
1992 Chen Kuiyuan named CCP leader for Tibet, calls for a purge of those
who "act as internal agents of the Dalai Lama clique."[Kristof93]
Over 30,000 visitors arrive in TAR's "Golden Year of Tibetan Tourism"
1991 1,000 Tibetan refugees, chosen by lottery, are admitted to the U.S.
1993 Residents of Lhasa protest for independence, against inflation and
the charging of fees for formally free medical services [Kaye93]
1994 Potala, former residence of the DL, is restored at a cost of $9 mln.
1995 A report on Chinese human rights violations, including one case where
a Tibetan nun was beaten to death, is narrowly rejected by the UN
DL recognizes six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as 11th Panchen Lama
China denounces the Dalai Lama's choice of Panchen Lama as a "fraud,"
selects rival candidate Gyaincain Norbu by golden urn process
Tibet's worst snowstorm in a century leaves more than 50 dead
1996 Earthquake in Lijang rates 7.0 on the Richter scale and kills 200
The U.S.-funded Radio Free Asia begins broadcasting on shortwave
Bomb explodes near government offices in Lhasa on Christmas day;
a 1 million yuan ($120,000) reward is offered to solve crime
DL takes steps to limit Shugden worship in Tibetan exile community
1997 Three monks close to DL are murdered; Shugden supporters suspected
Dalai Lama visits Taiwan and meets with ROC President Lee Teng-hui
Several major movies on Tibet, including _Kundun_ are released

http://stason.org/TULARC/travel/tibet/B1-What-are-the-major-events-of-Tibetan-history-timeline.html

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"Democratic Imperialism": Tibet, China, and the National Endowment for Democracy

by Michael Barker


Global Research, August 13, 2007

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People familiar with Asian history will be aware that during Tibet’s popular uprising against their Chinese occupiers in 1959, his Holiness Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama (then aged 23), escaped from his homeland of Tibet to live in exile in India. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama formed a Tibetan government-in-exile, and to this day the Dalai Lama and his government remain in exile. The Dalai Lama’s tireless efforts to draw international attention to the Tibetan cause received a welcome boost in 1989 when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and since then the Dalai Lama has been able to demand sustained media attention (globally) to his ongoing non-violent struggle for a free Tibet. This part of Tibetan history is fairly uncontroversial, but a part of Tibet’s story that less people will be familiar with is Tibet’s historical links to the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Indeed, as Carole McGranahan (2006) notes “[t]he case of Tibet presents a mostly unexplored example of covert Cold War military intervention.”[1]

While in recent years far more information has been made available concerning the CIA’s violent linkages with Tibetan forces, to date only one article has examined the connection between Tibet’s current independence campaigners and an organization that maintains close ties with the CIA, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).

A Brief History of CIA-Tibetan Relations

In 1951, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army entered Lhasa (Tibet’s capital) and proceeded to force the Dalai Lama’s government to sign a “Plan for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”, which effectively ratified the Chinese occupation of Tibet. This action combined with the ensuing Chinese repression of Tibetan activists subsequently inspired a popular revolution, which owing to its anticommunist orientation drew upon strong support from the CIA.[2] As Jim Mann (1999) notes, “during the 1950s and 60s, the CIA actively backed the Tibetan cause with arms, military training, money, air support and all sorts of other help.”[3] Furthermore, as Michael Parenti (2004) has observed at the same time:

“… in the United States, the American Society for a Free Asia, a CIA front, energetically publicized the cause of Tibetan resistance, with the Dalai Lama’s eldest brother, Thubtan Norbu, playing an active role in that group. The Dalai Lama’s second-eldest brother, Gyalo Thondup, established an intelligence operation with the CIA in 1951 [although CIA aid was only formally established in 1956]. He later upgraded it into a CIA-trained guerrilla unit whose recruits parachuted back into Tibet.”[4]

Indeed, according to formerly secret US intelligence documents (released in the late 1990s), it turned out that “[f]or much of the 1960s, the CIA provided the Tibetan exile movement with $1.7 million a year for operations against China, including an annual subsidy of $180,000 for the Dalai Lama”.[5] By 1969, however, it appears that covert support for the Tibetan cause had either served its geopolitical purpose (or it was decided that these operations were simply no longer effective), and the CIA announced the withdrawal of its aid for the Tibetan revolutionaries. That said, support for the Tibetan freedom fighters was still provided by the Indian and Taiwanese governments “until 1974, two years after President Richard Nixon normalized U.S. relations with China” (as were the U.S. subsidies for the Dalai Lama, which also continued until 1974): however, thereafter – especially once the Dalai Lama urged the fighters to put down their weapons – the violent resistance collapsed and the “CIA quietly paid to resettle the survivors”.[6] With the apparent end of CIA operations in Tibet, John Kraus (2003) observes that although:

“…President Ford ended the U.S. government’s involvement with Tibet as part of its Cold War strategy. The next phase of the U.S. relationship with the Dalai Lama and his people was to be cast in terms of a contest between human rights and political engagement with China.”[7]

Thus Kraus adds that in 1979 the Dalai Lama was “finally granted a visa by President Jimmy Carter… to visit the United States” and the “Tibetan cause then found new sponsors in a bipartisan group of senators, members of Congress, and congressional staff assistants who worked with the Dalai Lama’s entourage to focus the attention of successive U.S. administrations and a responsive world community on the Tibet situation”. As this article will demonstrate, a large part of this freedom work is presently being actively supported by the NED, so the following section will now examine this organization and it anti-democratic history.

The National Endowment for Democracy: Revisiting the CIA Connection

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was established in 1984 with bipartisan support during President Reagan’s administration to “foster the infrastructure of democracy – the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities” around the world.[8] Considering Reagan’s well documented misunderstanding of what constitutes democratic governance,[9] it is fitting that Allen Weinstein, the NEDs first acting president, observed that in fact “A lot of what we [the NED] do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA”.[10] So for example, it is not surprising that during the 1990 elections in Nicaragua it is has been estimated that “for every dollar of NED or AID funding there were several dollars of CIA funding”.[11]

By building upon the pioneering work of liberal philanthropists (like the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations’) – who have a long history of co-opting progressive social movements – it appears that the NED was envisaged by US foreign policy elites to be a more suitable way to provide strategic funding to nongovernmental organizations than via covert CIA funding.[12] Indeed, the NED’s ‘new’ emphasis on overt funding of geostrategically useful groups, as opposed to the covert funding, appears to have leant an aura of respect to the NED’s work, and has enabled them, for the most part, to avoid much critical commentary in the mainstream media.

The seminal book exposing the NED’s ‘democratic’ modus operandi, is William I. Robinson’s (1996) Promoting Polyarchy, which as it’s title suggests, lays out the argument that instead of promoting more participatory forms of democracy, the NED actually works to promote polyarchy. Robinson argues that the NED’s active promotion of polyarchy or low-intensity democracy “is aimed not only at mitigating the social and political tensions produced by elite-based and undemocratic status quos, but also at suppressing popular and mass aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratisation of social life in the twenty-first century international order.” His book furnishes detailed examples of how the NED has successfully imposed polyarchal arrangements on four countries, Chile, Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Haiti; while similarly, Barker (2006) has illustrated the NED’s anti-democratic involvement in facilitating and manipulating the ‘colour revolutions’ which recently swept across Eastern Europe. More recently, both Barker and Gerald Sussman (2006) have provided detailed examinations’ of how the NED works to promote a low intensity public sphere (globally) through its selective funding of media organizations.[13] This article will now extend these three initial studies by critically examining the NED’s support for Tibetan media projects from 1990 onwards.

‘Democacy Promoters’ and Tibet

The International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) was founded in 1988 and is a non-profit membership organization with offices in Washington, DC, Amsterdam, Berlin and Brussels. Their website notes that they “fundamentally believe that there must be a political solution based on direct dialogue between the Dalai Lama and his representatives and the People’s Republic of China.” ICT received their first NED grant (of the 1990s) in 1994 to:

“…enhance Chinese knowledge of Tibet by contributing articles about Tibet to newspapers and magazines within China and abroad; translating books about Tibet into Chinese; and facilitating a series of discussion meetings among key Chinese and Tibetan figures, focusing on bringing Chinese journalists and pro-democracy leaders together with Tibetan leaders in exile.”

Since then, the ICT has received regular support from the NED, obtaining subsequent grants in 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003 (all for media work except the 1997 grant). Like many groups that obtain NED aid, ICT are not afraid to boast of their ‘democratic’ connections, and in 2005 they even awarded one of their annual Light of Truth awards to the president of the NED, Carl Gershman. Furthermore, the year before (in 2004) ICT gave the same award to both Vaclav Havel (who had received the NED’s Democracy Award in 1991, and serves on the advisory board of the Project on Justice in Times of Transition), and also to one of the earliest ‘democracy promoting’ organizations, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. (For a summary of the key ‘democratic’ connections of the Project on Justice in Times of Transition and all the other groups mentioned in this article see, Barker (2007) Hijacking Human Rights: A Critical Examination of Human Rights Watch’s Americas Branch and their Links to the ‘Democracy’ Establishment. Due to this article’s heavy reliance on internet sources most links have been omitted from the paper, however, a fully referenced paper can be obtained from the author upon request.)

Some of ICT’s directors are also integral members of the ‘democracy promoting’ establishment, and include Bette Bao Lord (who is the chair of Freedom House, and a director of Freedom Forum),[14] Gare A. Smith (who has previously served as principal deputy assistant secretary in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), Julia Taft (who is a former director of the NED, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, has worked for USAID, and has also served as the President and CEO of InterAction), and finally, Mark Handelman (who is also a director of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights, an organization whose work is ideologically linked to the NED’s longstanding interventions in Haiti).[15] The ICT’s board of advisors also presents two individuals who are closely linked to the NED, Harry Wu, and Qiang Xiao (who is the former executive director of the NED-funded Human Rights in China).[16] Like their board of directors, ICT’s international council of advisors includes many ‘democratic’ notables like Vaclav Havel, Fang Lizhi (who in 1995 – at least – was a board member of Human Rights in China), Jose Ramos-Horta (who serves on the international advisory board for the Democracy Coalition Project), Kerry Kennedy (who is a director of the NED-funded China Information Center), Vytautas Landsbergis (who is an international patron of the British-based neoconservative Henry Jackson Society – see Clark, 2005), and until her recent death, the “mid-wife of the neocons” Jeane J. Kirkpatrick (who was also linked to ‘democratic’ groups like Freedom House and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies).[17]

Next up is the Tibet Fund, who first received NED aid in 1990 to “produce audio cassettes that will bring world and Tibetan news into rural communities in Tibet.” They then received continued NED support for this work in 1994 and 1996, whereupon the distribution of the audio tapes was extended to Tibetan exile communities in India and Nepal as well as those in Tibet. In 1996, the Tibet Fund also received NED aid on behalf of the Tibet Voice Project, “for an educational initiative based in Dharamsala, India, aimed at raising the social, political, economic and environmental awareness of Tibetans through audio-visual media.” The NED notes that:

“Particular emphasis will be given to speeches of the Dalai Lama on the topics of democracy and human rights. In Dharamsala, it will continue a series of lectures and films emphasizing social issues, politics, the economy and environment for new refugees and Tibetans in exile; and will organize grassroots level dialogues between Tibetans in exile and Indian youth to increase awareness and support for the Tibetan cause in India.”

The Tibet Fund’s work with the Tibet Voice Project was continued in 1998, and the Fund also received NED aid to run “an electronic media workshop for Tibetan journalists, and to introduce a bi-monthly Chinese language news magazine about Tibet.” Tenzing Choephel is the Tibetan scholarship program co-ordinator for the Tibet Fund, and it important to note that he previously helped “lay the foundation of the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy [a group that was founded in 1996 and received NED funding in 1999], where he worked as an Office Administrator / English Researcher for three years in Dharamsala.” Finally it is interesting to observe that three people who are involved with the International Campaign for Tibet are linked to the Tibet fund, these are Lodi G. Gyari (who is the the executive chairman of the board of the ICT, and an emertius director of the Tibet Fund), Gehlek Rinpoche (who serves on ICT’s advisory board, and is a director of the Tibet Fund), and Tenzin N. Tethong (who serves on ICT’s advisory board, and is a founder and emeritus director of the Tibet Fund).

Another group that has received strong NED backing is the London-based Tibet Information Network (TIN), who between 1999 and 2004 received annual NED grants (excepting 2000) to “provide comprehensive, accurate information about political, social, and economic developments in Tibet to Tibetan audiences, the international community, human rights groups, and the media.” TIN was cofounded in 1987 by Nicholas Howen (who is now the secretary general of the International Commission of Jurists) and Robert J. Barnett. Robert J. Barnett was the Director of TIN between 1987 and 1998 and now works at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute, alongside fellow faculty member Andrew J. Nathan (who is an editor of the NED’s Journal of Democracy, and also serves on the advisory board for the NED-funded Beijing Spring magazine). It is important to note that between 1998 and 2002 – the time coinciding with the start of the NED’s support for TIN – the organization was directed by Richard Oppenheimer who incidentally had just spent 22 years working for the BBC World Service. In 2002, Oppenheimer was then replaced by the world famous Tibetologist, Thierry Dodin, who left TIN in 2005 when it was announced that TIN “had to close down for lack of funds”, and he subsequently went on to direct the TibetInfoNet.[18]

The Tibetan Literary Society received NED aid between 2000 and 2005 to publish the Bod-Kyi-Dus-Bab (Tibet Times), a Tibetan language newspaper which was founded in 1996 and is published three times a month in Dharamsala, India. In 1998 and 1999 the newspaper itself also received direct support from the NED. Another group to receive NED support is the Tibet Multimedia Center, which received three grants from the NED between 2000 to 2002 to:

“…provide objective information about Tibet for Tibetans in the country and in exile as well as for audiences in China. The center will produce audio and videocassettes, organize debates among Tibetan high school students in exile and publish a Chinese language magazine to educate the Chinese public about the situation in Tibet and the struggle for human rights.”

Between 1999 and 2005 the Tibetan Review Trust Society received four grants to publish the Tibetan Review, a monthly English-language news magazine based in New Delhi, India, “that covers Tibet-related news and analysis.” The Tibetan Review was founded in 1968 and it’s precursor was Lodi G. Gyari’s (see earlier) The Voice of Tibet: in the early 1970s the Tibetan Review was published by Tenzin N. Tethong (who at the time headed the International Campaign for Tibet), and after passing through the hands of a number of other Directors it is now being edited by Pema Thinley (who is the former Executive Editor of Tibetan Bulletin, the “official journal of the Central Tibet Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama”).

Finally, in 2001 and 2002, the Voice of Tibet – a Tibetan-language shortwave radio station which was founded in 1996 – obtained NED aid to provide “regular news about Tibet, the Tibetan exile community, and the Tibetan government-in-exile, for listeners in Tibet and in exile in neighboring countries.” According to their website “[e]very day Voice of Tibet broadcasts a 30 minutes news service in the Tibetan language and a 15 minutes news service in Mandarin Chinese.” Voice of Tibet was founded by three Norwegian NGOs; the Norwegian Human Rights House, the Norwegian Tibet Committee and Worldview Rights. The final group is particularly interesting as it is also known as the Points of Peace Foundation, which is a “human rights organisation based in Stavanger, Norway, with a mandate to support Nobel Peace Prize Laureates in urgent need of media, dialogue and communication assistance in their home countries and internationally.” Crucially, the Points of Peace Foundation’s advisory board includes Jose Ramos-Horta, John Hume (who is a former patron of the British version of the NED, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy), Aung San Suu Kyi (who is a member of the international advisory board of the Democracy Coalition Project, and is an honorary director of the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance), Wangari Maathai (who is a member of the international advisory board of the Democracy Coalition Project, and is a trustee of World Learning), Mairead Corrigan Maguire (who is a member of the international council of advisors for the International Campaign for Tibet), and Muhammad Yunus (who is on the advisory board of Stockholm Challenge, where he sits alongside NED director Esther Dyson, and US Institute for Peace advisory board member John Gage). (Two other groups to receive NED aid for communication work in Tibet since 1990 for which no further information could be ascertained include the Tibet Justice Center (which received a single grant in 2002), and the Tibet Museum (which received NED support in both 2004 and 2005).)

Conclusion

This article has demonstrated the close ties that exist between the Dalai Lama’s non-violent campaign for Tibetan independence and U.S. foreign policy elites who are actively supporting Tibetan causes through the NED. This finding is particularly worrying given the high international media profile of many of the groups exposed in this article, especially when it is remembered that the NED’s activities are intimately linked with those of the CIA. This funding issue is clearly problematic for Tibetan (or foreign) activists campaigning for Tibetan freedom, as the overwhelmingly anti-democratic nature of the NED can only weaken the legitimacy of the claims of any group associated with the NED. In this regard it seems only fitting that progressive activists truly concerned with promoting freedom and democracy in Tibet should first and foremost cast a critical eye over the antidemocratic funders of many of the Tibetan groups identified in this study. Only then will they be able to reappraise the sustainability of their work in the light of the NED’s controversial background. Once this step has been taken, perhaps progressive solutions for restoring democratic governance to Tibet can be generated by concerned activists, so that Tibetan people wanting to reclaim their homeland will able to be more sure that they are bringing democracy home to Tibet, not polyarchy.

Michael Barker is a doctoral candidate at Griffith University, Australia. He can be reached at Michael.J.Barker@griffith.edu.au

References

[1] McGranahan, C. “Tibet’s Cold War: The CIA and the Chushi Gangdrug Resistance, 1956–1974.” Journal of Cold War Studies, 8 (3), (2006), p.105.

[2] Conboy, K. and J.Morrison. The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.

Deane, H. “The Cold War in Tibet.” Covert Action Information Bulletin 29 (Winter 1987): 48-50.

Knaus, J. K. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. New York: Public Affairs, 1999.

[3] Mann, J. “CIA Funded Covert Tibet Exile Campaign in 1960s.” The Age (Melbourne), 16 Sept. 1998. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[4] Parenti, M. “Friendly Feudalism: The Tibet Myth (Updated).” Jul. 2004. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[5] Mann, J. “CIA Funded Covert Tibet Exile Campaign in 1960s.” The Age (Melbourne), 16 Sept. 1998. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[6] Knaus, J. K. Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival. New York: Public Affairs, 1999.

Salopek, P. “The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet.” Seattle Times, 26 Jan. 1997. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[7] Knaus, J. K. “Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance.” Journal of Cold War Studies, 5 (3), (2003), p.78.

[8] Reagan, R. W. “Address to Members of the British Parliament.” Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 8 Jun. 1982. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[9] Rasmus, J. The War at Home: The Corporate Offensive Against American Workers and Unions from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush. San Ramon, CA: Kyklos Productions, 2006.

[10] Ignatius, D. “Innocence Abroad: The New World of Spyless Coups.” The Washington Post, 22 September 1991.

[11] Robinson, W. I. and J. Gindin. “The Battle for Global Civil Society.” Venezuelanalysis.com, 13 Jun. 2005. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[12] Barker, M. J. “Taking the Risk Out of Civil Society: Harnessing Social movements and Regulating Revolutions.” Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle 25-27 September 2006. 21 Jun. 2007. .

Roelofs, J. Foundations and Public Policy: The Mask of Pluralism. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.

[13] Barker, M. J. “The National Endowment for Democracy and the Promotion of ‘Democratic’ Media Systems Worldwide.” Communication for Development and Social Change: A Global Journal (In Press).

Barker, M. J. “Democracy or Polyarchy? US-Funded Media Developments in Afghanistan and Iraq Post 9/11.” Media Culture Society (In Press).

Sussman, G. “The Myths of ‘Democracy Assistance’: U.S. Political Intervention in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe.” Monthly Review, Dec. 2006. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[14] Barker, M. J. “A Force More Powerful: Promoting ‘Democracy’ Through Civil Disobedience.” State of Nature, Mar. 2007. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[15] Fenton, A. “Canada’s Growing Role in Haitian Affairs (Part I).” Znet, 21 Mar. 2005. 21 Jun. 2007. .

[16] For a detailed examination of both individuals strong ties to the NED see Barker, M. J. “Promoting a Low Intensity Public Sphere: American Led Efforts to Promote a ‘Democratic Media’ Environment in China.” A paper to presented at the China Media Centre Conference (Brisbane, Australia: Creative Industries Precinct, 5-6 July 2007).

Also of interest is Barker, M. J. “Hijacking Human Rights: A Critical Examination of Human Rights Watch’s Americas Branch and their Links to the ‘Democracy’ Establishment.” Znet, August 3, 2007. .

[17]Grandin, G. Empire's workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006.

[18] Robert, P. “Tibet Information Network Closes as Funds Dry Up.” Tibet Information Network, 13 Sep. 2005. 21 Jun. 2007. .

Global Research Articles by Michael Barker

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6530

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The politics of Tibet: a 2007 reality check

N. Ram

There have been five rounds of talks since 2002 between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. While China’s leaders have clarified that “all matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed,” the Dalai Lama says he is committed to resolving the Tibet question within the framework of China’s sovereignty and Constitution. But there is a big gap — on two core issues.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Dalai Lama, who turns 72 on July 5, has suffered some health setbacks over the past few years. While his senior aides have characterised these problems as “minor” and age-related, the fact that he was hospitalised and has had to cancel some scheduled foreign visits has raised the level of personal concern and political anxiety among his flock.

He has fuelled uncertainty about the future by making a profusion of statements about his own mortality. At times, he has indicated that he might choose to be the last Dalai Lama; and even proposed ‘democratic’ modalities for ending the institution. But he has also said: “If I die in exile, and if the Tibetan people wish to continue the institution of the Dalai Lama, my reincarnation will not be born under Chinese control … That reincarnation … will be outside, in the free world. This I can say with absolute certainty.” These remarks make it clear that while the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine of reincarnation belongs to the mystical-religious realm and asks a lot from 21st century believers, the Dalai Lama’s approach even to rebirth is decidedly ideological-political.

As religious leaders go, the Dalai Lama is certainly one of the world’s most-recognised faces. In this respect, he is comparable to Pope John Paul II and Ayatollah Khomeini, except that he has been on the world stage for much longer than either of them was. Centuries of history bear down on him. For he is the 14th in an ‘incarnate’ series launched in the 16th century when a Mongol chieftain, who owed allegiance to China’s Ming Emperor, conferred the honorific ‘Dalai’ (‘Ocean’) on a ‘Living Buddha’ of the Gelug sect who became the 3rd Dalai Lama. (Two predecessors were posthumously recognised.)

Historical records show that the institution of the Dalai Lama as an ‘incarnate’ politico-religious supremo — recognised and empowered by the Chinese central government — began in the middle of the 17th century, when the Great Fifth received a formal title, a golden certificate of appointment, and a golden seal of authority from the Qing Emperor whom he visited, and paid homage to, in Beijing. Interestingly, on February 22, 1940, Tenzin Gyatso was enthroned as the 14th Dalai Lama at the Potala Palace after receiving the necessary certificates and seals of approval from the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek, which in fact allocated 400,000 silver dollars to cover the expenses of the enthronement ceremony.

The shy and diffident religious leader who was prevailed upon to flee Tibet during the 1959 armed uprising and has, since 1960, been based with his entourage in Dharamsala — India’s ‘Little Lhasa’ — has developed into a consummate public figure and world traveller. Winner of the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize, the 14th Dalai Lama has been primarily responsible for keeping the Tibet question active internationally, within China, and in the arena of India-China bilateral relations.

Politically, Tibet presents a paradox.

On the one side, there is not a single country and government in the world that disputes the status of Tibet; that does not recognise it as a part of China; that is willing to accord any kind of legal recognition to the Dalai Lama’s ‘government-in-exile’ based in Dharamsala. This situation presents a contrast to the lack of an international consensus on the legal status of Kashmir.

India’s stand

With respect to Tibet, India, which started out in the late 1940s with a policy of ambivalence shaped by the British Raj, has come a long way. In the “Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” issued at the end of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s official visit to China in June 2003, India firmly reiterated its “one China policy” and recognised that “the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” It added that it did not allow Tibetans “to engage in anti-China political activities in India.” The Manmohan Singh government reiterated this official Indian position in the Joint Statement issued at the end of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India in April 2005.

On the other side, there is little doubt that there is a Tibet political question; that it has a problematical international dimension; that it continues to cause concern to the political leadership and people of China; and that it serves to confuse and divide public opinion abroad and, to an extent, at home.

This problematical side is a function of the interplay of a host of subjective and objective factors. They are the Dalai Lama’s religious charisma combined with the iconic international status of Tibetan Buddhism; his long-lastingness and tenacity; his alignment with colonial interests and western powers and the ideological-political purposes he has served over half a century; his considerable wealth and global investments, and resources mobilised from the Tibetan disaspora in various countries; the grievous cultural and human damage done in Tibet, as in the rest of China, during the decade of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ (1966-1976); the nature of the ‘independence for Tibet’ movement that has rallied round the person and office of the Dalai Lama and follows anything but the Buddhist ‘Middle Way’; the links and synergies he has established with Hollywood, the media, legislators, and other influential constituencies in the west; and, most troubling from a progressive Indian standpoint, the reality of a continuing Indian base of operations for the ‘Tibetan government-in-exile.’

A political figure

The long-term assessment of China’s political leadership has been that the Dalai Lama cannot be treated merely, or even primarily, as a religious leader. If he were just a pre-eminent religious leader, there would be no problem in accommodating him within the constitutional framework that guarantees religious freedom to all citizens and regional autonomy to ethnic minorities in extensive parts of a giant country. In fact, the 14th Dalai Lama is a consummate politician leading a movement that seeks to take ‘Greater Tibet’ away from the motherland — an anti-communist and separatist political figure, with external links.

The Dalai Lama’s track record certainly bears out this assessment. In September 1959, acting against Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s advice, he sought unsuccessfully to get the United Nations to intervene in Tibet. His ‘Tibetan government-in-exile,’ with its ‘Draft Constitution for Future Tibet’ and its front organisations, functions in flagrant disregard of legality as well as India’s long-declared official policy of not allowing Tibetans “to engage in anti-China political activities in India.”

Over the past three decades, following a high-level political decision, the Dalai Lama has travelled extensively abroad to rally support for the internationalisation of the Tibet question and presented various ‘realistic’ proposals for its ‘satisfactory and just solution.’ These have included a Five Point Peace Plan unfurled in a September 1987 address to members of the U.S. Congress; the elaboration of these five points in the so-called Strasbourg Proposal of June 1988; the withdrawal, in March 1991, of his “personal commitment” to the ideas expressed in the Strasbourg Proposal on the basis of the allegation that the Chinese leadership had a “closed and negative” attitude to the problem; and an abrasive and propagandistic open letter written to Deng Xiaoping in September 1992.

In his major pronouncements, the Dalai Lama has taken the stand that Tibet has been an independent nation from ancient times; that it has been a strategic ‘buffer state’ in the heart of Asia guaranteeing the region’s stability; that it has never ‘conceded’ its ‘sovereignty’ to China or any other foreign power; that China’s control over Tibet is in the nature of ‘occupation’ by a ‘colonial’ power; and that ‘the Tibetan people have never accepted the loss of national sovereignty.’

Equally important, he has repeatedly spoken of ‘six million Tibetans.’ He has falsely accused China of rendering Tibetans, through a state-sponsored policy of population transfer and Hanisation, into a ‘minority’ in their own land. The plain truth, borne out by official censuses and easily verifiable by foreign observers and experts, is that Tibetans constitute more than 92 per cent of the population of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). The Dalai Lama has even accused the Chinese socialist state of unleashing a ‘holocaust’ and exterminating more than a million Tibetans. He has put forward the demand for the reconstitution of a ‘Greater Tibet’ known as ‘Cholka-Sum’ and comprising the areas of ‘U-Tsang, Kham, and Amdo.’ He has demanded that ‘Chinese forces,’ the People’s Liberation Army, should pull out of Greater Tibet and that “a regional peace conference should be convened to guarantee demilitarisation in Tibet.” If the 14th Dalai Lama has his way, a single ‘de-Hanised’ administrative unit, which will be formed by breaking up four Chinese provinces, will appropriate one-fourth of China’s territory — instead of the one-eighth covered by TAR.

The Dalai Lama has even sought to implicate India in his political project, observing on one occasion, at a seminar, that “it is more reasonable for India to own sovereignty over Tibet than China.”

There have been other political provocations under the guise of exercising traditional religious authority. On May 14, 1995, in a pre-emptive bid, the Dalai Lama in exile in India ‘recognised’ the boy Gendhun Choekyi Nyima, sight unseen of course, as the 11th Panchen Lama. However, in December 1995, the Chinese central government, going by centuries-old custom and tradition that empower it to recognise and appoint both the Dalai and the Panchen Lama, approved the enthronement of Gyaltsen Norbu as the 11th Panchen Erdeni.

Over the past three decades, the Chinese leadership has fashioned and finessed its strategy of dealing politically with the Dalai Lama and his followers. In December 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced in a media interview that “the Dalai Lama may return, but only as a Chinese citizen” and that “we have but one demand — patriotism. And we say that anyone is welcome, whether he embraces patriotism early or late.” In May 1991, Prime Minister Li Peng clarified that “we have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is an inalienable part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling … All matters except ‘Tibetan independence’ can be discussed.” However, after several rounds of informal talks and contacts with the Dalai Lama’s emissaries and fact-finding delegations between 1979 and 1992, and after watching his performance on the international stage, the Chinese government came to a provisional conclusion by the time it held the Third National Conference on Work in Tibet in 1994. The conclusion was that the ‘Dalai clique’ was demonstrably insincere; that it was working overtime to separate Tibet from China and destabilise the situation in TAR in concert with ‘China’s international enemies’; and that its real demands were tantamount to independence, ‘semi-independence’ or ‘independence in disguise.’

But that was by no means the end of the story. In an era of China’s unprecedented economic growth, inclusive and nuanced socio-political and cultural policies, when serious international political support for ‘Tibetan independence’ is non-existent, the Dalai Lama has been obliged to back-pedal on the key issues. In turn, the Chinese central government and the Communist Party of China have shown exceptional patience. This has meant that since 2002 five rounds of discussion have taken place between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.

According to remarks made on November 14, 2006 at the Brookings Institution by Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari, the ‘lead individual’ designated by the Dalai Lama to “reach out to the Chinese leadership,” these talks have deepened mutual understanding, “brought the dialogue to a new level,” and gone “a long way towards establishing a climate of openness that is essential to reaching mutually agreeable decisions regarding the future of the Tibetan and the Chinese people.” For a start, the Dalai Lama’s representatives have declared themselves to be “encouraged by the new focus within China’s leadership on the creation of a ‘harmonious society’… [and] by the concept of China’s ‘peaceful rise,’ whereby it will develop as a ‘modern socialist country that is prosperous, democratic, and culturally advanced.’”

They have also stated that the Dalai Lama’s current approach is to “look to the future as opposed to Tibet’s history to resolve its status vis-À-vis China” because “revisiting history will not serve any useful purpose.” Further, they have clarified, the crux of the Dalai Lama’s ‘Middle Way’ approach is to “recognise today’s reality that Tibet is part of the People’s Republic of China … and not raise the issue of separation from China in working on a mutually acceptable solution for Tibet.” His commitment is to “a resolution that has Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic of China, the need to unify all Tibetan people into one administrative entity, and the importance of granting genuine autonomy to the Tibetan people within the framework of the Chinese Constitution.”

Therein lies a big gap — which cannot be narrowed unless the Dalai Lama and his establishment radically modify their stand on two core issues.

The core issues

First, the concept of ‘high-level’ or ‘maximum’ autonomy in line with the ‘one country, two systems’ principle (which Beijing holds to be applicable only to Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) is very different from what the Chinese constitutional framework and the law on national regional autonomy stipulate. The law, it has been pointed out, defines national regional autonomy as the basic political system of the Communist Party of China to solve the country’s ethnic issues using Marxism-Leninism. The content of autonomy, which in the Chinese constitutional and political context essentially means self-administering opportunities and subsidies and preferential policies from the state to help the autonomous region overcome historical backwardness, can certainly be improved.

However, the kind of autonomy that the Dalai Lama demanded in November 2005 — “the Central Government should take care of defence and foreign affairs, because the Tibetans have no experience in this regard, but the Tibetans should have full responsibility for education, economic development, environmental protection, and religion” — cannot possibly be accommodated within the Chinese Constitution. Further, his demand that “a Tibetan government should be set up in Lhasa and should have an elected administrative chief and possess a bicameral legislative organ and an independent judicial system” is ruled out of court. Beijing’s 2004 white paper, “National Regional Autonomy in Tibet,” is emphatic that, in contrast to Hong Kong and Macao that follow the capitalist system, Tibet does not face the possibility of introducing another social system. The democratic reform, introduced in 1959 ahead of schedule thanks to the armed uprising and the Dalai Lama’s flight, abolished serfdom along with the ancien regime and introduced the socialist system in stages in Tibet. Beijing is clear that there is no going back on this.

Secondly, the 2.6 million Tibetans in TAR — a number that has grown steadily and is more than twice the Tibetan population in the region when the Dalai Lama went into exile — form only 40 per cent of the total population of Tibetans in China. In responding to the demand for ‘one administrative entity’ for all ethnic Tibetans, the Chinese government makes the perfectly reasonable point that TAR parallels the area under the former Tibetan regime. Acceptance of the demand for ‘Greater Tibet’ means breaking up the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan, where there are a large number of Tibetan autonomous counties and prefectures; doing ethnic re-engineering, if not ‘cleansing’; and causing enormous de-stabilisation and damage to China’s state, society, and political system.

The talks will continue, as they should. Civility, open-mindedness, flexibility, and a positive attitude to resolving the Tibet question will certainly help, on both sides. During our visit to Tibet in June 2007, Nima Tsiren, vice-chairman of the regional government, responded to a question on the Dalai Lama by citing an observation made by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao at a Beijing press conference on March 16, 2007: “We will not only hear what he has to say; more importantly, we will watch what he does. We hope that the Dalai Lama will do something useful for China’s unity and the development of Tibet.”

Democratic India must hope so too.

http://www.thehindu.com/2007/07/05/stories/2007070559671300.htm

Posted by google at 12:43 AM | Comments (0)

Dalai Lama Group Says It Got Money From C.I.A.

World News Briefs; Dalai Lama Group Says It Got Money From C.I.A.
The Dalai Lama's administration acknowledged today that it received $1.7 million a year in the 1960's from the Central Intelligence Agency, but denied reports that the Tibetan leader benefited personally from an annual subsidy of $180,000.

The money allocated for the resistance movement was spent on training volunteers and paying for guerrilla operations against the Chinese, the Tibetan government-in-exile said in a statement. It added that the subsidy earmarked for the Dalai Lama was spent on setting up offices in Geneva and New York and on international lobbying.

The Dalai Lama, 63, a revered spiritual leader both in his Himalayan homeland and in Western nations, fled Tibet in 1959 after a failed uprising against a Chinese military occupation, which began in 1950.

The decade-long covert program to support the Tibetan independence movement was part of the C.I.A.'s worldwide effort to undermine Communist governments, particularly in the Soviet Union and China.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEFD61538F931A35753C1A96E958260

Posted by google at 12:39 AM | Comments (0)

Tibetan People's Uprising Movement

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDoEHW75FCM

Posted by google at 12:37 AM | Comments (0)

Route changes, scuffles mark Olympic torch relay

http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/04/09/torch.protest/index.html#cnnSTCVideo

Posted by google at 12:34 AM | Comments (0)

April 11, 2008

Understanding Tibet in Time and Space

http://chinadatacenter.org/presentation/Tibet_files/frame.htm

Posted by google at 11:43 PM | Comments (0)

The United States, Tibet, and the Cold War

C Melvyn C. Goldstein

U.S. policy toward Tibet has operated on two levels. At the strategic level, the United States has consistently supported the Chinese position that Tibet is part of China. At the pragmatic or tactical level, Washington has been opportunistic in its dealings with Tibet and has been prone to wide fluctuations, ranging from the provision of financial and military aid to Tibetan guerrilla forces in the 1950s and 1960s to neglect and almost no official contact in the 1970s and 1980s.

The first phase of the U.S.-Tibetan relationship encompassed the period from World War II to the fall of the Guomindang government in China in 1949. During these years, Tibet was de facto an independent state. China had exercised no authority in Tibet since 1913, and Tibet controlled not only its internal affairs but also its territorial defense and foreign relations.

The first statement of U.S. policy toward Tibet appeared in July 1942 in a memorandum to the British government:

For its part, the Government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims.1
At about the same time, the United States established direct contact with Tibet, sending two reconnaissance specialists from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, the wartime intelligence agency) into Tibet to travel overland to China and assess the potential for construction of roads and airfields. The U.S. government first asked its close ally, the Chinese Nationalist leader Jiäng Jièshi, to arrange this visit, but he was unable to do so because of the lack of Chinese control over Tibet. Hence, Washington asked the British (who had a representative in Lhasa) to secure permission from the Tibetan government. [End Page 145] After British envoys assured the Tibetan authorities that this was an official U.S. mission that could benefit Tibet, the Tibetan Foreign Affairs Bureau granted transit permission to the two OSS officers. They entered Tibet from India carrying presents and a letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to the 14th Dalai Lama asking him to assist the officers. Dated 3 July 1942, the letter read:

Your HOLINESS:
Two of my fellow countrymen, Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, hope to visit your Pontificate and the historic and widely famed city of Lhasa. There are in the United States of America many persons, among them myself, who, long and greatly interested in your land and people, would highly value such an opportunity.

As you know, the people of the United States, in association with those of twenty-seven other countries, are now engaged in a war which has been thrust upon the world by nations bent on conquest who are intent on destroying freedom of thought, of religion, and of action everywhere. The United Nations are fighting today in defense of and for preservation of freedom, confident that we shall be victorious because our cause is just, our capacity is adequate, and our determination is unshakable.

I am asking Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan to convey to you a little gift in token of my friendly sentiment toward you.

With cordial greetings
Franklin D. Roosevelt2

Following this visit, the United States sent several wireless radios to Tibet, also without going through China.

These contacts, however, did not amount to government-to-government relations, at least from Washington's perspective. Although U.S. officials were dealing directly with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government, the Roosevelt administration did not regard this as in any way legitimizing Tibetan claims to independence from China. William Donovan, the director of OSS, explained this point to President Roosevelt at the time: "This letter is addressed to the Dalai Lama in his capacity of [sic] religious leader of Tibet, rather than in his capacity of secular leader of Tibet, thus avoiding giving any possible offense to the Chinese Government which includes Tibet in the territory [End Page 146] of the Republic of China."3 The United States, however, refrained from mentioning this interpretation of Tibet's status to the Tibetan authorities.

In July 1948, the situation was reversed when the Tibetan government sent an official trade delegation to the United States. The U.S. State Department informed its embassy in New Delhi that because the United States did not recognize Tibet as a country the trade mission could be received only on an informal basis. Moreover, rather than referring to Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet as in 1942, the State Department at this point used the more anodyne term "sovereignty":

It should be recalled that China claims of sovereignty over Tibet and that this Government has never questioned that claim; accordingly it would not be possible for this government to accord members of the projected mission other than an informal reception unless the missions enjoyed the official sanction of the Chinese Government.4
Nevertheless, at the tactical level, the United States was again willing to deal with Tibet independent of China and in fact tried to ensure that the Tibetan trade delegation's visit enjoyed a modicum of success. For example, under strong pressure from China, the State Department insisted that the Tibetans could not meet President Harry Truman unless they were accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to the United States. But when the Tibetans refused, the Truman administration allowed them to meet with Secretary of State George C. Marshall without being accompanied by the Chinese ambassador.

The rapid disintegration of the Guomindang regime in the first half of 1949 pushed the Tibet question into the realm of Cold War politics. In April 1949 the U.S. embassy in New Delhi urged the State Department to conduct a review of U.S. policy toward Tibet. The embassy suggested that if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) succeeded in taking control in Beijing, the United States should be prepared to treat Tibet as an independent country. The embassy concluded that keeping Tibet friendly to the United States and other Western countries was useful so long as it did not "give offense" to the sensibilities of Jiäng Jièshi and his government on Taiwan:

It is believed to be clearly to our advantage under any circumstances to have Tibet as a friend if possible. We should accordingly maintain a friendly attitude toward Tibet in ways short of giving China [the Guomindang] cause for offense. We should encourage so far as feasible Tibet's orientation toward the West rather than toward the East. [End Page 147]
For the present we should avoid giving the impression of any alteration in our position toward Chinese authority over Tibet such as for example steps which would clearly indicate that we regard Tibet as independent, etc. . . . We should however keep our policy as flexible as possible by avoiding references to Chinese sovereignty or suzerainty unless references are clearly called for and by informing China of our proposed moves in connection with Tibet, rather than asking China's consent for them.5
Despite this recommendation, the State Department ultimately decided not to change the U.S. position. In late December 1949 the Tibetan government requested permission to send a special delegation to the United States to seek aid and support against the victorious CCP. The State Department turned down the request and instructed the U.S. ambassador in India to dissuade the Tibetans from sending such a delegation.6

Events on the ground changed quickly after the inauguration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. The CCP promptly set out to "liberate" Tibet—that is, to incorporate Tibet into China. In October 1950, after the Chinese had tried but failed to persuade the Dalai Lama to negotiate Tibet's "liberation," the PRC invaded Tibet's easternmost province. The Dalai Lama shifted his residence from Lhasa to a town near the Indian border so that he could easily flee into exile if the Chinese pressed further with their military occupation, and he appealed for help from the United States, Western Europe, and the United Nations (UN). When none was forthcoming, he sent a delegation to Beijing to negotiate Tibet's return to China. In May 1951 the two sides signed what became known as the "Seventeen-Point Agreement" (Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet), a document that for the first time formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Tibet.

The Dalai Lama himself, however, had not signed the agreement, nor was he even aware of its terms when it was signed. Consequently, the U.S. government urged him to declare the accord invalid and to flee into exile. This effort was unsuccessful, and the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa to try to live under the terms of the Seventeen-Point Agreement and Chinese rule. At the heart of his decision was his perception that the United States, though it might express sympathy for Tibet and offer some limited support, was unwilling to endorse Tibetan independence and would not provide substantial military aid or political backing for a government-in-exile headed by the Dalai Lama that would aspire to independence. In September 1951, after the Dalai Lama had [End Page 148] already returned to Lhasa to live under the terms of the new agreement, the U.S. government sent the last, and most forthcoming, of a series of messages to the Tibetan leader. The message called on him to flee Lhasa and stated that if he left Tibet, publicly disavowed the Seventeen-Point Agreement, and agreed to cooperate in opposing Communist aggression, the United States would officially adopt the position that the Dalai Lama is the "head of an autonomous Tibet" and would "support your return to Tibet at the earliest practicable moment as the head of an autonomous and non-communist, country."7

Thus, even at this late juncture, the U.S. government was unwilling to accommodate the Dalai Lama's fundamental desire to gain international support for Tibetan independence. Consequently, the Tibetan leader opted to remain in Lhasa as part of the PRC, dashing U.S. hopes of enlisting him in its anti-Chinese Communist crusade.8

Tibet remained in this uneasy situation for the next five years, lacking any further contact with the United States. But in 1956 the U.S. government again became actively involved in Tibet when a series of revolts broke out in Kham, the areas of western China inhabited by ethnic Tibetans. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) immediately made contact with the resistance leaders and by 1957 had begun to train and provide weapons to Tibetan guerrilla forces.9

Over the next three years, the situation within Tibet proper deteriorated, culminating in an uprising in Lhasa in March 1959 that sent the Dalai Lama into exile in India. The United States now had achieved what it so energetically sought without success in 1950–1951. Faced with this unexpected turn of events, U.S. officials had to decide how to proceed.10 [End Page 149]

At the operational level, the CIA continued its covert support for a Tibetan guerrilla force and received high-level approval to set up a new training base in northern Nepal for resistance fighters who could be infiltrated into Tibet. The CIA also provided funds and other forms of non-military support for the Dalai Lama.11 With regard to the international status of Tibet, however, the United States was much less forthcoming.

In late April 1959, just after the Dalai Lama fled into exile, he sent a message to the U.S. government that was summarized in a memorandum from Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. The Dalai Lama asked that "the United States recognize the Free Tibetan Government and influence other countries to do so. In this connection, he [the Dalai Lama] emphasizes his determination to work for complete independence, regardless of the time required for ending the opposition of India, and declares that autonomy is not enough."12 The memorandum addressed this issue succinctly:

Recognition is a political act and we could grant recognition when publicly asked if such a step is in the national interest. In response to previous approaches from the Dalai Lama in 1949–51 we refrained from committing ourselves to recognition of Tibet as an independent state. We continue to recognize both the claim of the Republic of China to suzerainty over Tibet and Tibet's claim to de facto autonomy.13
Dillon was averse to making any change in this policy. He warned Eisenhower that the United States must "avoid taking a position which might appear to encourage the Dalai Lama to seek international recognition."14

In subsequent months, the Eisenhower administration reexamined its policy vis-à-vis the Dalai Lama and Tibet but decided once again not to advocate Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, U.S. officials did offer stronger support for Tibet by starting to refer to it as an autonomous "country" under Chinese "suzerainty" and by also indicating that if unspecified conditions occurred in the future that made self-determination possible, the United States would support this. These nuances were made explicit in September 1959:

As to the position which the U.S. government takes with regard to the status of Tibet, the historical position of the U.S. has been that Tibet is an autonomous [End Page 150] country under Chinese suzerainty. However, the U.S. government has consistently held that the autonomy of Tibet should not be impaired by force. The U.S. has never recognized the pretension to sovereignty over Tibet put forward by the Chinese Communist regime.15
The revised U.S. position was laid out even more clearly in a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs J. Graham Parsons to Secretary of State Christian Herter dated 14 October 1959:

That you inform him [the Dalai Lama] that, while the United States cannot accord recognition to the Dalai Lama's government under present circumstances, it
(a) fully supports the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny,

(b) would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to this end should a change in the situation make this practicable, and

(c) would be prepared to make a public statement, after completion of the [U.N.] General Assembly consideration of the Tibetan item, affirming our support of Tibetan self-determination.16

A few months later, on 20 February 1960, Herter conveyed this message in a letter to the Dalai Lama.17

These indications of greater political support for Tibet were carefully couched. On the one hand, U.S. officials wanted to placate Tibetan sensibilities and assist the Tibetans in keeping their cause alive; on the other hand, they wanted to avoid any change in the international political status of Tibet as part of China. Consequently, rather than launching a campaign to secure international recognition of Tibet as an independent state (as the Tibetans themselves hoped to do), the Eisenhower administration actually constrained the Tibetans from presenting a political case to the United Nations (UN) that would have accused the PRC of aggression against an independent country. Instead, the United States pressured the Dalai Lama to refer to the suffering of the Tibetan people and human rights issues when making his case against [End Page 151] China. This distinction was emphasized by CIA Director Allen Dulles at a meeting of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) on 10 September 1959. The notes from the meeting indicate that "Mr. Dulles then took up Tibet. . . . The U.S has felt that he [the Dalai Lama] should not, in his presentation to the U.N. emphasize aggression, since Tibet was for many years a part of China. In our view, his case is stronger on a human rights basis."18 The same point was conveyed by Secretary of State Herter to the Dalai Lama in a letter dated 6 October 1959: "Consultation with other United Nations Members on this subject [the record of Chinese Communist activities in Tibet] have confirmed our view, made known to you earlier, that wider support can be obtained for a hearing of Tibet's case if the suppression of human rights aspects of it are stressed rather than matters relating to sovereignty."19

For the Dalai Lama, this was a crucial issue. Two days after the Tibetan leader received Herter's letter, Gyalo Thondup (the Dalai Lama's older brother who had led a Tibetan delegation to the UN headquarters in New York to lodge an appeal with the UN General Assembly) met with the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge. The Tibetans' lawyer, Ernest Gross, left no doubt that "Thondup had arrived with instructions . . . to raise question of independence."20 Lodge reported to the State Department that Gyalo Thondup "questioned US repeatedly as to whether action on human rights basis would in some way affect adversely cause of Tibetan independence. He clearly continued hope GA [General Assembly] might address itself to question of Tibetan independence."

A few days later, on 14 October 1959, Assistant Secretary of State Parsons sent a memorandum to Herter summarizing the conclusions of a policy review undertaken by the Far Eastern Affairs division (FE). Parsons recommended that no change be made in the long-standing U.S. strategic position on Tibet:

Our Embassy in India has reported that the Dalai Lama has requested United States support for hearing the Tibetan case in the United Nations on the basis of aggression and that the Tibetans are pressing for recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tibet. . . . FE has completed a study . . . of the question of United States recognition of the independence of Tibet in which the considerations both for and against such action are examined in detail. Taking these factors into account, we have concluded that on balance the arguments against recognition of Tibetan independence under present conditions are stronger than [End Page 152] those in favor. I consider this conclusion valid from the standpoint of both the United States national interest and from that of the Tibetans. We share with the Tibetans the objectives of keeping the Tibetan cause alive in the consciousness of the world and maintaining the Dalai Lama as an effective spokesman of the Tibetan people. I believe that United States recognition of the Dalai Lama's government as that of an independent country would serve neither purpose well.21
Consequently, despite the Cold War and the flight of the Dalai Lama into exile, the U.S. government continued to believe that American interests were best served by adhering to the position that Tibet was part of Communist-controlled China. The United States at the tactical level supported a Tibetan insurgency force and financially assisted the Dalai Lama, but it would not support the Tibetans' political aims. Moreover, U.S. officials repeatedly exhorted the Dalai Lama to shift the main focus of his campaign against the PRC, basing it not on the question of Tibet's independence but on issues of human rights violations. The public U.S. expressions of support for Tibetan self-determination if conditions ever became appropriate were, therefore, mainly an attempt to placate the Dalai Lama in the face of Washington's refusal to support his requests for help on the political front. Parsons acknowledged the gap between rhetoric and reality in his memorandum to Herter:

The Tibetans will probably be unhappy at our failure to go all the way toward recognition of Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, I think Thondup could be made to see that recognition under present conditions would not serve the best interests of the Tibetan people and that in offering to state publicly at an appropriate time in the future our support of the right of the Tibetans to self-determination we are moving in the direction he desires us to take. However, so long as the Chinese Communists occupy Tibet self-determination is not practicable and the struggle of the Tibetan people for control of their own political destiny is likely to be a long one.22
The rapprochement between the United States and Communist China in the early 1970s changed U.S. Cold War strategy and created a new set of foreign policy conditions that quickly marginalized the U.S. government's "pragmatic" interest in Tibet. Consequently, for more than a decade after the restoration of U.S.-China relations in 1969–1971, Tibet remained an obscure issue in U.S. foreign policy. The United States halted all remaining support for the Tibetan guerrillas and ceased to use terms such as "autonomous country."23 U.S. officials also stopped talking about vague support for the Tibetans' [End Page 153] right to self determination if conditions changed. Although the Cold War continued, Tibet ceased to be a part of it and faded into the shadows.

The early record of U.S. involvement with Tibet is thus relatively clear. Despite rhetoric about promoting freedom and democracy, the United States was unwilling in the case of Tibet to compromise its larger interests in China and Asia. Although in one sense the United States was clearly a friend and supporter of Tibet, in a more basic sense it was not a "good friend" and might even be described as a cynical and deceptive friend.24 Tibet's quest for independence ran up against the pragmatic side of U.S. foreign policy. On this issue, the triumph of realpolitik over what Henry Kissinger called America's "pursuit of its historic moral convictions" is particularly striking when we compare U.S. support of Tibet with the Soviet Union's support of Mongolia.25 Although Tibet and Mongolia were of a politically equivalent status at the time of the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911–1912, Mongolia has long been an independent state and a member of the UN. The reason is simple: At the Yalta conference in early 1945, the Soviet leader Josif Stalin persuaded Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to support a plebiscite for Mongolia, a demand that the Chinese Nationalist government was forced to accept. Mongolia was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for decades but is today an independent country.

Tibet and the United States in the Deng Xiaoping Era
From the time of the Dalai Lama's flight into exile in 1959 until the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, the Tibetan government-in-exile had no official contact with the Chinese authorities. The situation changed in 1978 after Deng Xiaoping initiated a new Chinese external and internal initiative [End Page 154] to resolve the Tibet question. The external initiative sought to induce the Dalai Lama to return from exile. Deng invited the Tibetan leader to send delegations from India to observe the situation in Tibet, and these overtures quickly led to secret face-to-face meetings in Beijing in 1982 and 1984.

At the same time, Beijing launched a parallel strategy to reverse the policies of the Cultural Revolution and meet Tibetans' ethnic sensibilities by making the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) more Tibetan in overall character. This initiative, led by Hu Yaobang, essentially gave the green light for a revitalization of Tibetan culture and religion, including the reopening of monasteries, permission to recruit new monks, greater leeway to use written Tibetan, and the replacement of large numbers of ethnic Chinese cadres with Tibetans. Deng Xiaoping also sought to foster accelerated economic development in Tibet that would rapidly improve the inhabitants' living standards.

Despite these promising signs, the reconciliation talks between Beijing and the Dalai Lama's representatives were unsuccessful. The Chinese authorities wanted to persuade the Dalai Lama and his officials in exile to set aside past animosities and exhibit a new friendship toward China—an acceptance of being part of the "motherland" and being loyal citizens of China. To achieve this, Deng was willing to allow a substantial degree of cultural autonomy, but he was unwilling to yield any real political power to the Dalai Lama or his officials. The CCP under the new initiative would remain in power in the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The Tibetans quickly realized that Beijing was not even going to consider granting them independence. With that overriding goal still out of reach, the key question in Dharamsala was how much less than independence—if anything—they were willing to settle for. After considerable discussion, the Dalai Lama's government in 1984 proposed that China should grant Tibetans in all parts of China complete internal political autonomy—in essence self-rule. Tibet could then adopt a political system different from that in the rest of China, presumably something closer to a Western-style democracy. This proposal was along the lines of the "One Country Two Systems" offer the CCP had been floating for Taiwan. But in Beijing the Tibetan proposal met a hostile reception. The Chinese authorities argued that the two situations were not comparable because Tibet, unlike Taiwan, was already an integral part of the PRC. The talks collapsed because the Dalai Lama's bottom line was far above what China was willing to contemplate.

The Launching of the Pro-Tibet International Campaign
As officials in both Beijing and Dharamsala assessed these failures, the PRC increased its effort to stimulate economic development in Tibet in the hope of [End Page 155] winning over ordinary Tibetans who would be induced to accept limited autonomy. The Dalai Lama, for his part, launched an international campaign to win worldwide support and assistance for his cause. The Tibetan leader realized that he needed new sources of leverage if he was to have any hope of prying the concessions he wanted from Beijing. A full-scale international campaign, he believed, was the only means by which he could gain the requisite level of support.

The U.S. government was central to this new international campaign. Of all the Western democracies, the United States had provided the most extensive support for Tibetans during the difficult times of the 1950s and 1960s. However, the U.S. relationship with Tibet had changed a great deal in the 1970s when the U.S.-PRC rapprochement made the Dalai Lama and the Tibet question an issue that ranked low among U.S. foreign policy priorities. The exiled leader's new campaign, therefore, sought to regain U.S. attention and support by working through the backdoor of U.S. foreign policy—Congress. The key innovation in this strategy was that the Dalai Lama for the first time carried his political message to the United States and the world. Prior to this the Dalai Lama had traveled and spoken only as a religious leader.26

With the help of Western supporters and donors and of sympathetic members of the U.S. Congress and their aides, the Tibetans launched a campaign in the United States to gain support for the Dalai Lama's cause, in essence recasting the Tibet question not in geopolitical terms but in terms of the U.S. commitment to freedom and human rights. The goal was to highlight China's human rights violations in Tibet and to present the Dalai Lama as a champion of Western values.27

In 1987, the campaign achieved several major breakthroughs. In June, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a bill that condemned human rights abuses in Tibet, instructed the president to express sympathy for Tibet, and urged China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.28 In September the Dalai Lama was invited to speak to the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington, DC. In his speech, the first he had given [End Page 156] in the United States, he argued that Tibet had been "fully independent" at the time of the Chinese invasion in 1950. The Dalai Lama claimed that the invasion had begun China's "illegal occupation of the country" and that "although Tibetans lost their freedom, under international law Tibet today is still an independent state under illegal occupation."29 The speech also raised human rights charges in provocative terms, referring twice to a "holocaust" against the Tibetan people.

The Dalai Lama called on China to resolve the Tibet problem through five specific steps:

transforming the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace—this would include not only Tibet proper but also ethnographic Tibet (the ethnic Tibetans in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan and Yunnan) and would require the withdrawal of all Chinese troops and military installations;
abandoning the policy of forced population transfers, which, according to the Dalai Lama, threatened the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
respecting the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms (the Dalai Lama asserted that Tibetans are "deprived of all basic democratic rights and freedoms [and] exist under a colonial administration in which all real power is wielded by Chinese officials of the Communist Party and the army");
restoring and protecting Tibet's natural environment and halting China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste; and
holding negotiations about the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.30
The speech was received well in the United States, and three weeks later, on 6 October 1987, the U.S. Senate passed its version of the earlier House bill. On 22 December 1987, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for fiscal year 1989, which contained a sense of the Congress resolution affirming that

the United States should express sympathy for those Tibetans who have suffered and died as a result of fighting, persecution, or famine over the past four decades;
the United States should make the treatment of the Tibetan people an important [End Page 157] factor in its conduct of relations with the People's Republic of China;
the Government of the People's Republic of China should respect internationally recognized human rights and end human rights violations against Tibetans;
the United States should urge the Government of the People's Republic of China to actively reciprocate the Dalai Lama's efforts to establish a constructive dialogue on the future of Tibet;. . . [and]
the United States should urge the People's Republic of China to release all political prisoners in Tibet.31
The resolution also contained a provision about the sale of defense-related articles to the PRC, indicating that the United States should take into consideration "the extent to which the Government of the People's Republic of China is acting in good faith and in a timely manner to resolve human rights issues in Tibet." Finally, it authorized funding for fifteen scholarships that would allow Tibetans to attend American universities.32

After the Cold War ended, congressional support for Tibet grew. In 1990, Congress authorized the creation of a Tibetan-language broadcast unit at the Voice of America, and in 1991 Congress included a number of tough though non-binding provisions on Tibet in a State Department authorization act that was signed into law by President George H. W. Bush later that year. The provisions described "Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai," as an "occupied country" and declared that the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile were "Tibet's true representatives."33

Although the pro-Tibet statements in the legislation were only a non-binding "sense of Congress" resolution, they were seen in Dharamsala as a major victory and the start of a congressional move to establish a new policy that would actively pursue a settlement favorable to the Dalai Lama and his government. In that sense, the United States was again actively involved in Tibetan affairs, albeit primarily through Congress rather than the executive branch.

The Impact of the Pro-Tibet International Campaign
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the pro-Tibet sentiment in Congress was supported by the growth of a number of Tibet lobbying groups such as the [End Page 158] Washington-based International Campaign for Tibet, the Tibet Justice Center, Students for a Free Tibet, and broader human rights groups like Asia Watch and Amnesty International. As the Cold War drew to an end, policy vis-à-vis Tibet had to be made with an eye not just to U.S. global and economic interests but also to domestic political concerns.

The Dalai Lama himself became a major public advocate for his cause. On 15 June 1988, nine months after his successful speech to the U.S. congressional caucus, he spoke explicitly about political issues when he addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg. In the speech he set forth, for the first time publicly, his conditions for settling the Tibet question and for his return to Tibet. The main points were:

The whole of Tibet [political and ethnographic Tibet] . . . should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the People's Republic of China.
The Government of the People's Republic of China could remain responsible for Tibet's foreign policy. The Government of Tibet should, however, develop and maintain relations through its own Foreign Affairs Bureau, in the fields of religion, commerce, education, culture, tourism, science, sports and other non-political activities. Tibet should join international organizations concerned with such activities.

The Government of Tibet should be founded on a constitution of basic law. The basic law should provide for a democratic system of government. . . . This means that the Government of Tibet will have the right to decide on all affairs relating to Tibet and Tibetans.

As individual freedom is the real source and potential of any society's development, the Government of Tibet would seek to ensure this freedom by adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including the rights to speech, assembly, and religion. Because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice.

The Government should be composed of a popularly elected Chief Executive, a bi-cameral legislative branch, and an independent judicial system. Its seat should be Lhasa.

The social and economic system of Tibet should be determined in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan people, bearing in mind especially the need to raise the standard of living of the entire population.

. . . A regional peace conference should be called to ensure Tibet becomes a genuine sanctuary of peace through demilitarization. Until such a peace conference can be convened and demilitarization and neutralization achieved, China [End Page 159] could have the right to maintain a restricted number of military installations in Tibet. These must be solely for defense purposes.34

The Strasbourg proposal did not seek complete independence, but it also did not accept limited autonomy within the Chinese political system. Rather, it called for Tibet to have a new status as a kind of autonomous dominion that conceivably could even field its own sports teams in international competitions. The Dalai Lama would accept being part of the PRC, but the Chinese authorities would have little authority over affairs in Tibet, and the Communist Party would not rule Tibet. Because this proposal had in essence been presented to Beijing at the secret 1984 talks, it did not represent anything new to the Chinese. But it did seem new to everyone else because it was the first time that the Dalai Lama had openly stated his willingness to settle for something less than independence. The proposal was well received around the world, solidifying the Dalai Lama's reputation as a leader who was reasonable and seeking a compromise solution.

In subsequent years the international campaign for Tibet did, in one sense, enjoy extraordinary success. It generated new visibility and sympathy in the West for the Dalai Lama's cause, made the Tibet question a part of U.S. domestic and international politics, and helped the Dalai Lama win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. In the process, he became an international symbol of peace and justice and a powerful spokesman for Tibet.

The Dalai Lama's international campaign also had an enormous impact in China. Tibetans in Lhasa knew about the Dalai Lama's visit to the United States in 1987 because of foreign short-wave broadcasts and because of attacks on the Dalai Lama's visit that appeared in the official Chinese media. As a result, less than a week after the Dalai Lama's first speech in Washington, a small group of nationalistic monks from Drepung monastery in Lhasa staged a political demonstration supporting Tibetan independence and the Dalai Lama. The monks were arrested, but four days later a second demonstration that was held to demand the release of these monks ended in a full-scale riot, killing several people.

Although China had liberalized its religious policies and allowed monasteries to reopen in Tibet, thousands of average Tibetans by this point were angry enough to face death and prison by rising up against Chinese rule in Tibet. The Dalai Lama's international campaign had stirred up Tibetan nationalist sentiment and focused it on the Dalai Lama and the West as the answer to Tibet's problems. Many Tibetans saw the visible U.S. support for the Dalai Lama as a sign that a turning point had been reached in Tibetan history and that this was the time to support the Dalai Lama's efforts by engaging [End Page 160] in active political dissidence. Two further riots erupted in Lhasa in 1988, and on 5 March 1989 a fourth riot occurred in the Tibetan capital. The Dalai Lama's international initiative had successfully turned the tables on China, placing Beijing on the defensive both internationally and within Tibet. In March 1989, three months before the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the Chinese authorities imposed martial law in Tibet, a status that lasted more than a year.

The martial law declaration signaled a shift by the PRC to a more repressive, integrationist policy in Tibet. In Beijing, hardliners who gained ascendance after the Tiananmen Square massacre were able to make the case that China had to stop "coddling" Tibet lest matters get completely out of hand. Many officials in Lhasa and Beijing had believed from the start that liberalizing the practice of religion and allowing the reopening of monasteries in Tibet would only increase nationalistic and separatist sentiments, and their view now prevailed.35

Beijing's new policy in Tibet led to more effective security measures that prevented further riots. At the same time, the hardline policy constrained institutions that could potentially strengthen Tibetan ethnic identity, notably language and religion. To be sure, the Tibetan language and Buddhist religion were not prohibited, and Tibetans still spoke their own language and studied it in primary school. Moreover, monasteries and nunneries remained open. Nonetheless, the new policy placed increasingly sharp restraints on how such institutions could operate and develop. In particular, it shelved a number of plans to increase the Tibetanization of Tibet. These reversals angered many Tibetans who, for example, wanted Tibetan to be the language used not only at home but also in government and higher education (including science) and who wanted monasteries and nunneries to be free of government limits on the number of monks and nuns they could have and the age of boys and girls who could enter. In addition, many Tibetans were offended by the tone of the new campaigns and their demeaning comments about Tibetan religion and culture, particularly by a wave of personal attacks on the Dalai Lama.

The new Chinese policy also accelerated the existing program of rapid economic development in Tibet, including much closer economic integration of the region with the rest of China. This was accomplished by further opening up Tibet for commercial development and resulted in a growing influx of non-Tibetan (Han Chinese and Hui Chinese Muslim) entrepreneurs and laborers, who were eager to receive some of the massive funds being poured into [End Page 161] Tibet and to take advantage of new economic opportunities. These non-Tibetans were not colonists in the normal sense of the term, inasmuch as their official residency permits did not refer to Tibet and they were expected eventually to return to their home areas. They were temporary migrants, or what is known in China as the "floating population." Nevertheless, their numbers and increasing ability to take control of Tibet's growing economy sparked widespread resentment.

A bittersweet joke making the rounds of minority officials in Lhasa conveyed these popular sentiments by sarcastically summarizing four periods of Tibetan history under the PRC:

In the first 10 years [1950–1960] we lost our land [i.e., Chinese troops entered and took control of Tibet];
In the second ten years [1960–1970] we lost political power [i.e., the traditional government was replaced by a Han dominated Communist government];

In the third ten years [1970–1980] we lost our culture [i.e., the Cultural Revolution destroyed religion and other traditional customs];

In the fourth ten years [1980–1990] we lost our economy [i.e., the open door economic policy allowed non-Tibetans to dominate the autonomous region's economy].

Despite much criticism both within Tibet and internationally, China's huge investment in rapid economic development in Tibet is having a major impact in rural Tibet, where the standard of living in recent years has increased markedly. At the same time, Beijing has been able to implement its hardline policy with impunity. Neither the United States nor the UN took any concrete steps, such as economic sanctions or diplomatic pressure, to try to compel China to moderate its policies in Tibet. In fact, a 1994 State Department report to Congress clearly reiterated the long-standing U.S. strategic position on Tibet:

Historically, the United States has acknowledged Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Since at least 1966, U.S. policy has explicitly recognized the Tibetan Autonomous Region . . . as part of the People's Republic of China. This long-standing policy is consistent with the view of the entire international community, including all China's neighbors: no country recognizes Tibet as a sovereign state. Because we do not recognize Tibet as an independent state, the United States does not conduct diplomatic relations with the self-styled "Tibetan government-in-exile." The United States continues, however, to urge Beijing and the Dalai Lama to hold serious discussions at an early date, without preconditions, and on a fixed agenda. The United States also urges China to respect Tibet's unique religious, linguistic and cultural traditions as it formulates policies for Tibet.
Internationally revered for his spiritual and moral leadership, and honored with the Nobel Prize for Peace, the Dalai Lama has been a committed advocate [End Page 162] of nonviolent change and resolution of disputes. To show respect for his religious leadership and courtesy to adherents of Tibetan Buddhism, senior U.S. officials—including the President of the United States—have met from time to time with the Dalai Lama. In addition, administration officials at appropriate levels occasionally meet the Dalai Lama's representatives informally, to exchange views about conditions in Tibet. These informal meetings are a routine part of informal U.S. diplomacy, and do not imply recognition of the political goals of Tibetan exile groups.36

Beijing therefore, in a sense, turned the tables back on the Dalai Lama. The triumphs won by the Dalai Lama's international campaign and its Congressional supporters looked more and more like pyrrhic victories. The international initiative won significant symbolic gains for the exiles in the West, and it spurred Tibetans in Tibet to demonstrate their support for the Dalai Lama, but it did not compel China to yield to its demands. To the contrary, it played a major role in precipitating the new hardline policy that the exiled leaders argued was destroying Tibet by changing the demographic and ethnic nature of the region. Ironically, by threatening China's political hold over Tibet, the Dalai Lama and his Western supporters provided the advocates of a hardline policy in China the leverage they needed to shift Beijing's Tibet policy away from the more ethnically sensitive approach pursued by Hu Yaobang in the early 1980s.

The Dalai Lama's international campaign, moreover, also heightened China's distrust of the Dalai Lama, who, it was felt, was not serious about ceasing separatist activities and making the kind of political compromises China could agree to. Many in China came to believe that the Dalai Lama was unnecessary and that the policy of rapidly developing and modernizing Tibet would solidify China's position there regardless of what the Dalai Lama or nationalistic Tibetans thought or did. The Chinese leaders were confident that a new generation of Tibetans would emerge who would be less influenced by religion and lamas and would genuinely consider themselves patriotic citizens of China.

Conclusion
From the time the United States first made contact with Tibet, in 1942, through the end of the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations consistently refused to accept Tibet's claim to independence and, after the Dalai fled Tibet in 1959, to regard him as the head of a government-in-exile. Consequently, although many in the West (and Tibet) viewed the United States as a friend of [End Page 163] Tibetans, U.S. policy in reality played a significant role both in undermining the Dalai Lama's case that Tibet was an independent state before 1950–1951 and in validating the legitimacy of China's dominion over Tibet. At the strategic level, U.S. policy remained constant, even at the height of the Cold War. Tibet was never seen as part of America's core national interests, and when American policy toward China changed in the early 1970s, the U.S. government abandoned its erstwhile tactical support for Tibetan guerrilla forces and exiled leaders.

The end of Maoism in China led to the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC in 1979 as well as the opening of a new chapter in Sino-Tibetan relations. These changes prompted the Dalai Lama to send delegations to hold secret talks in Beijing in 1982 and 1984. Optimism abounded that this renewal of face-to-face talks would yield a peaceful solution to the longstanding conflict. Unfortunately, it did not. Coming together to talk was far easier than making painful compromises to reach a solution, and by 1984 the talks collapsed. The Tibetan and Chinese objectives were too far apart to allow a settlement of the conflict.

This failure led the Dalai Lama and his supporters to launch an international campaign to try to secure U.S. and international support for Tibet in its dealings with Beijing. The campaign was successful insofar as it created a powerful, Congress-driven Tibet lobby that the White House could not ignore and that inserted Tibet into American domestic politics. The campaign successfully pressured the White House and State Department to criticize China's actions in Tibet and even, in the post–Cold War era, to take actions that treated Tibet as being partly separate from China (e.g., by having special Tibet reports and a coordinator for Tibetan affairs). Those successes, however, were essentially symbolic. They did not provide the Dalai Lama with leverage to force Beijing to make concessions or to moderate its hardline policy in Tibet.

The gains achieved by the international campaign had to be carefully crafted to appear responsive to Congress and the Tibet lobby without crossing a line that would threaten basic Chinese interests or the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Tibet. The international campaign and the Tibet lobby were able to restore Tibet as a component of Sino-American relations, but only as an irritant and only in terms of human rights issues. Moreover, the Dalai Lama's role in the international campaign had the unintended consequence of helping the hardline faction in China to implement its policies. The victories of the campaign were ultimately pyrrhic.

Even so, the Tibet question has not faded away. For the foreseeable future, this issue will likely remain an irritant to the Chinese in the international arena and a potential danger-point in Sino-American relations.

Melvyn C. Goldstein is the John Reynold Harkness Professor of Anthropology at Case Western Reserve University and co-director of the Center for Research on Tibet.

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_cold_war_studies/v008/8.3goldstein.html

Posted by google at 02:21 AM | Comments (0)

April 10, 2008

Protest by the Bay

By Imran Syed on 4/10/08

PrintEmail Article Tools Page 1 of 1 The Olympic Torch made its way through San Francisco yesterday, the only American stop on its storied journey around the world. And what a spectacle it was - a San Francisco treat, if you will.

Two hundred police officers were called in to escort the flame in hopes of avoiding the kind of skirmishes that happened as the flame made its way through London and Paris recently. Still, overzealous protestors jumped barricades and shouted "Shame on China" as they attempted to interfere with the procession.

Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi wants the U.S. Olympic Committee to consider boycotting the opening ceremony of the Summer Olympics in Beijing later this year. I strongly disagree, but at least she has a considered, coherent reason for her suggestion. That's a luxury many of her San Francisco constituents apparently cannot afford.

The enraged protestors want the U.S. Olympic Committee to boycott the Beijing Olympics in order to punish China for its continued human rights violations, especially as highlighted by the recent turmoil in Tibet. Hear that China? If you keep silencing journalists and maiming monks, America - the coolest kid on the playground - won't play with you anymore.

Honestly, is the Chinese government supposed to buckle to that sort of bumbling, mindless attempt at coercion? Not caring for what human rights organizations the world over have been saying for decades, is the Chinese government just going to freak and comply in face of demands from a few San Francisco hippies-for-hire? Of course not.

Is the point then simply to polarize Chinese Americans or the good people of China by rubbing our noses at their country's special moment? I hope not, but perhaps the protestors should consider some context. Screaming anti-Chinese sentiments in the shadow of Angel Island - the immigration station that was essentially a jail for Chinese immigrants during the Chinese Exclusion Act - presents a wry human rights irony for our own country. The point of the protest was to bring real, meaningful, lasting social change to the largest polity in the world, but such hackneyed juxtaposition can only undermine that goal.

We have the right in this great democracy to protest, and boy do we use it. But, more importantly, we have the responsibility as mature human beings to act in the way most rational for fulfilling our purpose, and we don't seem to be too big on that.

If you have a strong political message to send, why would you boycott one of the world's largest stages? Should Tommie Smith and John Carlos have boycotted the '68 Olympics because they were upset by racial injustice in American society? Some folks suggested they and other black athletes do just that. But the two American sprinters luckily proved smart enough not to shoot themselves in the foot.

Smith won gold in the 200-meter dash, while Carlos took bronze in the same event. As the Star Spangled Banner played to honor their victories, the two men raised black-gloved fists in the most memorable and damning protest in sports history. The black power salute - initially ostracized, but today celebrated as the heroic gesture that it was - would never have happened had Smith and Carlos decided to stay home.

Certainly the Chinese government, and perhaps even the International Olympic Committee, is terrified of the possibility of the repeat of such a moment. So, my earnest agitators, why ease their fears?

The concept of athletes taking a stand, however, leads us to another dangerous precipice. In 1968, Jim Crow was a tangible reality that black American athletes could readily understand. Thus, Smith and Carlos were politically aware black athletes who protested something that directly affected them. Can that be said for any of the American athletes who may choose to take a stand in Beijing? Probably not.

As much as I do want to see Michael Phelps don the "Free Tibet" Speedo when he breaks those world records, I'd like much more that any political statements made by protestors at events like the one in San Francisco or by athletes at the Olympics be heartfelt, informed and substantive. Wouldn't it be better for all of us if these Olympics went without empty grandstanding by athletes who feel compelled to protest because of the mayhem surrounding these games?

Pelosi wants to boycott the opening ceremony because it is an aggrandizement of the Chinese government. Fair enough, but how about our lawmakers stop being lazy and stop pretending that the Olympics and their athletes have any more capital to effect social change than the government? How about getting some legislation passed, meeting with and pressuring China diplomatically - you know, the sorts of things that actually work?

The Olympics certainly have a political aspect, and there's nothing wrong with athletes behaving as Smith and Carlos did. However, there are so many more substantive ways to bring change, and it's in our best interest to pursue those first.

Imran Syed was the Daily's fall/winter editorial page editor in 2007. He can be reached at galad@umich.edu.

http://media.www.michigandaily.com/media/storage/paper851/news/2008/04/10/Columns/Protest.By.The.Bay-3315505.shtml

Posted by google at 11:38 AM | Comments (0)

Olympic-Torch Protesters Given Slip In San Francisco

from Wall Street Journal

The Olympic torch made its long-anticipated one-day visit to the U.S. Wednesday with the expected protests and some hoodwinking of demonstrators by authorities.

Even more visible in San Francisco than the often violent anti-China protests that have struck the torch run elsewhere was the backlash of hundreds of Chinese-Americans and other pro-China supporters who rose up to protest the protesters. Media attention has not only spotlighted the protests but galvanized support for China among Chinese-Americans and Chinese nationals living in the U.S.

The torch relay began by abruptly going off script. As befuddled demonstrators looked on, the authorities sent the first runner out in another direction than had been planned, like a rock star slipping out the back door. In a cat-and-mouse game between protesters, officers and reporters, the first runner headed out, then veered from the planned route, which authorities apparently feared was too crowded or blocked.

The runner ran to a nearby pier, then vanished into a warehouse. Later torch runners emerged -- cushioned by torch guards and phalanxes of police -- taking another route. Protesters frantically called each other on mobile phones trying to keep up with the route, which had turned inland.

Mayor Gavin Newsom had said earlier that he reserved the right to change the route of the relay at any point, even during the race, if there was a possibility that protesters would interfere. Mr. Newsom has said he is trying to balance the rights of protesters with people who want to enjoy the torch relay in safety.

As colorful flags flapped in a stiff breeze off McCovey Cove next to the San Francisco Giants' AT&T Park, police patrolled the waters where fans used to float awaiting Barry Bonds' home runs. Even before the relay began, crowds chanted 'China, China, China' and 'Olympics! No Politics!'

They shouted at, and sometimes jostled, demonstrators objecting to Chinese policies on human rights, Tibet and Darfur. Police struggled to separate the two sides and had detained a protester even before the relay's planned six-mile trip along the waterfront began. About 100 additional police in riot helmets arrived just as ceremonies began.

Earlier, many of the pro-China demonstrators invoked slogans about how sports shouldn't be sullied by politics, but the protests seem to have awakened a broader feeling of angry nationalism among many of the pro-China demonstrators. San Francisco's large Chinese-American population includes many who fled communist rule in China and support Taiwan, and many whose roots in America predate them and who hold no truck with the current Chinese government. But many immigrants are Chinese nationals who left for economic rather than political reasons and resent the protesters trying to spoil their fast-growing country's preamble to the Olympic Games.

At dawn Wednesday, for example, two groups of mostly Chinese exchange students -- one from the University of California at Berkeley and the other from Stanford -- arrived in busloads. 'We are friendly rivals,' said Siqi Mou, an 18-year-old freshman from Stanford, who added her group of about 150 students had responded to Internet pleas from fellow Chinese exchange students in the U.S. to turn out and support the Chinese Olympics.

'We want to encourage Americans to visit China and see the real China,' said Yinjie Tang, a 33-year-old Chinese national who is a postgraduate student at Berkeley. 'We want to let everyone know that, while not perfect, the human-rights situation is improving. Give us time to improve our human rights.'

Since its ceremonial lighting in Greece on March 24, the torch has taken a tumultuous journey across several cities, fending off protesters in London, Paris and elsewhere. San Francisco, with its robust tradition of counterculture dissent, was expected to be the climactic stop. From here the torch will briefly touch down in South America and Africa, then move to Asia, where it is unclear what the reception will be.

In San Francisco, two 'Save Darfur' supporters from the Bay Area, Bruce Grossan and Rick Williamson, were swarmed by dozens of China supporters. A group of Chinese youths surrounded the two, covering their end-genocide sign with several big Chinese flags. Mr. Williamson said he and Mr. Grossan were hit several times with the flagpoles. City police quickly gathered up the two men and asked them to move away from the youths. 'I can't insure your safety,' said one SFPD officer.

Tibet and China supporters clashed nearby. 'You know nothing about Tibet!' said one Chinese man to a young girl in a 'Free Tibet' shirt.

In a press area at the start of the relay, torch runner Raj Mathai, a sportscaster for the local NBC affiliate, stretched. He said security for the runners has been so tight that at a planning meeting for them Tuesday, they convened in a conference room at a San Francisco hotel, then moved to another after just 10 minutes. Mr. Mathai said he and the other runners were advised that, if attacked, they should fall back and let police and security officials protect them. 'I am no longer nervous,' Mr. Mathias said. 'But I am anxious.'

Betty Yuan, head of the Northern California Chinese Culture-Athletic Federation, said earlier this week that she has been getting dozens of phone calls, many from Chinese-Americans upset with news reports of protesters.

She says she believes the majority of people supports the Olympic torch. 'The people that are going to the protest, they just are little but they make big noise,' says Ms. Yuan.

Community leaders, many of whom have protested themselves around issues like civil rights, say they don't dispute the protesters' right to demonstrate, nor do they agree with all of China's policies. But they fear that 'anti-China' sentiments will morph into 'anti-Chinese' violence.

'This is America. We cannot stop [protesters]. The only thing we can do is show up to show our support,' says Ms. Yuan, adding 'But we will outnumber them.'

Stephanie Kang / Jim Carlton / Bobby White

http://chinese.wsj.com/gb/20080410/bus085017.asp?source=email

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April 09, 2008

Let the Games Go On

By Joan Chen
Wednesday, April 9, 2008; A19

I was born in Shanghai in 1961 and grew up during the Cultural Revolution. During my childhood, I saw my family lose our house. My grandfather, who studied medicine in England, committed suicide after he was wrongly accused of being a counterrevolutionary and a foreign spy.

Those were the worst of times.

Since the Cultural Revolution ended in the late 1970s, however, I have witnessed unimaginable progress in China. Changes that few ever thought possible have occurred in a single generation. A communist government that had no ties to the West has evolved into a more open government eager to join the international community.

A state-controlled economy has morphed into a market economy, greatly raising people's standard of living. It's clear that the majority of the Chinese people enjoy much fuller, more abundant lives today than 30 years ago. Though much remains to be done, the Chinese government has made rapid progress in opening up and trying to be part of the international community.

Last month I went to China and spent four weeks visiting Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong and Chengdu. The people I met and spoke with are proud and excited about the Beijing Games. They believe that the Olympics are a wonderful opportunity to showcase modern China to the rest of the world. Like many Americans, most Chinese people are disturbed by the recent events in Tibet. But after watching the scenes of violence and arson by the rioters, the Chinese believe that the government is doing the right thing in cracking down to restore order.

The Olympic torch is in California and is to be carried through San Francisco today. In a resolution criticizing China, Chris Daly, a member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors, said that demonstrating against the torch relay would "provide the people of San Francisco with a lifetime opportunity to help 1.3 billion Chinese people gain more freedom and rights." To his credit, Mayor Gavin Newsom did not sign Daly's resolution.

This statement could not be further from reality. For one thing, the Chinese are a proud people. They want freedom and greater rights, but they know they must fight for them from within. They know that no one can grant them freedom and rights from afar. The stigma of Western imperialism and the Opium Wars also remains a strong reminder of the past, and Chinese people do not want their domestic policies to be dictated by outside powers. They also do not want the United States to boycott the opening ceremonies of the Games. The U.S. boycott of the 1980 Games in Moscow and the Soviet boycott of the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles accomplished nothing. A U.S. boycott of the opening ceremonies in Beijing would be counterproductive for relations between the two countries.

For decades, anti-China human rights groups in Washington have spent millions of dollars denouncing China. To many Chinese, it seems that this lobby is the only voice that's acceptable or newsworthy in the U.S. media and to the U.S. government. But times are changing. We need to be open-minded and farsighted. We need to make more friends than enemies. Remember what a little ping-pong game did for Sino-U.S. relations in the 1970s? Let's celebrate the Olympics for what the Games are meant to be -- a bridge for friendship, not a playground for politics.

The writer is an actress and director. She became a U.S. citizen in 1989.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/08/AR2008040802907_pf.html

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Something you won't see from western media

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April 08, 2008

An Open Letter to the Official-In-Charge of CNN

To Whom It May Concern:

March 31, 2008

Dear Madam/Sir,

Credibility is the only key for every member of news media to accomplish wide public recognition. It is an intellectual asset wooed by every member of media. While the establishment and confirmation of such credibility is an accumulating and difficult process, the destruction of such is as easy as blowing a candle.

CNN was inaugurated in 1980. While it struck the media community with its coverage of the attempted assassination of President Reagon, CNN was not really seen as part of the main stream by the American public then. CNN failed to lift itself off from financial difficulty within the five years since its inception. Its audience share was among the lowest. The most outstanding feature of CNN was live coverage at the scene. However, in the Gulf War between 1990 and 1991, CNN allowed audience around the world to watch "Desert Shield", a war raged by the Alliance troops with United States as the leader to fight Iraq. In August 1991, a coup d'etat broke out in Kremlin, at the time even the U.S. CIA received no advanced warning, but CNN was able to make the first presentation of the event to the world expeditiously. Since that time, CNN has achieved an outstanding reputation and confirmed its status as the only global TV news agency. It has then established an invaluable and hard-to-achieve level of credibility.

It is undeniable that journalists at CNN in general observe the most basic rules of news reporting, seeking for the truth and all the facts. However, regrettably, these rules seem to be applicable only to news stories about the Western countries. For news about China, the Chinese Communist Party or overseas ethnic Chinese, a double standard based on entrenched chauvinism would arise. Discrimination, prejudice and an anti-Chinese sentiment would then replace all ethic standards and rules of news reporting. CNN would adopt all means of distortion, stating inversely right into wrong , mixing lies into truth, taking quotes out of context, defaming and making wrongful accusation, and even fabricating facts without basis to cover news in China and life of the overseas ethnic Chinese, and to tarnish and demonize China, people of China and the overseas Chinese.

On March 14, the "Tibetan Independents" provoked certain criminal elements to start a riot in the capital city Lhasa of the Tibetan Self-Autonomous Region of China. As it had done before, CNN did not shake off its attitude of being unfair and non-objective in covering news of China. In order to prove its intention of portraying "Tibetans are being persecuted", CNN first broadcast non-stop news stories about "Tibetans assaulting Chinese" and "Tibetans burning down shops owned by the Chinese". CNN unreasonably tried to separate the Tibetan compatriots from the Great China Family of 56 ethnic groups. It then edited the original photos on Internet and presented the most convincing parts to confuse the facts and to fool the audience. It even became a spokesman of Dalai Lama and repeatedly emphasize that rioters in Tibet were in "peaceful demonstrations", and that China had launched a "military crack-down" in Tibet, a "control measure by force" and "a hundred Tibetans had been killed". These are all but fabricated news stories to mislead the American public and they deprived the rights of people around the world, including the American public, to find out the facts and the truth.

These made-up news stories were based on distortion of facts, casting inversely right into wrong, mixing lies with truth, taking quotes out of context, defaming and making wrongful accusation and fabricating facts without basis. Not only did they become the worst failure of news reporting by CNN and became the biggest joke 0f 2008 among members of media, but they undermined the credibility long established by CNN.

Credibility is the soul of news media. The ugly conduct of CNN in its tarnishing and demonizing of China cannot and will not escape from scrutiny in this age of mass media. For its coverage of Lhasa riot on March 14, the American public has timely created a humorous and sarcastic comment about CNN: "Don't be like CNN", which has been widely adopted all over the country. It seems like the credibility established with tremendous endeavor by CNN over the years has suddenly collapsed in the eyes of the American public.

On behalf of Citizens of Chinese descent in United States, members of the United Chinese Associations of Eastern America strongly condemns CNN for its adoption of a double standard and the violation of ethic for news coverage. The Association would like to caution members of the CNN news team that the key of good news coverage lies not only in its timeliness of presentation, but also in its fairness, objectivity, truthfulness and credibility. In case that the journalists mix their individual ideology, personal taste of favor and disfavor, their wishful prejudice or subjective judgment with their news coverage, they would violate the most basic ethic in news reporting, i.e. being fair, objective, truthful and credible, and they would lose their credibility in the media community and among the public. The kind of news coverage, as lacking credibility as CNN has presented, not only would mislead the public and harm sentiment of the people, but it would become a negative factor in obstructing and damaging the relationship between China and United States, and in hurting the friendship between peoples of the two nations.

Sincerely yours,

Executive Chairman of

United Chinese Associations of Eastern America

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Tibet: The Truth (oppression, monks, nuns... you're wrong)

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Tibet separatists overwhelmed by Chinese, London

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Top stories censored by American Government

http://www.amazon.com/Censored-2008-Top-Stories-2006-07/dp/1583227725

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Torch by radical Tibetan Youth Congress

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Torch Protests Anger Chinese; Chaos In Paris

2008/04/08/

The relay carrying the Olympic torch to Beijing for this summer's Olympic Games has quickly turned into a gantlet of criticism that is angering ordinary Chinese who feel their country is being treated unfairly.

As thousands of French police struggled to keep the Olympic torch moving -- and lit -- through throngs of anti-China protesters in Paris before canceling the last stretch on Monday, people on the streets of Shanghai and Beijing were voicing increasing anger and rising nationalism.

'Chinese people should all be indignant,' said Du Chunhua, who works for a trading company in the Chinese capital. 'I think it's really bad that they are trying to ruin such a peaceful event.'

It is becoming clear that the Olympics, envisioned by the Chinese government as a kind of international coming-out party to celebrate China's rapid economic growth and its growing role on the world stage, is instead posing a major challenge to the nation's image.

And an event that many had hoped would help Westerners to better understand China and give China a better understanding of the West, is instead laying bare the sharply divergent views of each side.

The trouble in Paris came a day after the torch made a difficult journey through a snowy London, where a protester managed to break through security and momentarily grip the torch. On Wednesday, it arrives in San Francisco, where activists have spent months planning protests.

The scene in Paris on Monday was chaotic. At one point, the torch appeared unlit while being carried by a woman in a wheelchair. Moments later organizers placed the torch inside a bus transporting Chinese officials, and police on in-line skates surrounded the vehicle as it continued along the route.

A police spokeswoman said the torch was extinguished at least once during the relay. The actual flame, which was lit in Olympia, Greece, in late March, remained burning inside a lantern in the bus as a backup.

The torch protests in London and Paris have been fueled by events in Tibet, where peaceful demonstrations that began in early March turned into violence that met with a forceful Chinese government response.

But those speaking and acting out against the torch relay and China's hosting of the Olympics also criticize China's overall human-rights record, as well as its ties to repressive regimes such as Sudan and Myanmar.

Jean Pierre Bonville, a 59-year-old lawyer from Belgium, traveled to Paris with his 12-year-old son to protest. 'This is not just about Tibet; it's about the right to freedom in general,' he said.

Many, if not most, Chinese, however, see their country as freer -- and more prosperous -- than at any time in their lifetimes. For them, the Games are seen as a celebration of their economic, political and social progress.

At least some of the demonstrations have been blocked from broadcasts in China of the torch relay, particularly interruptions in the lighting of the torch in Athens. But as the protests have gone on, they are being reported in the Chinese press, though often not very promptly and generally blamed only on Tibetan separatists.

The protesters 'should come here and see for themselves,' said Han Hailing, 26, an urban planner in Beijing. 'They don't understand what's going on here. But you can't blame them either. They're getting wrong information from the media.'

Ms. Han said that 'every government has its problems,' but added: 'I have to say the Chinese government is right' on the way it is handling Tibet. 'The government has already invested a lot' in Tibet and other ethnic-minority areas, she said.

Such sentiments have drawn ethnic Chinese to the defense of China and the torch. In Paris, Tibetan protesters faced off in a shouting match with China supporters waving the country's red-and-gold national flag and chanting 'Bravo, Beijing.'

Shen Shuang, a 27-year-old woman from China, said she traveled to Paris from Marseille to show her support for the Beijing Olympics. With her face painted with Chinese flags, she ran alongside the convoy dodging protesters who blew whistles at her. 'I can keep this up all day,' she said.

As the torch traveled from the Eiffel Tower along the Seine River, hundreds of activists draped in Tibet flags poured into the street chanting 'Free Tibet,' trying to block the route.

Large vans and trucks helped clear a path for the torch through the crowds as police clad in heavy shoulder and arm pads locked arms with shouting protesters and forced some to the ground. A group of Chinese guards in tracksuits ran alongside the flame, forming a protective bubble.

Despite the tightly coordinated security effort, authorities were forced to take further precautions as several protesters broke through the police wall to get within steps of the embattled torch.

Part of what made the protests so difficult to contain was their scale -- both large and small. Members of the Paris-based rights group Reporters Without Borders managed to climb a section of the Eiffel Tower and unfurl a giant banner that depicted the Olympic rings as interlocking handcuffs.

Yolaine De La Bigne, a torchbearer, wore an armband depicting the Tibetan flag as she received the torch. Chinese guards who were running alongside her ripped the band off her arm as soon she tried to display it, she says.

Sun Weide, a spokesman for the Beijing Olympics on Monday criticized protesters who tried to disrupt the relay in London. 'A few Tibetan separatists attempted to sabotage the torch relay in London, and we strongly denounce their disgusting behavior,' Mr. Sun said.

For many Chinese, who read about the protests and see images online, the troubles with the torch relay seem very far from the reality of China as they perceive it. China this year is marking the 30th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's decision to turn away from central planning and toward markets and to reopen China to the rest of the world. These ever-accelerating changes have transformed China from a Communist backwater to the world's fourth-largest economy.

Cheng Hongyu, a 25-year-old French-language student, says the protesters 'don't live here. From their perspective they are seeing problems, but they don't see the whole picture.' She continued: 'I think in general, the direction the government is taking is good. The government only wants improvements for Tibet and the Tibetan people.'

Online commentary has tended to be nationalistic and to argue that the coming Olympics are being used to bolster the cause of an independent Tibet. 'These destructive activities by the foreign forces of Tibet independence are really outrageous,' wrote one person in a popular Chinese chat room for political and social issues. 'Making ordinary Chinese angry is more dangerous than p- off the government.'

Some Chinese have taken matters into their own hands, launching campaigns of harassing phone calls and email against Tibetan human-rights campaigners and China-based foreign correspondents covering the recent unrest in Tibetan areas.

Many Chinese don't understand why the outside world fails to see the incredible progress that their country has made over the course of their lives.

'First of all, it's still a small group of people trying to screw up the event. And obviously there are political motives behind it,' says Han Hongyi, 36, who works at a human-resources-consulting company, and said he read about the protests online. 'It's unfair to most of the Chinese people. We have been looking forward to the Olympics for a long time.'

Gordon Fairclough / Stacy Meichtry / Max Colchester / Loretta Chao

http://chinese.wsj.com/gb/20080408/bch133833.asp?source=email

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April 07, 2008

Dalai Lama Forum by Indian students

Time : Wednesday 7pm
Location: the east hall atrium
Speaker: Professor Donald Lopez

==================================================

As members of the Indian American Student Association's Political Awareness Core, ours goals are to increase awareness on campus about political, social, and economic issues. We are organizing an event on Wednesday, April 9, 2008 about the recent protests in Tibet against the Chinese government and the role of the Dalai Lama in this conflict. This event will increase awareness and spur discussion on both sides of this issue. We hope to have Donald Lopez, an esteemed Asian Studies professor specializing in Tibetan politics, speak at our event and answer questions from the audience. We also anticipate this event to be a forum for discussion in which audience members can voice their views.

We are expecting a large audience, and would greatly appreciate your help. We feel our dialogue would be enhanced by the presence of diverse campus organizations, such as yours. We hope you will participate by contributing speakers, helping with logistics, or just being active members of the audience! Please contact Zainub Naqvi (znaqvi@umich.edu) or Arjun Venkat (arjunv@umich.edu) with any questions or to get involved.

We hope to see you there!

Sincerely,

IASA Political Awareness Core 2008

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April 06, 2008

Chinese leadership struggles to control freedom of expression

Paul Mooney
YaleGlobal, 22 July 2004

In Beijing, the thirst for information is strong, but so is the government's desire to control it. (Photo: Nayan Chanda)

BEIJING: When Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao began to take over the reins of the Chinese Communist Party and China's government in November 2002, liberal intellectuals expressed modest hopes that the new leadership would loosen the tight gag on freedom of expression. Against the backdrop of China’s increasingly closer integration with the world, the government did indeed relax some controls in the first few months, but it has since become clear that the Communist Party is not about to open the door to its own demise. Still, with critics increasingly bolder and more determined, there can be no return to the past.

In early 2003, Hu rapped state television network on the knuckles for pandering to government officials, Politburo propaganda czar Li Changchun called for more hard-hitting reporting and officials were told to be more responsive to the needs of the media. Journalists took up their offer to be more open in their reporting, even though it meant nudging the invisible line that every journalist knows is not to be crossed.

But the promise of a Beijing spring was quickly dashed in March 2003 when the outspoken daily paper 21st Century Herald published a letter by Li Rui, former secretary to Mao Zedong, harshly criticizing past and present Party leaders – specifically Chairman Mao, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin – for being autocratic. The newspaper was soon shut down, and more than a year later remains closed.

Since then, officials have stepped up attacks on Internet dissidents, scholars and journalists, leading some observers to say the freedom of speech today is more threatened than in the grim days shortly after the 1989 Tiananmen democracy crackdown. While there has been a major relaxation of media taboos—from reporting on disasters to corruption and social issues—the unwritten rule remains that any news that potentially threatens the Party’s authority is strictly off-limits.

Earlier this year, two former editors and the former general manager at the hard-hitting Southern Metropolis Daily in Guangdong were arrested on charges of embezzlement and bribery. Chinese sources believe the real reason for their arrest was the newspaper’s active coverage of SARS and its reporting of the case of Sun Zhigang, a graphic designer who was beaten to death while in police custody in Guangzhou last year.

The most telling example of the clampdown concerns a best-selling book published earlier this year titled “An Investigation of the Chinese Peasantry." The title is eerily similar to Mao’s seminal work, "The Report on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement of Hunan", which set the stage for the Party-led revolution. This shocking look at the plight of farmers was an instant hit, and the husband-wife authors were soon turning up on TV shows and in the pages of newspapers and magazines around the country.

But despite the new leadership’s stated concern for the rights of farmers, the book’s assertion that things are not so good down on the farm was too much for the Party to accept. The Propaganda Department banned the book a few months ago, and co-authors Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao now face a lawsuit by a local official whose son is a judge in the local court. Attempts to move the hearing to a neutral court have failed, and the farmers quoted in the book are too afraid to testify in court, leaving the authors despondent.

Despite being banned, the book has gone on to sell millions of pirated copies on the streets. Nonetheless, the case is a sad reminder of the consequences of expressing one’s opinions.

In February, Jiang Yanyong, the 72-year-old retired Army surgeon who a year earlier had gone to the foreign media with proof of SARS, was back in the spotlight. Bolstered by his SARS fame, Jiang wrote an open letter to the leadership in which he called on the government to admit responsibility for the 1989 crackdown during the Tiananmen protests that left hundreds, and possibly more than 1,000, dead. In his letter, the retired surgeon recalled treating wounded and dying people in his hospital on the morning of June 4. Since releasing his letter, however, Jiang's fame has not been enough to protect him. He and his wife were both detained on June 1 on their way to the U.S. Consulate to apply for a visa to visit their daughter in the U.S. His wife was released two weeks later, but Jiang was held for 49 days while undergoing what the Washington Post reported were “brain-washing sessions.” Whether Jiang recanted under pressure is still unclear, but the government has said that his case is still not closed.

The Party is clearly facing a dilemma. If Jiang had not been dealt with, say intellectuals, it would have sent a signal that people can speak up. At the same time, if 49 days in jail wasn’t enough to break the elderly doctor’s will and he continues to publicly criticize the government,, the Party will face a very embarrassing situation. Although Jiang’s detention and release has not been reported anywhere in the Chinese media, more and more Chinese are learning the news every day, and respect for him is growing.

Nor is Jiang an isolated case.

In May, Bao Tong, a prominent liberal and former high-ranking official, lashed out at the Party in the run-up to the June 4 anniversary this year. In his statement, Bao took the Party to task for failing to advance reforms since 1989. “On the contrary, some things have even gone backwards,” he wrote. He particularly cited Party interference in the media and publishing sectors. Bao, long a thorn in the government’s side, spent seven years in prison for opposing the 1989 crackdown, and is under round-the-clock surveillance. Foreign journalists who try to telephone him say the calls are repeatedly disconnected.

Earlier this year, Jiao Guobiao, a professor at the prestigious Beijing University, and a former journalist, wrote a scathing attack on the Propaganda Department, which oversees the media, saying the Party organ uses Nazi tactics and is the “stumbling block” in the development of Chinese society.

“Today, you can’t mention ‘Jiang Yanyong,’ tomorrow you can’t reflect on SARS, the day after tomorrow there will be some new taboo…,” he wrote. While Jiao’s article will obviously never appear in the media, it has circulated widely on the Internet to the delight of many Chinese.

Government measures to silence its critics don’t appear to be having the intended effect, as journalists and scholars continue to speak out and the government finds it increasingly difficult to be the sole guardian of the truth. Aggressive young journalists continue to dig into a growing array of sensitive news, from the recent fake baby milk powder scandal that left dozens of babies dead around the country to the growing army of petitioners who arrive each day in the capital to air their grievances at central government officials over runaway local corruption.

While Chinese intellectuals and journalists acknowledge that they are able to speak out about an increasing number of topics, they warn that this should not be mistaken as a move toward true freedom of expression. Sensitive political issues will continue to remain off-limits for the foreseeable future, they say. Neither Hu Jintao nor Wen Jiabao will sanction any reform that will undermine the Party’s—and their own--authority. As one Western diplomat says, “The Party is not in the business of putting itself out of business.”

Paul Mooney, a freelance journalist, has been reporting on China for 15 years.

Rights:
© 2004 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4265

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Internet Fans Flames of Chinese Nationalism

Paul Mooney
YaleGlobal, 4 April 2005

At the dawn of the Internet Age, many visionaries predicted that the rising tide of global interconnectedness would gradually eliminate sovereign borders and nationalism. The experience of China, which today is more open than in anytime in the past, however, belies that expectation. Highly connected and internet-savvy Chinese youth today have emerged as virulent nationalists, hampering the government's attempt at better relations with Japan. Meanwhile, rising Japanese nationalism is adding fuel to the fire.

Anti-Japanese sentiment among younger people here is unprecedented – and increasing significantly. Ironically, China's opening up and the internet are playing a key role in this trend.

The best illustration is the ongoing cyber-roots campaign against Japan's bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Organizers of a petition, which started among Chinese in the US, originally hoped for one million signatories. However, due to internet popularity in China, the figure, the organizers claim, has already surpassed 22 million. Petitioners hope their pressure will force Beijing to keep Japan out of the Security Council – a move that would seriously damage already worsening relations.

Chinese nationalists have taken advantage of the limited free space on the internet to express their anger toward Japan. They have advocated boycotts of Japanese goods, denounced Japan in chat rooms, and sought to alter the government's policies toward Japan.

The Western media has been quick to point an accusing finger at the Chinese government for failing to rein in anti-Japanese sentiments, accusing it of fanning the flames of nationalism in an attempt to shore up its own legitimacy. Experts on Sino-Japanese relations insist that the government is, indeed, worried about the current trend, but fears that appearing weak-kneed vis-à-vis Japan will damage Party legitimacy. The web is closely monitored by the government, which has shut down sites for going beyond permissible limits. But curbing anger against Japanese poses a new challenge.

While the government routinely deals harshly with dissident behavior, the Japan question appears to be its major vulnerability. Last year, anti-Japanese outbursts on the country's fiercely nationalist web sites led Beijing to reluctantly take a tough stance when Japan arrested seven Chinese activists for illegally sailing to one of the contested Senakaku Islands. Angry postings flooded the internet, calling for a hard-line approach against Japan. Though the government had hoped that the case would fade quickly, it allowed protesters to demonstrate in front of the Japanese consulate for several days. And when a nationalist web site actively protested a hefty purchase order for high-speed trains from Japan, the web site was shut down – and the deal seems to be in trouble.

Jiang Wenran, professor of political science at the University of Alberta, Canada, says that while Beijing has not made an effort to shut down the online petition drive, the government is not encouraging it. "The order is out to lead it in a moderate way," he says.

Chinese observers say there's no real incentive for the government – or Japan, for that matter – to allow relations to further deteriorate. Furthermore, the Communist Party is well aware that nationalism can be a double-edged sword: Should petitioners force Beijing to veto Japan's Security Council membership, this energy could then be easily turned inward, to sensitive domestic issues.

Several signs suggest that Hu Jintao has actually tried to create a constructive environment for improving Sino-Japanese relations. For one, he put moderates in charge of the country's Japan policy, and appointed one, Wang Yi, as the new ambassador to Tokyo.

Two years ago, the government also quietly looked the other way when Ma Licheng, a well-known commentator for the People's Daily, published an article in Strategy and Management magazine, criticizing ultra-nationalist views of Japan and calling for "new thinking" in China's Japan policy. He urged Chinese to forget about history and to focus on normalizing ties with Japan. (A source close to Ma says he may have indirectly been nudged to write the article by people with close ties to the top leadership, an attempt to break the ice with Japan.) The daring article was followed by a rare and lively public debate among academics, researchers, and journalists about the direction of China's Japan policy.

Unfortunately, the Japanese government failed to respond to China's gestures. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi continued to ignore Chinese sensitivities by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine in Tokyo dedicated to fallen Japanese soldiers – including a handful declared by the allied powers to have been war criminals during World War II. Rather than making some kind of goodwill gesture to China or ceasing visits to the shrine, Japan cut the floor out from under Chinese advocates of new thinking, who were already under fierce pressure from nationalists at home.

Shi Yinhong, professor of political science at Renmin University, says that it is now much more difficult for anyone to advocate a more balanced view of relations between the two countries. Unfortunately, thinking is changing drastically among some sectors of the public in both countries, making it increasingly difficult to put relations back on track.

There was a time when Tokyo, still feeling guilty over World War II, reflexively deferred to Beijing – but no longer. Japan's new leaders say it's time to leave history behind and become a "normal" country. And it seems to have a good degree of public support.

Chinese attribute this partially to China's growing economic and political influence in the region. "Japanese feel that China is developing quickly and getting stronger," says Ma Ling, a well known news commentator who studied in Japan, "and they're worried about this."

In recent months Japan has taken a number of steps that have enraged China's leaders. These include a new security agreement with the United States, wherein the two pronounced Taiwan a "common strategic concern." Also, Tokyo announced its intent to cancel soft loans to China beginning in 2008 and published a white paper naming China as a threat.

On the positive side, a Chinese scholar who closely follows Sino-Japanese relations says that Koizumi has reached an implicit agreement with China's top leaders that this year will be too sensitive for bilateral relations to make a visit to Yasukuni. If true, this could pave the way for the resumption of visits between the leaders of both countries.

Meanwhile, a new generation of Chinese is taking pride in China's growing international status, and they're itching to stand up against Japan. "Younger Chinese have a different sense of power than past generations," says Shi. "They see China getting stronger and Japan relatively weaker."

The government's worst fears came true over the weekend as news reports said 10,000 Chinese demonstrated in Chengdu, Sichuan province, on Saturday, with some attacking a Japanese-owned supermarket. On Sunday, an estimated 3,000 protesters damaged two Japanese department stores in Shenzhen, in the south. Meanwhile, local businesses in Northeast China began pulling Japanese products off their shelves.

What began as hyperventilating in cyberspace has now spread to the streets. It's still not clear whether the government condoned the increasing online anti-Japanese sentiment out of fear of domestic criticism or to pressure Japan. But as the recent dilemma with Japan shows, riding the internet can be like riding a tiger: Once you get on, it can be very hard to get off.

Paul Mooney, a freelance journalist, has been reporting on China for 15 years.

Rights:
© 2005 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5516

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'Streets with Memories' in Lhasa

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6111986&ft=1&f=1021

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Two Realities of Tibet

Two Realities of Tibet

By Robert Barnett from Columbia University

Two sets of images have already come to dominate outsiders’ understanding of this month’s events in Tibet, where a pro-independence movement has seen some 40 protests of greater intensity and extent than in some four decades.
Times Topic: TibetOne image is the video footage of Tibetan rioters savagely beating Chinese migrants in Lhasa on March 14, when 16 people are said to have been killed or burned to death by the mobs. These scenes, shown repeatedly on CNN and other networks (not always with clear indications that the Chinese government supplied them), are immensely troubling, and challenge any remaining Western image of the pacific, spiritual Tibetan.
The other image is conveyed by a series of photographs showing Tibetans shot dead in pro-independence protests in Ngaba, far to the east of Lhasa, reportedly by riot police. The blood-streaked and bullet-ridden bodies, too gruesome to show in public media, have been posted on the Web.
The video footage of the Lhasa riots – hardly representative, since no attacks on Chinese civilians have been reported in any of the 40 other protests – are in one view taken as a sign that economic marginalization has seeded envy of the commercial success of Chinese migrants in Tibet and hardened into ethnic hatred. A similar school, strongly held by Chinese leaders, accuses the exile Tibetan leadership of inciting the unrest, seeking to undermine China’s Olympic Games to be held there this summer.
For others, the Ngaba photographs are emblematic of the resistance of oppressed Tibetans to Chinese domination. Terms like uprising or intifada are used, and the deaths are seen as the inevitable price of the fight for freedom.
Neither view is wrong, though they are barely compatible. If the polarizing images are to bring outsiders closer to understanding what is happening in Tibet and why, we need to recognize the historical basis for both interpretations.

China takes a statist position: that, to modernize, all cultures need to give up something of their distinct identities, and all states limit citizens’ rights when they threaten national interests. The British had a similar view when they invaded Tibet in 1903-4, arguing that Tibet was outdated theocracy with a corrupt religion that would be brought to its senses by a taste of modern military efficiency. When Mao Zedong sent his army to integrate Tibet into the new People’s Republic in 1950, it was said that a weak Tibet needed liberating from Western imperialists. Nine years later, when a failed uprising against Chinese rule led the Dalai Lama to flee with 80,000 other Tibetans to India, the Chinese said Tibetans needed to be liberated from feudal oppression. In the 1980s, the explanation changed to one in which China offered social and economic development to free Tibetans from material backwardness. In all such views, Tibet and Tibetans are seen as something incomplete and in need of fulfillment from an outside source, whether a civilization, a state or the forces of modernization.
Claims this week that Tibetan protesters were stirred up by the exiled Dalai Lama, reflect a historical view of people not as thinking individuals with concerns, but as captives of a powerful ideology, be it religion, feudal bondage, traditional customs or inefficient economic practices like nomadic herding.
Thus the fact that Tibetan monks arranged a protest to coincide with a similar event in India is seen as evidence that they were controlled by exile groups in India. The protesters’ calculation that the security forces would be reluctant to shoot them in the run-up to the summer Olympics is seen as a political conspiracy rather than an intelligent wish to remain alive.
On the Tibetan side, the events are seen in terms of national identity — a distinct population and culture, with features shared by all its members, a sense of common purpose and a broad agreement about the story of its past.
The historical high points are the eighth century, when Tibet was a major empire; the year 1642 when the fifth Dalai Lama began to form Tibet into a single nation; the declaration of independence in 1913 by the 13th Dalai Lama, and the 1959 uprising against Chinese rule. In this record, outsiders have taken something away from what was otherwise whole. China has deprived the nation of its culture, the Tibetan people have been denied freedom, their language has been whittled away, and their economic resources have been appropriated by others.
Will new views result from what has happened in Tibet this month? Few people will continue to see Tibetans as figments of spiritual fantasies, or simply as victims of oppression or as subjects for our sympathy. We are more likely to see them now as complex, passionate figures making very political and sometimes brutal decisions in the difficult effort to become again the authors of their own destinies.
No one of good will is likely not to feel for those Chinese who are pained deeply by the images of horrific ethnic violence, even if they and their leaders had been warned of explosive tensions many times, sympathy that will be squandered if executions and summary justice ensues. In either case, the deaths on both sides show that Tibet is after all a deeply serious issue, resolvable only through political means, one in which we all will need to develop more complex views needed to understand the new realities created by Tibetan protesters inside Tibet.

Robert Barnett is director of the Modern Tibetan Studies Program at Columbia University and the author, most recently, of “Lhasa: Streets With Memories” (Columbia University Press, 2006).

http://topics.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/tibets-two-realities/?scp=5-b&sq=tibet&st=nyt

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Protests in Tibet and Separatism: the Olympics and Beyond

Barry Sautman

Recent protests in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas were organized to embarrass
the Chinese government ahead of the Olympics. The Tibetan Youth Congress (
TYC), the major Tibetan exile organization that advocates independence for
Tibet and has endorsed using violent methods to achieve it, has said as much
. Its head, Tsewang Rigzin, stated in a March 15 interview with the Chicago
Tribune that since it is likely that Chinese authorities would suppress
protests in Tibet, “With the spotlight on them with the Olympics, we want
to test them. We want them to show their true colors. That’s why we’re
pushing this.” At the June, 2007 Conference for an Independent Tibet
organized in India by “Friends of Tibet,” speakers pointed out that the
Olympics present a unique opportunity for protests in Tibet. In January,
2008, exiles in India launched a “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” to
“act in the spirit” of the violent 1959 uprising against Chinese
government authority and focus on the Olympics.

Several groups of Tibetans were likely involved in the protests in Lhasa,
including in the burning and looting of non-Tibetan businesses and attacks
against Han and Hui (Muslim Chinese) migrants to Tibet. The large
monasteries have long been centers of separatism, a stance cultivated by the
TYC and other exile entities, many of which are financed by the US State
Department or the US Congress’ National Endowment for Democracy. Monks are
self-selected to be especially devoted to the Dalai Lama. However much he
may characterize his own position as seeking only greater autonomy for Tibet
, monks know he is unwilling to declare that Tibet is an inalienable part of
China, an act China demands of him as a precondition to formal negotiations
. Because the exile regime eschews a separation of politics and religion,
many monks deem adherence to the Dalai Lama’s stance of non-recognition of
the Chinese government’s legitimacy in Tibet to be a religious obligation.

Reports on the violence have underscored that Tibetan merchants competing
with Han and Hui are especially antagonistic to the presence of non-Tibetans
. Alongside monks, Tibetan merchants were the mainstay of protests in Lhasa
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This time around, many Han and Hui-owned
shops were torched. Many of those involved in arson, looting, and ethnic-
based beatings are also likely to have been unemployed young men. Towns have
experienced much rural-to-urban migration of Tibetans with few skills
needed for urban employment. Videos from Lhasa showed the vast majority of
rioters were males in their teens or twenties.

The recent actions in Tibetan areas differ from the broad-based
demonstrations of “people power” movements in several parts of the world
in the last few decades. They hardly show the overwhelming Tibetan anti-
Chinese consensus portrayed in the international media. The highest media
estimate of Tibetans who participated in protests is 20,000 — by Steve Chao
, the Beijing Bureau Chief of Canadian Television News, i.e. one of every
300 Tibetans. Compare that to the 1986 protests against the Marcos
dictatorship by about three million — one out of every 19 Filipinos.

Tibetans have legitimate grievances about not being sufficiently helped to
compete for jobs and in business with migrants to Tibet. There is also job
discrimination by Han migrants in favor of family members and people from
their native places. The gaps in education and living standards between
Tibetans and Han are substantial and too slow in narrowing. The grievances
have long existed, but protests and rioting took place this year because the
Olympics make it opportune for separatists to advance their agenda. Indeed,
there was a radical disconnect between Tibetan socio-economic grievances
and the slogans raised in the protests, such as “Complete Independence for
Tibet” and “May the exiles and Tibetans inside Tibet be reunited,”
slogans that not coincidentally replicate those raised by pro-independence
Tibetan exiles.

While separatists will not succeed in detaching Tibet from China by rioting,
they believe that China will eventually collapse, like the former Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, and they seek to establish their claim to rule before
that happens. Alternatively, they think that the United States may intervene
, as it has elsewhere, to foster the breakaway of regions in countries to
which the US is antagonistic, e.g. Kosovo and southern Sudan. The Chinese
government also fears such eventualities, however unlikely they are to come
to pass. It accordingly acts to suppress separatism, an action that comports
with its rights under international law.

Separatists know they can count on the automatic sympathy of Western
politicians and media, who view China as a strategic economic and political
competitor. Western elites have thus widely condemned China for suppressing
riots that these elites would never allow to go unsuppressed in their own
countries. They demand that China be restrained in its response; yet, during
the Los Angeles uprising or riots of 1992 — which spread to a score of
other major cities — President George H.W. Bush stated when he sent in
thousands of soldiers, that “There can be no excuse for the murder, arson,
theft or vandalism that have terrorized the people of Los Angeles . . . Let
me assure you that I will use whatever force is necessary to restore order.
” Neither Western politicians nor mainstream media attacked him on this
score, while neither Western leaders nor the Dalai Lama have criticized
those Tibetans who recently engaged in ethnic-based attacks and arson.

Western elites give the Chinese government no recognition for significant
improvements in the lives of Tibetans as a result of subsidies from the
China’s central government and provinces, improvements that the Dalai Lama
has himself admitted. Western politicians and media also consistently credit
the Dalai Lama’s charge that “cultural genocide” is underway in Tibet,
even though the exiles and their supporters offer no credible evidence of
the evisceration of Tibetan language use, religious practice or art. In fact
, more than 90% of Tibetans speak Tibetan as their mother tongue. Tibet has
about 150,000 monks and nuns, the highest concentration of full-time “
clergy” in the Buddhist world. Western scholars of Tibetan literature and
art forms have attested that it is flourishing.

Ethnic contradictions in Tibet arise from the demography, economy and
politics of the Tibetan areas. Separatists and their supporters claim that
Han Chinese have been “flooding” into Tibet, “swamping” Tibetans
demographically. In fact, between the national censuses of 1990 and 2000 (
which count everyone who has lived in an area for six months or more), the
percentage of Tibetans in the Tibetan areas as a whole increased somewhat
and Han were about one-fifth of the population. A preliminary analysis of
the 2005 mini-census shows that from 2000-2005 there was a small increase in
the proportion of Han in the central-western parts of Tibet (the Tibet
Autonomous Region or TAR) and little change in eastern Tibet. Pro-
independence forces want the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han (as happened in
1912 and 1949); the Dalai Lama has said he will accept a three-to-one
Tibetan to non-Tibet population ratio, but he consistently misrepresents the
present situation as one of a Han majority. Given his status as not merely
the top Tibetan Buddhist religious leader, but as an emanation of Buddha,
most Tibetans credit whatever he says on this or other topics.

The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has
very few non-Tibetans. The vast majority of Han migrants to Tibetan towns
are poor or near-poor. They are not personally subsidized by the state;
although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by
infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who
migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within
two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to
local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown
that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that
some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to
prosper.

Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle
class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale
manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-
employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because
those who cannot find work leave. Many Han migrants have racist attitudes
toward Tibetans, mostly notions that Tibetans are lazy, dirty, and obsessed
with religion. Many Tibetans reciprocate with representations of Han as rich
, money-obsessed and conspiring to exploit Tibetans. Long-resident urban
Tibetans absorb aspects of Han culture in much the same way that ethnic
minorities do with ethnic majority cultures the world over. Tibetans are not
however being forcibly “Sincized.” Most Tibetans speak little or no
Chinese. They begin to learn it in the higher primary grades and, in many
Tibetan areas, must study in it if they go on to secondary education.
Chinese, however, is one of the two most important languages in the world
and considerable advantages accrue to those who learn it, just as they do to
non-native English speakers.

The Tibetan exiles argue that religious practice is sharply restricted in
Tibetan areas. The Chinese government has the right under international law
to regulate religious institutions to prevent them from being used as
vehicles for separatism and the control of religion is in fact mostly a
function of the state’s (overly-developed) concern about separatism and
secondarily about how the hyper-development of religious institutions
counteracts “development” among ethnic Tibetans. Certain state policies do
infringe on freedom of religion; for example, the forbidding, in the TAR (
Tibet Autonomous Region), of state employees and university students to
participate in religious rites. The lesser degree of control over religion
in the eastern Tibetan areas beyond the TAR– at least before the events of
March, 2008 — indicate however that the Chinese government calibrates its
control according to the perceived degree of separatist sentiment in the
monasteries.

The Dalai Lama’s regime was of course itself a theocracy that closely
regulated the monasteries, including the politics, hierarchy and number of
monks. The exile authorities today circumscribe by fiat those religious
practices they oppose, such as the propitiation of a “deity” known as
Dorje Shugden. The cult of the Dalai Lama, which is even stronger among
monks than it is among Hollywood stars, nevertheless mandates acceptance of
his claim that restrictions on religious management and practice in Tibet
arise solely from the Chinese state’s supposed anti-religious animus.
Similarly, the cult requires the conviction that the Dalai Lama is a
pacifist, even though he has explicitly or implicitly endorsed all wars
waged by the US.

The Dalai Lama is a Tibetan ethnic nationalist whose worldview is — in US
terms — both liberal and conservative. He and many of his foreign
supporters have a pronounced affinity for conservative politicians, such as
Bush, Thatcher, Lee Teng-hui and Ishihara Shintaro, but they can get along
well with liberals like US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, because they are virulently
anti-communist and anti-China.

The Dalai Lama is far from being a supporter of oppressed peoples. For
example, in 2002, when he visited Australia, the Dalai Lama, upon arriving
in Melbourne, noted “he had flown over ‘a large empty area’ of Australia
that could house millions of people from other densely populated continents.
” The area is, of course, not wholly empty, as it contains Aborigines. To
them, the Dalai Lama proffered the advice that “black people ‘should
appreciate what white people have brought to this country, its development.
’” (R. Callick, “Dalai Lama Treads Fine Line,” Australian Financial
Review, May 22, 2002).

The development of the “market economy” has had much the same effect in
Tibetan areas as in the rest of China, i.e. increased exploitation,
exacerbated income and wealth differentials, and rampant corruption. The
degree to which this involves an “ethnic division of labor” that
disadvantages Tibetans is however exaggerated by separatists in order to
foster ethnic antagonism. For example, Tibet is not the poorest area of
China, as is often claimed. It is better off than several other ethnic
minority areas and even than some Han areas, in large measure due to heavy
government subsidies. Rural Tibetans as well receive more state subsidies
than other minorities. The exile leaders employ hyperbole not only in terms
of the degree of empirical difference, but also concerning the more
fundamental ethnic relationship in Tibet: in contrast to, say, Israel/
Palestine, Tibetans have the same rights as Han, they enjoy certain
preferential economic and social policies, and about half the top party
leaders in the TAR have been ethnic Tibetans.

Tibet has none of the indicia of a colony or occupied territory and thus has
no relationship to self-determination, a concept that in recent decades has
often been misused, especially by the US, to foster the breakup of states
and consequent emiseration of their populations. A settlement between the
Chinese government and Tibetan exile elites is a pre-condition for the
mitigation of Tibetan grievances because absent a settlement, ethnic
politics will continue to subsume every issue in Tibet, as it does for
example, in Taiwan and Kosovo, where ethnic binaries are constructed by “
ethnic political entrepreneurs,” who seek to outbid each other for support.

The protests in Tibet had no progressive aspect. Many who participated in
the ethnic murders, beatings and arsons in Lhasa were poor rural migrants to
the city, but the slogans there and elsewhere in Tibet almost all concerned
independence or the Dalai Lama. There have been many movements the world
over in which marginalized people have taken a reactionary and often racist
road, for example, al-Qaeda or much of the base of the Nazis. The riots in
Tibet also have done nothing to advance discussions of a political
settlement between the Chinese government and exiles, yet a settlement is
necessary for the substantial mitigation of Tibetan grievances. For Tibetan
pro-independence forces, a setback to such efforts may have been their very
purpose in fostering the riots. Tibetan pro-independence forces, like
separatists everywhere, seek to counter any view of the world that is not
ethnic-based and to thwart all efforts to resolve ethnic contradictions, in
order to boost the mobilization needed to sustain their ethnic nationalist
projects. They have claimed that China will soon collapse and the US will
thereafter increase its patronage of a Tibetan state elite, to the benefit
of ordinary Tibetans. One only has to look round the world at the many
humanitarian catastrophes that have resulted from such thinking to project
what consequences are likely to follow for ordinary Tibetans if the
separatist fantasy were fulfilled.

http://www.blackandwhitecat.org/2008/04/01/separatism-and-tibet/

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April 04, 2008

The Roots of Chinese Nationalism

By EMILY PARKER
April 1, 2008; Page A17

The Chinese media decry violent Tibetan rioters; the West criticizes the Chinese crackdown. The Western press describes Chinese censorship; Chinese netizens slam Western media bias. A Chinese official calls the Dalai Lama a "political exile bent on engaging in activities aimed at splitting the motherland," while in the West he is described as a man of "peace" and "reconciliation." Americans and Europeans debate boycotting the Olympics to protest China's human-rights record; Chinese commentary describes Western arrogance toward a "developing country that is going to host the games."

Are we all living on the same planet?

1
It may be tempting to write off these Chinese nationalist attitudes as the results of state propaganda. And Beijing is certainly fanning the flames, at least for now. But as Chinese outrage explodes on the Web and among Chinese abroad, it's clear that Chinese nationalism is not just coming from the top down. It's not hard to find a Chinese person who expresses a "nationalist" view -- that Tibet is part of China, or that the Western media is biased -- but is also a vehement critic of the Communist Party. In some cases, nationalists have accused Beijing of not defending Chinese interests strongly enough.

So what does it mean to love China? And who decides, the Communist Party or the Chinese people themselves?

Meanwhile, those outside the country are asking their own questions. Perhaps what they want to know most is this: Will China's "love of country" (aiguozhuyi) somehow amount to hostility toward us? There have been several moments over the past decade when the short answer to this question, particularly where Americans and Japanese were concerned, appeared to be "yes."

One of the more dramatic outbursts took place in 1999, when NATO bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing three Chinese people. Many Chinese refused to believe fervent U.S. pleas that the bombing was a tragic accident, and tens of thousands took to the streets, with some throwing bricks and Molotov cocktails. U.S. Ambassador Jim Sasser was trapped in the American embassy for days as demonstrators pelted the building with stones.

In 2005, thousands of Chinese people took to the streets again, this time in reaction to Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The emotional, occasionally violent demonstrations were also protests against what many Chinese felt was Japan's failure to address the past -- including textbooks that whitewashed Japan's historical atrocities and then Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's repeated visits to Japan's Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined.

These expressions of outrage were rooted in the perception that China was victimized by a foreign country. This idea of a wounded, defeated nation has deep roots in education and propaganda. In "China's New Nationalism," Peter Gries discusses how the narrative of China's "century of humiliation" has framed its interactions with the West. This narrative starts, he says, with China's defeat in the First Opium War and the British acquisition of Hong Kong in 1842, includes unequal treaties with the British and the Japanese in the 19th century, and continues with the "War of Resistance" against Japan in the 1930s and 1940s.

Running through this narrative is a potent streak of pride and indignation, and these emotions bleed into the business sphere. American and Japanese companies have learned the perils of appearing to treat China as an "inferior" nation. In 2004, Nike ran an ad on the mainland that featured American basketball star LeBron James battling, and defeating, Chinese symbols such as dragons and a kung-fu master.

Memo to Nike: If you run this kind of ad in China, the dragons better win. A brouhaha erupted, Chinese "national dignity" was wounded, and the Nike ad was banned. In 2005, a McDonald's television ad that showed a Chinese man begging for a discount was taken off the air, apparently because it was too humiliating.

A year before the Nike incident, Toyota ended up pulling and formally apologizing for advertisements featuring stone lions bowing to a Prado SUV. The issue was that lions, ancient symbols of Chinese power, were bowing to a Japanese product. Several years before that, some Chinese accused Toshiba of treating them as inferior because, following accusations of a laptop defect, the company compensated U.S. consumers but not their Chinese counterparts. Toshiba sales saw a steep drop on the Chinese marketplace.

These nationalist outbursts may have been influenced by years of propaganda, but they are not always dictated from the top. In fact, the widespread popularity of the Internet is allowing the people to influence the state media. A Chinese journalist who worked for CCTV, a major state media outlet, explained to me how this works. The journalist, who requested that he not be named, described his own experience covering Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council. An Internet petition opposing the bid reportedly obtained over 40 million signatures.

Public opinion may have played a decisive role in determining the state media reporting, not the other way around. "After the reactions on the Internet, the government changed, so we had to change. We had to report every day on how these efforts [to gain a seat on the Security Council] were going. Before this era, government could act unilaterally. Now, when something happens on the Internet, the government has to change policy."

As Beijing has tried to forge friendlier relations with Japan, public patriotism has threatened to get in the way. In 2004, the Chinese authorities shut down the popular Patriots' Alliance Web site founded two years earlier. The site had criticized Japan, the U.S., and occasionally the Chinese government for being too weak. It apparently crossed the line after launching an online petition protesting the Railways Ministry's decision to award contracts to Japanese companies. The petition obtained over 67,000 online signatures in under 24 hours.

Chinese outrage over Tibet could again put Beijing in a tough position. Stoking popular nationalism may have once been a convenient way to shore up faith in the party, but a public spewing rhetoric about the West bullying China has no place in a "One World, One Dream"-themed Olympic Games. The Olympics will provide a window into China's self-image and global ambitions, and one imagines that Beijing will not want to show the world a face that is contorted with anger.

Many Chinese might tell you that one particularly proud moment in recent history was in August 1984, a mere six years after Deng Xiaoping opened China's doors to the world. The moment was the Los Angeles Olympic Games, where China took home 15 gold medals. For a country that had once been called "the sick man of Asia," this was a truly historic moment. China has come a long way since.

Let's hope the Beijing Olympics will pave the way for a new aiguozhuyi -- one that reflects a confident nation whose patriotism is dictated neither by resentment nor by the Communist Party. Let the games begin.

Ms. Parker is an assistant editorial features editor at The Wall Street Journal. Her chapter on Chinese nationalism will appear in "China's Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights Challenges," (Seven Stories Press, May 2008).

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120701186550979029.html

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April 02, 2008

Uprising Movement Background

The Tibetan people stand at an important crossroads as two historic moments approach; the Beijing 2008 Olympics in China and the 50th commemoration of the March 1959 uprising against China’s occupation of Tibet. The Chinese government is attempting to use the Olympic Games as a platform to gain acceptance as a global leader and to promote its propaganda on Tibet. Beijing sees this moment as an opportunity to legitimize its rule in Tibet once and for all.

The Olympics will take place just months before Tibetans mark 50 years since His Holiness the Dalai Lama and tens of thousands of Tibetans were forced to escape Tibet and Chinese troops violently crushed the popular uprising in Lhasa and across the country. More than 1 million Tibetans have since died as a direct result of China’s occupation. At this critical time - as the Chinese leadership wages an unrelenting war on Tibetan religion and culture, and is drastically increasing the rate of Chinese population transfer into Tibet - the very survival of Tibetans as a people is at stake.

It is time for Tibetans to take control of our future through a unified and coordinated resistance movement. We must now proclaim to the Chinese and to the world that the desire for freedom still burns in the heart of every Tibetan, both inside Tibet and in exile. In particular, the time has come for Tibetans in exile to boldly demonstrate that even after 50 years, we long to return to our homeland. A return march from exile in India back home to Tibet is being organized and will revive the spirit of the 1959 Uprising.

The 2008 Olympics will mark the culmination of almost 50 years of Tibetan resistance in exile. We will use this historic moment to reinvigorate the Tibetan freedom movement and bring our exile struggle for freedom back to Tibet. Through tireless work and an unwavering commitment to truth and justice, we will bring about another uprising that will shake China’s control in Tibet and mark the beginning of the end of China’s occupation.

DECLARATION
In the spirit of the 1959 Uprising and in memory of all the courageous Tibetans who sacrificed their lives for Tibet’s independence and continue to resist China’s tyrannical rule, we declare the commencement of the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement.

The Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement is a global movement of Tibetans inside and outside of Tibet taking control of our political destiny by engaging in direct action to end China’s illegal and brutal occupation of our country. Through unified and strategic campaigns we will seize the Olympic spotlight and shine it on China’s shameful repression inside Tibet, thereby denying China the international acceptance and approval it so fervently desires.

We call on Tibetans inside Tibet to continue to fight Chinese domination and we pledge our unwavering support for your continued courageous resistance. We call on Tibetans in exile and supporters in the free world to take every opportunity to protest China’s Olympic Games and support the Tibetan people’s struggle for freedom. We call on Tibetans everywhere to support the return march of Tibetan patriots to our homeland, Tibet.

DEMANDS
As we move forward with our movement we, the Tibetan People, commit ourselves whole-heartedly to this effort and demand that the Chinese government immediately:

1. Remove all obstacles to the unconditional return of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to Tibet and his rightful place as leader of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama is revered by Tibetans as our sole and undisputed leader. In recent years, Tibetans inside Tibet have repeatedly called for the Dalai Lama’s return for which many have been persecuted and still languish in prison.

2. Begin dismantling the colonial occupation of Tibet. Chinese colonial rule along with the transfer of Chinese into Tibet is marginalizing the Tibetan population and reducing us to a minority in our own country. The very survival of the Tibetan people and nation, represented by our language, religion, culture and traditions, is gravely threatened.

3. Release all Tibetan political prisoners from any form of detention and restore human rights to the Tibetan population. Thousands of Tibetans – including the young Panchen Lama Gendun Chokyi Nyima, Chadrel Rinpoche, Lobsang Tenzin, Trulku Tenzin Delek, Bangri Rinpoche, Dolma Kyab, Rungye A’drak, and Adruk Lopo – are being persecuted for the peaceful expression of their religious and political beliefs and all Tibetans living inside Tibet are systematically denied their basic human rights.

The Tibetan People also demand that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) immediately:

1. Cancel the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and never again consider China as a potential host country of the Olympic Games until Tibet is free. The Chinese government is committing cultural genocide in Tibet and does not deserve the honour of hosting such an internationally celebrated event.

4 January 2008

Tibetan Youth Congress
Tibetan Women’s Association
Gu-Chu-Sum Movement of Tibet
National Democratic Party of Tibet
Students for a Free Tibet, India

http://tibetanuprising.org/2008/03/11/background/

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Tibet Through Chinese Eyes

Many Chinese working in Tibet regard themselves as idealistic missionaries of progress, rejecting the Western idea of them as agents of cultural imperialism. In truth, they are inescapably both

by Peter Hessler, February 1999 Atlantic Monthly

Political views on Tibet tend to be as unambiguous as the hard blue dome of sky that stretches above its mountains. In Western opinion, the "Tibet question" is settled: Tibet should not be part of China; before being forcibly annexed, in 1951, it was an independent country. The Chinese are cruel occupiers who are seeking to destroy the traditional culture of Tibet. The Dalai Lama, the traditional spiritual leader of Tibet, who fled to India in 1959, should be allowed to return and resume his rule over either an independent or at least a culturally autonomous Tibet. In short, in Western eyes there is only one answer to the Tibet question: Free Tibet.

For Han—ethnic Chinese—who live in Tibet, the one answer is exactly the same and yet completely different. They serve what the Chinese call "Liberated Tibet." Mei Zhiyuan is Han, and in 1997 he was sent by the Chinese government to act as a "Volunteer Aiding Tibet" at a Tibetan middle school, where he works as a teacher. His roommate, Tashi, is a Tibetan who as a college student was sent in the opposite direction, to Sichuan province, where he received his teacher training. Both men are twenty-four years old. They are good friends who live near Heroes Road, which is named after the Chinese and Tibetans who contributed to the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet in the 1950s. This is how Mei Zhiyuan sees Tibet—as a harmonious region that benefits from Chinese support. When I asked him why he had volunteered to work there, he said, "Because all of us know that Tibet is a less developed place that needs skilled people."

I went to Tibet to explore this second viewpoint, hoping to catch a glimpse of the Tibet question through Chinese eyes. Before coming to Tibet, I had spent two years as a volunteer English teacher at a small college in Sichuan, which made me particularly interested in meeting volunteer teachers like Mei Zhiyuan. I also talked with other young government-sent workers and entrepreneurs who had come to seek their fortunes, and for four weeks that was my focus, as I spent time in Lhasa and other places where there are large numbers of Han settlers.

Of all the pieces that compose the Tibet question, this is by far the most explosive: the Dalai Lama has targeted Han migration as one of the greatest threats to Tibetan culture, and the sensitivity of the issue is evident in some statistics. According to Beijing, Han make up only three percent of the population of the Tibet Autonomous Region, whereas some Tibetan exiles claim that the figure is in fact over 50 percent and growing. Tibetans see the influx of Han as yet another attempt to destroy their culture; Chinese see the issue as Deng Xiaoping did in 1987, when he said, "Tibet is sparsely populated. The two million Tibetans are not enough to handle the task of developing such a huge region. There is no harm in sending Han into Tibet to help.... The key issues are what is best for Tibetans and how can Tibet develop at a fast pace, and move ahead in the four modernizations in China."

Regardless of the accuracy of the official Chinese view, many of the government-sent Han workers in Tibet clearly see their role in terms of service. They are perhaps the most important historical actors in terms of the Tibet question, and yet they are also the most-often overlooked. Why did they come to Tibet? What do they think of the place, how are they changing it, and what do they see as their role?

Gao Ming, a twenty-two-year-old English teacher, told me, "One aspect was that I knew we should be willing to go to the border regions, to the minority areas, to places that are jianku—difficult. These are the parts of China that need help. If I could have gone to Xinjiang, I would have, but I knew that Tibet was also a place that needed teachers. That was the main reason. Another aspect was that Tibet is a natural place—there's no pollution here, and almost no people; much of it is untouched. So I wanted to see what it was like."

Shi Mingzhi, a twenty-four-year-old physics teacher, said, "First, I'd say it's the same reason that you came here to travel—because it's an interesting place. But I also wanted to come help build the country. You know that all of the volunteers in this district are Party members, and if you're a Party member, you should be willing to go to a jianku place to work. So you could say that all of us had patriotic reasons for coming—perhaps that's the biggest reason. But I also came because it was a good opportunity, and the salary is higher than in the interior of China."

Talking with these young men was in many ways similar to talking with an idealistic volunteer in any part of the world. Apart from the financial incentive to work in Tibet, many of the motivations were the same—the sense of adventure, the desire to see something new, the commitment to service. And government propaganda emphasizes this sense of service, through figures like Kong Fansen, a cadre from eastern China who worked in Tibet and became famous as a worker-martyr after his death in an auto accident. Han workers are exhorted to study the "old Tibet spirit" of Kong and other cadres as they serve a region that in the Chinese view desperately needs their talents.

Central to their task is the concept of jianku. I heard this term repeatedly when the Chinese described conditions in Tibet, and life is especially jianku for Volunteers Aiding Tibet, who commit in advance to serving eight-year terms. Most government-sent Han workers fall into the category of Cadres Aiding Tibet—teachers, doctors, administrators, and others who serve for two or three years. Having graduated from a lower-level college, Mei Zhiyuan could not qualify for such a position, and as a result was forced to make an eight-year commitment. The sacrifice is particularly impressive considering that he assumed it would have serious repercussions on his health. Many Chinese believe that living at a high altitude for long periods of time does significant damage to the lungs, and a number of workers told me that this was the greatest drawback to living in Tibet. "It's bad for you," Mei Zhiyuan explained, "because when you live in a place this high, your lungs enlarge, and eventually that affects your heart. It shortens your life." During my stay in Tibet I heard several variations on this theory (one from an earnest young teacher who was smoking a cigarette), but generally it involved the lungs expanding and putting pressure on the heart. There is no medical evidence to support such a belief; indeed, in a heavily polluted country like China, where one of every four deaths is attributed to lung disease, the high, clean air of Tibet is probably tonic. Nevertheless, this perception adds to the sense of sacrifice, and it is encouraged by the government pay structure, which links salary to altitude: the higher you work, the higher your pay.

The roughly 1,000 yuan ($120) a month that Mei Zhiyuan earns is half what the local cadre teachers make. Even so, his salary is two to three times what he would make as a teacher in rural Sichuan, and he is able to send half his earnings home to his parents, who are peasants. It's good money by Chinese standards but seems hardly a sufficient incentive for a young man to be willing to shorten his life. Leaving before his eight years are up would incur a heavy fine of up to 20,000 yuan—$2,400, nearly two years' salary, or, for a peasant family like Mei Zhiyuan's, approximately twenty tons of rice.

The Dream of a Unified Motherland

From the Chinese perspective, Tibet has always been a part of China. This is, of course, a simplistic and inaccurate view, but Tibetan history is so muddled that one can see in it what one wishes. The Chinese can ignore some periods and point to others; they can cite the year 1792, when the Qing Emperor sent a Chinese army to help the Tibetans drive out the invading Nepalese, or explain that from 1728 to 1912 there were Qing ambans, imperial administrators, stationed in Lhasa. In fact the authority of these ambans steadily decreased over time, and Tibet enjoyed de facto independence from 1913 to 1951. An unbiased arbiter would find Tibetan arguments for independence more compelling than the Chinese version of history—but also, perhaps, would find that the Chinese have a stronger historical claim to Tibet than the United States does to much of the American West.

Most important, China's reasons for wanting Tibet changed greatly over the years. For the Qing Dynasty, Tibet was important strictly as a buffer state; ambans and armies were sent to ensure that the region remained peaceful, but they made relatively few administrative changes, and there was no effort to force the Tibetans to adopt the Chinese language or Chinese customs. In the Qing view, Tibet was a part of China but at the same time it was something different; the monasteries and the Dalai Lamas were allowed to maintain authority over most internal affairs.

In the early twentieth century, as the Qing collapsed and China struggled to overcome the imperialism of foreign powers, Tibet became important for new reasons of nationalism. Intellectuals and political leaders, including Sun Yat-sen, believed that China's historical right to Tibet had been infringed by Western powers, particularly Britain, which invaded Tibet in 1904 to force the thirteenth Dalai Lama to open relations. As Tibet slipped further from Chinese control, a steady stream of nationalistic rhetoric put the loss of Tibet into a familiar pattern—the humiliation by foreign powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Hong Kong went to the British, Manchuria and Shandong to the Japanese, Taiwan to the U.S.-funded Kuomintang. By the time Mao Zedong founded the People's Republic of China, in 1949, Tibet had figured into the nation's pre-eminent task: the reunification of the once-powerful motherland.

Tibet thus changed from buffer state to a central piece in Communist China's vision of itself as independent and free from imperialist influence. Orville Schell, a longtime observer of China, says that even today this perception is held by most Chinese. "I don't think there's any more sensitive issue," he says, "with the possible exception of Taiwan, because it grows out of the dream of a unified motherland—a dream that historically speaking has been the goal of almost every Chinese leader. This issue touches on sovereignty, it touches on the unity of Chinese territory, and especially it touches on the issue of the West as predator, the violator of Chinese sovereignty."

The irony is that China, like an abused child who grows up to revisit his suffering on the next generation, has committed similar sins in Tibet: the overthrow of the monasteries and the violent redistribution of land, the mayhem of the Cultural Revolution, and the restriction of intellectual and religious freedom that continues to this day. And as in any form of imperialism, much of the damage has been done in the name of duty. When the Chinese speak of pre-1951 Tibet, they emphasize the shortcomings of the region's feudal-theocratic government: life expectancy was thirty-six years; 95 percent of Tibetans were illiterate; 95 percent of the population was hereditary serfs and slaves owned by monasteries and nobles. The sense is that the Tibetans suffered under a bad system, and the Chinese had a moral obligation to liberate them. Before traveling to Tibet, I asked my Chinese friends about the region. Most responded like Sai Xinghao, a forty-eight-year-old photographer: "It was a slave society, you know, and they were very cruel—they'd cut off the heads of their slaves and enemies. I've seen movies about it. If you were a slave, everything was controlled by the master. So, of course, after Liberation the rich lords opposed the changes [instituted by the Chinese]. It's like your America's history, when Washington liberated the black slaves. Afterward the blacks supported him, but of course the wealthy class did not. In history it's always that way—it was the same when Napoleon overthrew King Louis, and all of the lords opposed Napoleon because he supported the poor."

My friend is not an educated man, but many Chinese intellectuals make the same comparison. President Jiang Zemin made a similar remark during his 1997 visit to the United States (although he correctly identified Lincoln as the Great Liberator). The statistics about Tibetan illiteracy and life expectancy are accurate. Although the Chinese exaggerate the ills of the feudal system, mid-century Tibet was badly in need of reform—but naturally the Tibetans would have much preferred to reform it themselves.

Another aspect of the Chinese duty in Tibet is the sense that rapid modernization is needed, and should take precedence over cultural considerations. For Westerners, this is a difficult perspective to understand. Tibet is appealing to us precisely because it's not modern, and we have idealized its culture and anti-materialism to the point where it has become, as Orville Schell says, "a figurative place of spiritual enlightenment in the Western imagination—where people don't make Buicks, they make good karma."

But to the Chinese, for whom modernization is coming late, Buicks look awfully good. I noticed this during my first year as a teacher in China, when my writing class spent time considering the American West. We discussed western expansion, and I presented the students with a problem of the late nineteenth century: the Plains Indians, their culture in jeopardy, were being pressed by white settlers. I asked my class to imagine that they were American citizens proposing a solution, and nearly all responded much the way this student did: "The world is changing and developing. We should make the Indians suit our modern life. The Indians are used to living all over the plains and moving frequently, without a fixed home, but it is very impractical in our modern life.... We need our country to be a powerful country; we must make the Indians adapt to our modern life and keep pace with the society. Only in this way can we strengthen the country."

Virtually all my students were from peasant backgrounds, and like most Chinese, the majority of them were but one generation removed from deep poverty. What I saw as freedom and culture, they saw as misery and ignorance. In my second year I repeated the lesson with a different class, asking if China had any indigenous people analogous to the Plains Indians. All responded that the Tibetans were similar. I asked about China's obligation in Tibet. The answers suggested that my students had learned more from American history than I had intended to teach. One student replied, "First, I will use my friendship to help [the Tibetans]. But if they refuse my friendship, I will use war to develop them, like the Americans did with the Indians."

The Two Sides of Support

Regardless of China's motivations, and regardless of its failures in Tibet, the drive to develop the region has been expensive. According to Beijing, more than 200,000 Han workers have served in Tibet since the 1950s. Taxes in Tibet are virtually nonexistent; Tibetan farmers, unlike those in the interior, receive tax-free leases of land, and a preferential tax code has been established to encourage business. Low-interest loans are available, and business imports from Nepal are duty-free. Despite the dearth of local revenues, government investment is steadily developing a modern infrastructure. From 1952 to 1994 the central government invested $4.2 billion in the region, and in 1994 Beijing initiated sixty-two major infrastructure projects for which the eventual investment is expected to be more than $480 million. It is estimated that more than 90 percent of Tibet's government revenue comes from outside the region.

This investment of both human and financial capital complicates the issue of Tibet in ways that few outsiders realize. Foreign reports often refer to the exploitation of Tibetan resources as a classic colonial situation, which is misleading. Although Beijing is certainly doing what it can with Tibet's timber and mineral reserves, China spends an enormous amount of money in the region, and if self-sufficiency ever comes, it will not come soon. Tibet does have significant military value: the Chinese do not want to see it under the influence of a foreign power such as India, but not even this would seem to merit the enormous investment. In 1996 China spent some $600 million in Tibet. One foreign observer who has studied the region puts this in perspective: "For that same year the United States gave a total of eight hundred million dollars in aid to all of Africa. That's all of Africa—we're talking about hundreds of millions of people. In Tibet there are only two and a half million. So if they become independent, who's going to be giving them that kind of money?"

"Unless you're a complete Luddite," Orville Schell says, "and don't believe in roads, telephones, hospitals, and things like that, then I think China must be credited with a substantial contribution to the modern infrastructure of Tibet. In this sense Tibet needs China. But that's not to diminish the hideous savageness with which China has treated Tibet."

Almost every aspect of Chinese support has two sides, and education illustrates the point well. I met a number of young Han teachers like Mei Zhiyuan, who were imbued with a sense of service: they were conscientious, well-trained teachers, and they were working in places with a real need for instructors. One volunteer was teaching English at a middle school where the shortage was so acute that many students had to delay the start of their English studies until the following year, when additional Han teachers were expected to arrive. I visited one district in which out of 230 secondary-school teachers, sixty were Han, and many of the Tibetan instructors had been trained in the interior at the Chinese government's expense. Such links with the interior seem inevitable, given that the Chinese have built Tibet's public education system from scratch. Before they arrived, in 1951, there were no public schools in Tibet, whereas now there are more than 4,000.

Likewise the schools I saw were impressive facilities with low student fees. In one town I toured the three local middle schools; two of them were newly built, with far better campuses than I was accustomed to seeing in China. The third school, whose grounds featured massive construction cranes fluttering with prayer flags, was being refurbished with the help of a $720,000 investment from the interior. Unlike students at most Chinese schools, those at the local No. 1 Middle School paid no tuition, and even high school students, who generally pay substantial amounts in China, had paid at most $70 a semester, including board. Everything possible was being done to encourage students to stay in school: a student's tuition and boarding charge were cut in half if only one parent worked, and transportation to and from the remote nomad areas was often free.

In a poor country such policies are impressively generous; essentially, Tibetan schools are better funded than Chinese schools. And this funding is sorely needed: the adult illiteracy rate in Tibet is still 52 percent. Only 78 percent of the children start elementary school, and of those only 35 percent enter middle school. But Chinese assistance must be considered in the context of what's being taught in the schools—a critical issue for Tibetans.

One morning I visited an elementary school on a spacious, beautiful campus, with new buildings and a grass playground that stretched westward under the shadow of a 14,000-foot mountain. Most of the school's 900 students were Tibetan. I paused at the central information board, where announcements were written in Chinese.

The board detailed a $487,800 investment that had been made by a provincial government in the interior, and displayed a short biography of Zu Chongzhi, a fifth-century Chinese mathematician. Next to this was a notice telling students to "remember the great goals." They were urged to work on doubling China's GNP from its 1980 level, and they were reminded that by 2050 China needed to achieve a GNP and a per capita income ranking in the middle of developed countries. Beside these goals was a long political section that read, in part,

We must achieve the goal of modern socialist construction, and we must persevere in building the economy. We must carry out domestic reform and the policy of opening to the outside world.... We must oppose the freedom of the capitalist class, and we must be vigilant against the conspiracy to make a peaceful evolution toward imperialism.

It was heavy stuff for elementary school students (and indeed, if I were a Chinese propagandist, I would think twice before exhorting Tibetan children to resist imperialism), and it indicates how politicized the climate of a Chinese school is. Despite all the recent economic changes in China, the education system is still tied to the past. This conservatism imbues every aspect of education, starting with language. Two of the schools I visited were mixed Han and Tibetan, and classes were segregated by ethnicity. The reasons here are linguistic: most Tibetan children don't start learning Mandarin until elementary school, and even many Tibetan high school students, as the Han teachers complained, don't understand Chinese well. This segregation leads to different curricula—for example, Tibetan students have daily Tibetan-language classes, whereas Han students use that time for extra English instruction. To the Chinese, this system seems fair, especially since Tibetan students have the right to join the Han classes.

But Tibetans feel that there is an overemphasis on Chinese, especially at the higher levels, which threatens their language and culture. All the classes taught by Han teachers are in Chinese or English, and most of the Tibetan teachers in the middle and high schools are supposed to use Mandarin (although the ones I spoke with said they often used Tibetan, because otherwise their students wouldn't understand). In any case, important qualifying exams emphasize Chinese, and this reflects a society in which fluency is critical to success, especially when it comes to any sort of government job. Another, more basic issue is that Tibetan students are overwhelmed. One Han teacher told me that his students came primarily from nomad areas, where their families lived in tents; yet during the course of an average day they might have classes in Tibetan, Chinese, and English, three languages with almost nothing in common.

Political and religious issues are paramount. In Lhasa I met a twenty-one-year-old Tibet University student who was angered by his school's anti-religious stance, which is standard for schools in Tibet. "They tell us we can't believe in religion," he said, "because we're supposed to be building socialism, and you can't believe in both socialism and religion. But of course most of the students still believe in religion—I'd say that eighty to ninety percent of us are devout." One of his classmates, a member of the Communist Party, complained about the history courses. "The history we study is all Chinese history [of Tibet]," he said. "Most of it I don't believe." These students also adamantly opposed existing programs that send exceptional Tibetan middle and high school students to study in the interior, where there is nothing to offset the Chinese view of Tibet.

Such complaints reflect the results of recent education reforms. A series of them made in 1994, characteristically, represent both the good and the bad aspects of Chinese support. On the one hand, the government stepped up its campaign against illiteracy, and on the other, it resolved to control the political content of education more carefully, in hopes of pacifying the region. There has certainly been some success with this approach: I met a number of educated Tibetans who identified closely with China. Tashi, Mei Zhiyuan's roommate, seemed completely comfortable being both Tibetan and Chinese: he had studied in Sichuan, he had a good job, and he had the government's support to thank. When I asked him what was the biggest problem in Tibet, he mentioned language—but not in the way many Tibetans did. "So many [Tibetan] students can't speak Chinese," he said, "and if you can't speak Chinese, it's hard to find a good job. They need to study harder."

Most Tibetans seemed less likely to accept Chinese support at face value. But it was clear that politically they were being pulled in a number of directions at once, and my conversations with educated young Tibetans were dizzying experiences. Their questions ranged from odd ("Which do you think is going to win, capitalism or socialism?") to bizarre ("Is it true that in America when you go to your brother's or sister's house for dinner, they charge you money?"), and the surroundings were often equally unsettling. One Monday morning I watched the flag-raising ceremony at a middle school, where students and staff members lined up to listen to the national anthem, after which, in unison, they pledged allegiance to the Communist Party, love for the motherland, and dedication to studying and working hard. With the Tibetan mountains towering above, it was a surreal scene—and it became all the more so when the school's political adviser, a Tibetan in his early thirties with silver teeth, walked over and asked me where I was from. After I told him, he said, "Here in Tibet we already have a lot of influence from your Western countries—like Pepsi, Coke, movies, things like that. My opinion is that there are good and bad things coming from the West. For example, things regarding sex. In America, if you're married and you decide that you want another lover, what do you do? You get a divorce, regardless of how it affects your wife and child. But the people here are very religious, and we don't like those kinds of ideas."

I heard a number of comments like this, and undoubtedly the education system included a great deal of anti-America propaganda. I felt that here the Chinese were almost doing the Tibetans a service; nothing depressed me more than my conversations with less-educated Tibetans, who invariably had great faith in American support and believed that President Clinton, who was then in China on last year's state visit, had come in order to save Tibet. Considering that China's interest in Tibet is largely a reaction to foreign imperialism, it's no surprise that nothing makes the Chinese angrier and more stubborn than the sight of the Dalai Lama and other exiled leaders seeking—and winning—support in America and elsewhere. And yet Tibetan faith in America seems naive given America's treatment of its own indigenous people, and because historically U.S. policy in Tibet has been hypocritical and counterproductive. For example, the CIA trained and armed Tibetan guerrillas in the 1950s, during a critical period of mostly peaceful (if tenuous) cooperation between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese. The peace ended when Tibetan uprisings, in which these guerrillas played a part, resulted in brutal Chinese repression and the Dalai Lama's flight to India.

America also represents modernity, and a further complication, beyond the Chinese political agenda, is that the long-isolated Tibetan society must come to grips with the modern world. One college student said, "The more money we Tibetans have, the higher our living standard is, the more we forget our own culture. And with or without the Chinese, I think that would be happening."

Sichuanese on the Frontier

Perhaps the most hopeful moment in recent Han-Tibetan relations came shortly after 1980, when the Chinese Party Secretary, Hu Yaobang, went on a fact-finding mission to Tibet and returned with severe criticisms of Chinese policies. He advocated a two-pronged solution: Chinese investment was needed to spur economic growth in Tibet, but at the same time the Han should be more respectful of Tibetan culture. Cadres needed to learn Tibetan; the language should be used in government offices serving the public; and religion should be allowed more freedom.

There's no question that such respect is sorely needed, especially with regard to language. I never met a single government-sent Han worker who was learning Tibetan—not even the volunteers who would be there for eight years. And in Lhasa at the Xinhua bookstore, the largest in the city, I found not one textbook for Chinese students of Tibetan—books for foreign students, yes, but nothing for the Chinese.

Some of the 1980 reforms were implemented, but they were cut short by a series of riots in Lhasa that started in 1987. To Beijing hardliners, the riots indicated that too much freedom is a bad thing, and in 1987 Hu Yaobang was purged, partly for his recommendations regarding Tibet. By the spring of 1989 martial law had been declared in Tibet, and the Chinese concluded that relaxing restrictions on Tibetan culture and religion was tantamount to encouraging unrest. The two-pronged solution was quickly cut in half: Beijing would simply develop the economy, hoping that rising standards of living would defuse political tensions while building closer economic ties with the interior. This policy has been accelerated by the enormous investments of the 1990s.

Development, however, often comes at the cost of culture. Traditional sections of Lhasa are being razed in favor of faceless modern buildings, and the economic boom is attracting hordes of Han and Hui (an Islamic minority) migrants to Tibet.

Outsiders dominate Tibet's economy—indeed, they've essentially built it, inspiring enormous resentment among the Tibetan population. I met some Tibetans who didn't mind that cadres were sent from the interior, but I never met one who wasn't opposed to the influx of migrant workers, especially the huge numbers of Han from nearby Sichuan. Longtime Han residents, too, felt this was a serious problem.

The phenomenon of liudong renkou, or "floating population," is affecting urban areas all across China, with some 100 million people seeking work away from home. In the west and south there are particularly large numbers of Sichuanese in the floating population, and during my travels I often heard the same prejudices: the Sichuanese migrants are uncultured, their women loose, their men jiaohua, sly. And worst of all, people complained, they keep coming.

Having spent two years in Sichuan, I understand why the Sichuanese so often leave. Their province, roughly the size of France, contains 120 million people, and the economy is so shaky that recent factory closings have led to worker uprisings in some cities. Mostly the Sichuanese leave because they aren't afraid to; they have been toughened by tough conditions, and all across China that is another thing they are famous for: their ability to chiku—eat bitter. They work and they survive, and like successful migrants anywhere else in the world, they are resented for their success.

In Tibet the Sichuanese have helped themselves to a large chunk of the economy. This was clear from the moment I arrived at the Lhasa airport, where thirteen of the sixteen restaurants bordering the entrance advertised Sichuan food. One was Tibetan. Virtually all small business in Lhasa follows this pattern; everywhere I saw Sichuan restaurants and shops. Locals told me that 80 percent of Lhasa's Han were Sichuanese, and this may not be much of an exaggeration.

This influx is far more significant and disruptive than the importing of Han cadres, and it's also harder to monitor. One common misperception in Western reports is that these people are sent by the government: the image is of a tremendous Han civilian army arriving to overwhelm Tibetan culture. The truth is that the government has little control over the situation. "How do you cut off the people moving out there?" asked one American who had spent much time in Tibet. "What mechanism are you going to have to prevent that? They don't have any restrictions on internal travel—and we always beat them over the head about not having those, because to institute them would be a human-rights issue."

Far from arriving with an ethnic agenda, the independent migrants are for the most part completely apolitical. In Lhasa I often ate at a small Sichuan restaurant run by Fei Xiaoyun, a thirty-one-year-old native of Chengdu who, along with her husband, had been laid off in 1996 by a bankrupt state-owned natural-gas plant. Each of them had been given a two-year severance allowance of $30 a month, and when that was gone, they took their savings and bought plane tickets to Lhasa. They had left their five-year-old son with his grandmother—a common choice for migrants, including cadres. This is partly out of fear of the effects on health of living in Tibet, and also because Tibetan schools are considered worse than those in the interior and children who are registered outside their districts have to pay extra fees.

Fei Xiaoyun never spoke of the growth of the GNP, and she had no interest in developing the motherland. Once, I asked her about Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, whose economic reforms are closing factories like hers, and she didn't even recognize his name. "All of the country's big affairs I don't understand," she said with a shrug. She was simply a poor woman with her back against the wall, and like the rest of the Sichuanese who had made their way to Tibet, she was trying desperately to make a living.

But such migrants have a political effect, as Tibetans watch outsiders develop an economy from which they feel increasingly removed. This also presents a question: If the rules are the same for everybody, why are the Han entrepreneurs so much more successful than the Tibetans? The most common response is that the rules aren't the same: the Chinese have easier access to government guanxi, or connections. But even on a level playing field the Han would have more capital and better contacts with sources in the interior. And their migrant communities have a tendency to support recent arrivals. This is especially true of the Sichuanese—one will arrive, and then a few relatives, and before long an extended family is dominating a factory or a block of shops. In front of the Jokhang, the holiest temple in Tibet, rows of stalls sell khataks, ceremonial scarves that pilgrims use as offerings. It's a job one would expect to see filled by Tibetans—as one would expect those selling rosaries in front of St. Peter's to be Catholic. But one saleswoman explained that all the stalls were run by Sichuanese from three small cities west of Chengdu. There were more than 200 of them—relatives, friends of relatives, relatives of friends—and they had completely filled that niche.

One day I walked past the khatak sellers with a Tibetan friend, and he shook his head. "Those people know how to do business," he said. "We Tibetans don't know how to do it—we're too straight. If something's supposed to be five yuan, we say it's five yuan. But a Sichuanese will say ten." I felt there was some truth to this—the Han are successful in Tibet for some of the same reasons that they are successful in so many places, from Southeast Asia to the United States. They have a stronger business tradition than the Tibetans, and virtually all independent Han settlers in Tibet have failed somewhere else, giving them a single-minded drive to succeed.

Consequently, Tibet feels like a classic frontier region, with typically peculiar demographics. There are disproportionately few Han children, and almost nobody comes to stay: the intention is invariably to return to the interior. The majority of the Han are men, including the government-sent workers. Of the Han women I saw in Tibet, more than a few were prostitutes; locals told me that they had come in a wave in 1994 and 1995, after the investments in the sixty-two major projects. One Han volunteer I spoke with had arrived in a group of thirteen men; one woman had applied but was rejected because the authorities felt that Tibet was no place for a young woman. The young man was resigned to finding a wife during his three paid trips home. "During vacation I'll be able to look for a girlfriend," he said. "I'll have six months. You can meet one then, and after that you c can write andall when you come back here."

There were moments when everything—the ethnic tension, the rugged individualism, the hard, bright sun and the high, bare mountains—seemed more like a Jack London story than a real society. One day some American friends and I hired a driver, a twenty-five-year-old Sichuanese named Wei, who was nursing a defeated 1991 Volkswagen Santana. He had a two-year-old son at home, and he hoped to earn enough money by carrying passengers—though he wasn't registered to do so—to buy a new car in six months. We agreed to pay him $36 if he drove us to Damxung, five hours north of Lhasa. Drive he did—past the police checkpoint, where he faked his credentials ("It's simpler that way," he explained), and past a Land Rover full of foreigners driven by a Tibetan, who, realizing our driver wasn't registered, swore he'd turn him in at Damxung. "It's because I'm Han," Wei said grimly. "And at Damxung the police will be Tibetan." He drove faster and faster, racing ahead of the Land Rover, until finally he hit a bump and ruptured the fuel line.

The car eased to a stop in the middle of nowhere. To the west rose the snow-topped Nyenchen Tanglha Mountains. The Tibetan driver cruised past, glaring. Wei cut a spare hose and patched the leak, and then he addressed the problem of injecting fuel back into the carburetor. He unhooked the fuel line and sucked out a mouthful of gas. Holding it in his mouth, he plugged the line back in. Then he walked around the front of the car and spit the fuel into the carburetor.

The car started. I could see Wei working the taste of gasoline around his mouth, and then, a few minutes later, he took out a cigarette. Everybody in the car held his breath—everybody but Wei, who lit the cigarette and sucked deeply. He did not explode. He stared ahead at the vast emptiness that stood between him and $36, and he kept driving.

That was the way a Sichuanese did things in Tibet. Gasoline was bitter but he ate it, the same way he ate the altitude and the weather and the resentment of the locals. None of that mattered. All that mattered was the work he did, the money he made, and the promise that if he was successful, he'd go home rich.

A House Without Pillars?

Tibet gave rise to exciting stories, but it was indeed jianku, and the social problems made a hard place even harder. Near the end of my trip I ate dumplings at Fei Xiaoyun's restaurant, and as I ate, she complained about her situation. Business was bad, and her life was boring; she worked fifteen-hour days and she had no friends in Lhasa. She missed her son, back in Chengdu, and she probably wouldn't see him until the following year. She asked me how long it had been since I'd been home, and I said I hadn't left China in more than two years.

"We're the same," she said. "Both of us are a long way from home." I agreed, and she asked if I missed my family. "Of course I miss them," I said. "But I'll see them next month, when I go home."

It was the wrong thing to say. Her eyes went empty and then filled with tears. We sat alone in the restaurant. It was unusual for a Chinese to show emotion in public, and I didn't know what to say. Silently I ate my dumplings while she cried, the late-afternoon sun stirring the Lhasa flies that were thick about the table.

Tibet had started to depress me, and I was looking forward to leaving. Strangely, it almost seemed worse for not being as bad as I had always heard. There were definite benefits of Chinese support, and I was impressed by the idealism and dedication of some of the young Han teachers I had met. But at the same time, most efforts to develop the region were badly planned, and it was frustrating to see so much money and work invested in a poor country and so much unhappiness returned. And often I felt that the common people, who knew little of Tibet's complicated historical and cultural issues, were being manipulated by the government in ways they didn't understand. But although I was certain that nobody was truly happy (most of the Han didn't like being there, and most of the Tibetans certainly weren't happy to have them), I wasn't sure who was pulling the strings. One could go straight to the top and probably find the same helplessness, the same strings. It was mostly the irrevocable mistakes of history, but it was also money—simple economic pressure that drove a mother away from her son to a place where the people did not want her.

This was not the first time I'd seen somebody cry in Lhasa. Five days earlier I'd spent the evening in front of the Jokhang temple, where I talked with two Tibetans. The first was a doctor who had done time in prison for writing an article warning Tibetans to protect their culture, and the second was a fifty-three-year-old who described himself as a common worker. Both men were eager to speak with an American, and they had a great deal of faith in America's ability to help solve the Tibet question. That saddened me as well. I wanted to tell them that in America there are many FREE TIBET bumper stickers, but they sit next to license plates that often bear the names of forgotten tribes who succumbed to the same forces of expansion and modernization now threatening Tibet. And the Chinese solution to the Tibet question—throwing money at the problem—also seemed very American. But I held my peace and listened.

"Look at this pillar," the worker said. He was standing next to the temple entrance, and he rested his hand on the worn red wood. "If a house doesn't have pillars, or if the pillars aren't straight, what will happen? It will fall down. It's the same thing here—our pillars are our history and our politics. If we don't have those, our society will collapse, and all of it will be lost—all of our culture."

It was dark, and I could barely make out his face, but I could see there were tears in his eyes. There was no more politically sensitive place in Tibet; virtually every major protest had happened in front of the Jokhang, and I knew it was unwise to speak so openly here. He glanced over his shoulder and continued.

"You need to tell the people of America what it's like here," he said. "You need to tell them what needs to be done." I nodded and shook his hand, but I realized I had no idea what I would recommend, or what the people of America could do. Perhaps we could build casinos.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/199902/tibet-china.

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Tibet Travel Guide

http://www.travelchinaguide.com/cityguides/tibet/

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THE CRY OF TIBET

By WANG LIXIONG
The Wall Street Journal
March 28, 2008; Page A12

The recent troubles in Tibet are a replay of events that happened two decades ago. On Oct. 1, 1987, Buddhist monks were demonstrating peacefully at the Barkor -- the famous market street around the central cathedral in Lhasa -- when police began beating and arresting them. To ordinary Tibetans, who view monks as "treasures," the sight was intolerable -- not only in itself, but because it stimulated unpleasant memories that Tibetan Buddhists had been harboring for years.
A few angry young men then began throwing stones at the Barkor police station. More and more joined, and then they set fires, overturned cars and began shouting "Independence for Tibet!" This is almost exactly what we saw in Lhasa two weeks ago.

The fundamental cause of these recurrent events is a painful dilemma that lives inside the minds of Tibetan monks. When the Chinese government demands that they denounce their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, monks are forced to choose between obeying, which violates their deepest spiritual convictions, and resisting, which can lead to loss of government registry and physical expulsion from monasteries.
From time to time monks have used peaceful demonstrations to express their anguish. When they have done this, an insecure Chinese government, bent on "annihilating unstable elements" in the "emergent stage," has reacted with violent repression. This, in turn, triggers violence from Tibetans.

In recent decades, the Chinese government's policy for pacifying Tibet has been to combine the allure of economic development on the one hand with the threat of force on the other. Experience has shown that this approach does not work.

The most efficient route to peace in Tibet is through the Dalai Lama, whose return to Tibet would immediately alleviate a number of problems. Much of the current ill will, after all, is a direct result of the Chinese government's verbal attacks on the Dalai Lama, who, for Tibetan monks, has an incomparably lofty status. To demand that monks denounce him is about as practical as asking that they vilify their own parents.

It should be no surprise that beatings of monks and closings of monasteries naturally stimulate civil unrest, or that civil unrest, spawned in this way, can turn violent.

Why aren't these simple truths more obvious? Phuntsog Wanggyal, a Tibetan now retired in Beijing who for years was a leading Communist official in Tibet, has observed that a doctrine of "anti-splittism" has taken root among Chinese government officials who deal with religion and minority affairs, both in central offices in Beijing and in Tibet. Having invested their careers in anti-splittism, these people cannot admit that the idea is mistaken without losing face and, they fear, losing their own power and position as well.

Their ready-made tag for everything that goes wrong is "hostile foreign forces" -- an enemy that justifies any kind of harsh or unreasoning repression. When repeated endlessly, anti-splittism, although originally vacuous, does take on a kind of solidity. Careers are made in it, and challenging it becomes impossible.

I am a supporter of the Dalai Lama's "middle way," meaning autonomy for Tibet in all matters except foreign affairs and national defense. This arrangement eventually would have to mean that Tibetan people select their own leaders -- and that would be a major change from the way things are now. Tibet is called an "autonomous region," but in fact its officials are all named by Beijing, and are all tightly focused on their own personal interests and the interests of the Communist Party. Tibetans can clearly see the difference between this kind of government and self-rule, and there is no way that they will support bogus autonomy.

It follows -- even if this is a tall order -- that the ultimate solution to the Tibet problem must be democratization of the Chinese political system itself. True autonomy cannot come any other way.

It is time for the Chinese government to take stock of why its long-term strategy in Tibet has not worked, and to try something else. The old problems remain, and they are sure to continue, perhaps in places like the "Uighur Autonomous Region" of Xinjiang, if a more sensible approach is not attempted.

Mr. Wang, a Beijing-based writer, was the organizer of the recent 12-point statement on Tibet by 30 Chinese intellectuals. This article was translated from the Chinese by Princeton University Prof. Perry Link.

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Just like America, China is building a multi-ethnic empire in the west

Tibet and Xinjiang have the misfortune of having resources the Asian giant wants, and being on the path to resources it needs

Parag Khanna The Guardian, Tuesday March 25 2008 Article historyAbout

this articleClose This article appeared in the Guardian on Tuesday March 25 2008 on p29 of the Comment & debate section. It was last updated at 00:02 on March 25 2008.

It is difficult to find a westerner who does not intuitively support the idea of a free Tibet. But would Americans ever let go of Texas or California? For China, the Anglo-Russian great game for control of central Asia was neither inconclusive nor fruitless, something that cannot be said for Russia or Britain. Indeed, China was the big winner.

Boundary agreements in 1895 and 1907 gave Russia the Pamir mountains and established the Wakhan Corridor - the slender eastern tongue of Afghanistan that borders China - as a buffer to Britain. But rather than cede East Turkestan (Uighurstan) to the Russians, the British financed China's recapture of the territory, which it organised into Xinjiang (which means "New Dominions"). While West Turkestan was splintered into the hermetic Soviet Stans, China reasserted its traditional dominance over Xinjiang and Tibet, today its largest - and least stable - provinces. (Beijing has now accused the Dalai Lama of colluding with Muslim Uighur separatists in Xinjiang.) But without them, the country would be like America without all territory west of the Rockies: denied its continental majesty and status.

Every backpacker who has visited Tibet and Xinjiang in the past decade knows that the Chinese empire is painfully real: the western region's going concern is undoubtedly Chinese Manifest Destiny. With the end of the civil war in 1949, China endeavoured immediately to overcome the "tyranny of terrain" and tame the interminable mountain and desert landscapes with the aim of exploiting vast natural assets, establishing penal colonies and military bases, and expand the Lebensraum for its exploding population.

Both Tibet and Xinjiang have the misfortune of possessing resources China wants and of being situated on the path to resources China needs: Tibet has vast amounts of timber, uranium and gold, and the two territories constitute China's geographic gateway for trade flow outward - and energy flow inward - with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Decades of labour by the army and swarms of workers have paved the way for unchallenged Chinese dominance. The high-altitude train linking Shanghai and Lhasa that began service in 2006 represents not the beginning of Chinese hegemony, but its culmination.

Tibet and Xinjiang today set the stage for the birth of a multi-ethnic empire in ways that resemble nothing so much as America's frontier expansion nearly two centuries ago. Chinese think about their mission civilatrice much as American settlers did: they are bringing development and modernity. Asiatic, Buddhist Tibetans and Turkic, Muslim Uighurs are being lifted out of the third world - whether they like it or not.

They are getting roads, telephone lines, hospitals and jobs. School fees are being reduced or abolished to promote basic education and Chineseness. Unlike those Europeans who seek to define the EU as a Christian club, there are no Chinese inhibitions about incorporating Muslim territories. The new mythology of Chinese nationalism is based not on expunging minorities but granting them a common status in the paternalistic state: Uighurs and Tibetans, though not Han, are told they are Chinese.

"The Soviet Union collapsed because they experimented with glasnost prematurely, before the achieved unity among the peoples," explains a Chinese intellectual in Shanghai who studies central Asia. Large empires are maintained through a combination of force and law; and as recent weeks illustrate, China is determined not to waver.

In even the remotest corners of Tibet, small bases house platoons of the People's Liberation Army, with soldiers menacingly practising martial arts twice daily in public squares, often right next to ancient Buddhist stupas. Inaccessible jungle areas designated environmentally protected zones are often actually military encampments. Signs trumpeting "Tibet power" refer strictly to the Chinese electricity company.

China has pumped in billions of development dollars, hoping to generate goodwill among the scarcely 3 million Tibetans. In Lhasa, crumbling stone quarters have been replaced with sturdy homes built along thoroughfares connecting the city to the new railway station. The consequence of Chinese modernity, however, is that a city that once symbolised cultural authenticity has become merely a gateway to the remote plateaus where wild yak still outnumber people.

An even greater prize than Tibet is the far larger and more populous Xinjiang, with its oil deposits, deserts and mountains. Its demographic dilution has been dubbed "apartheid with Chinese characteristics". Xinjiang's Muslims have always been unruly, even briefly securing an independent East Turkestan at the end of the civil war. But massive Han resettlement began with the "Develop the west" campaign of the 1950s, and in the cultural revolution Xinjiang was sealed off for a massive pogrom of mosque destruction and Qur'an burning. Violent clashes in Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, in 1996 proved that no peaceful Islamic culture would prevail in a Chinese-dominated environment. China suspended all mosque reconstruction and launched a "Strike Hard" campaign, imprisoning and executing hundreds of suspected separatists. Today one can see the results of a programme Mao and Deng began, but never completed: a railway and highway transporting coal, migrants and goods across the Taklamakan desert, facilitating the Hanification of a province where Uighurs now make up only half the population.

The annihilation of local people, history and architecture, and their replacement with shiny skyscrapers paying tribute to modern Chinese capitalism, make Urumqi the Shanghai of the northern Silk Road. A six-lane freeway runs through the city, and the Han majority fill up spiffy Japanese cars at the large Sinopec and PetroChina petrol stations. Urumqui buzzes with traders from Russia to Pakistan and all Stans in between, who buy cheap Chinese goods to be sold back home at a profit. Uighurs are now a marginalised minority in the city. Chinese tourists crowd the few accessible natural attractions, making the emerald-coloured Heavenly Lake no longer very heavenly.

Ironically, China's near absolute sense of security over both provinces is the greatest hope for a Chinese glasnost: China no longer faces any meaningful resistance to its rule and so some day may lighten up. Spiritual Tibetans have long looked south to Nepal and India for their cultural underpinnings, and in the 18th century Tibet was allowed a functional autonomy from China, a model the current Dalai Lama has proposed. Once he passes the scene, China might be less anxious about cultural exchange between Buddhists, further restoring Tibet's role as the Silk Road passage it was when Dunhuang's Caves of the Thousand Buddhas were carved, more than a millennium ago.

Tibetans and Uighurs will gradually become more prosperous than their neighbouring Mongols, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, Afghans, Pakistanis, Indians, and Nepalis - and this may provide a basis for Chinese claims of a benevolent hegemony elsewhere in Asia. But China will achieve that dominance before it talks about it.

· This is an edited extract from Parag Khanna's book The Second World: Empires and Influences in the New Global Order, which will be published next week

paragkhanna.com

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/mar/25/china.tibet/print

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The West plays with Tibetan lives

from David Seaton's News Links

Thursday, March 27, 2008

It might not be too much of an exaggeration to say that Richard Gere is a Weapon of Mass Destruction.

When westerners think of Tibet they think of the Tibetan spiritual superstar, the Dalai Lama and they naturally sympathize with the Tibetan’s desire for independence.

The Chinese, imagining an independent Tibet in NATO, with Mount Everest covered with American radar and CIA listening equipment, don’t.

Unfortunately for Tibetans, Tibet, besides its art treasures, the marvels of its Himalayan landscapes and the spiritual wealth of its unique form of Buddhism, has vast amounts of timber, uranium and gold that resource hungry China covets and a unique strategic position overlooking the world’s other rising giant, India. To expect the Chinese to trade any of this for a brilliant Olympic opening ceremony is disingenuous to the point of cynicism.

Sadly for Tibet, Washington, bogged down in two wars, with its economy troubled and its currency debauched, views China as a major threat, not just in Asia, but in Africa and Latin America as well. Richard M Bennett, an intelligence and security consultant writing in Asia Times observed that, “it would be rather surprising if the CIA was not taking more than just a passing interest in Tibet. For Washington this may seem a heaven-sent opportunity to create a significant lever against Beijing, with little risk to American interests. The Chinese would receive worldwide condemnation for violating human rights and it will be young Tibetans dying on the streets of Lhasa rather than yet more uniformed American kids.”

So, as HDS Greenway wrote in the Boston Globe, “If Tibetans are encouraged to further resist, it will be as with the Hungarian uprising, or the call for Iraqis to rise up during the first Gulf War - a hollow gesture that will lead to more repression in which the United States has no intention to intervene.” Writing in the

Guardian, Parag Khanna quoted a Chinese intellectual, "The Soviet Union collapsed because they experimented with glasnost before they achieved unity among the peoples." Khanna observes that, “Large empires are maintained through a combination of force and law; and as recent weeks illustrate, China is determined not to waver.”
Western globalization's discourse today is so filled with self-referring, self serving ideological constructions, that contemporary China's radical pragmatism seems mysterious. The authoritarian Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of China has taken China on a path that has little to do with Marx but quite a bit to do with Lenin. Lenin himself defined “Communism” simply as “state power plus the electrification of the whole country.” If we change the word “electrification” for “development”, we have a very workmanlike description of today’s China. DS

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April 01, 2008

AN APPEAL TO THE CHINESE PEOPLE FROM HIS HOLINESS THE 14TH DALAI LAMA

Today, I extend heartfelt greetings to my Chinese brothers and sisters round the world, particularly to those in the People's Republic of China. In the light of the recent developments in Tibet, I would like to share with you my thoughts concerning relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples, and to make a personal appeal to you all.

I am deeply saddened by the loss of life in the recent tragic events in Tibet. I am aware that some Chinese have also died. I feel for the victims and their families and pray for them. The recent unrest has clearly demonstrated the gravity of the situation in Tibet and the urgent need to seek a peaceful and mutually beneficial solution through dialogue. Even at this juncture I have expressed my willingness to the Chinese authorities to work together to bring about peace and stability.

Chinese brothers and sisters, I assure you I have no desire to seek Tibet's separation. Nor do I have any wish to drive a wedge between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. On the contrary my commitment has always been to find a genuine solution to the problem of Tibet that ensures the long-term interests of both Chinese and Tibetans. My primary concern, as I have repeated time and again, is to ensure the survival of the Tibetan people's distinctive culture, language and identity. As a simple monk who strives to live his daily life according to Buddhist precepts, I assure you of the sincerity of my motivation.

I have appealed to the leadership of the PRC to clearly understand my position and work to resolve these problems by "seeking truth from facts." I urge the Chinese leadership to exercise wisdom and to initiate a meaningful dialogue with the Tibetan people. I also appeal to them to make sincere efforts to contribute to the stability and harmony of the PRC and avoid creating rifts between the nationalities. The state media's portrayal of the recent events in Tibet, using deceit and distorted images, could sow the seeds of racial tension with unpredictable long-­term consequences. This is of grave concern to me. Similarly, despite my repeated support for the Beijing Olympics, the Chinese authorities, with the intention of creating rift between the Chinese people and myself, assert that I am trying to sabotage the games. I am encouraged, however, that several Chinese intellectuals and scholars have also expressed their strong concern about the Chinese leadership's actions and the potential for adverse long-term consequences, particularly on relations among different nationalities.

Since ancient times, Tibetan and Chinese peoples have lived as neighbors. In the two thousand year-old recorded history of our peoples, we have at times developed friendly relations, even entering into matrimonial alliances, while at other times we fought each other. However, since Buddhism flourished in China first before it arrived in Tibet from India, we Tibetans have historically accorded the Chinese people the respect and affection due to elder Dharma brothers and sisters. This is something well known to members of the Chinese community living outside China, some of whom have attended my Buddhist lectures, as well as pilgrims from mainland China, whom I have had the privilege to meet. I take heart from these meetings and feel they may contribute to a better understanding between our two peoples.

The twentieth century witnessed enormous changes in many parts of the world and Tibet, too, was caught up in this turbulence. Soon after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet finally resulting in the 17-Point Agreement concluded between China and Tibet in May 1951. When I was in Beijing in 1954-55, attending the National People's Congress, I had the opportunity to meet and develop a personal friendship with many senior leaders, including Chairman Mao himself. In fact, Chairman Mao gave me advice on numerous issues, as well as personal assurances with regard to the future of Tibet. Encouraged by these assurances, and inspired by the dedication of many of China's revolutionary leaders of the time, I returned to Tibet full of confidence and optimism. Some Tibetan members of the Communist Party also had such a hope. After my return to Lhasa, I made every possible effort to seek genuine autonomy for Tibet within the family of the People's Republic of China (PRC). I believed that this would best serve the long-term interests of both the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Unfortunately, tensions, which began to escalate in Tibet from around 1956, eventually led to the peaceful uprising of March 10, 1959, in Lhasa and my eventual escape into exile. Although many positive developments have taken place in Tibet under the PRC's rule, these developments, as the previous Panchen Lama pointed out in January 1989, were overshadowed by immense suffering and extensive destruction. Tibetans were compelled to live in a state of constant fear, while the Chinese government remained suspicious of them. However, instead of cultivating enmity towards the Chinese leaders responsible for the ruthless suppression of the Tibetan people, I prayed for them to become friends, which I expressed in the following lines in a prayer I composed in 1960, a year after I arrived in India: "May they attain the wisdom eye discerning right and wrong, And may they abide in the glory of friendship and love." Many Tibetans, school children among them, recite these lines in their daily prayers.

In 1974, following serious discussions with my Kashag (cabinet), as well as the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker of the then Assembly of the Tibetan People's Deputies, we decided to find a Middle Way that would seek not to separate Tibet from China, but would facilitate the peaceful development of Tibet. Although we had no contact at the time with the PRC - which was in the midst of the Cultural Revolution - we had already recognized that sooner or later, we would have to resolve the question of Tibet through negotiations. We also acknowledged that, at least with regard to modernization and economic development, it would greatly benefit Tibet if it remained within the PRC. Although Tibet has a rich and ancient cultural heritage, it is materially undeveloped.

Situated on the roof of the world, Tibet is the source of many of Asia's major rivers, therefore, protection of the environment on the Tibetan plateau is of supreme importance. Since our utmost concern is to safeguard Tibetan Buddhist culture - rooted as it is in the values of universal compassion - as well as the Tibetan language and the unique Tibetan identity, we have worked whole-heartedly towards achieving meaningful self-rule for all Tibetans. The PRC's constitution provides the right for nationalities such as the Tibetans to do this.

In 1979, the then Chinese paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping assured my personal emissary that "except for the independence of Tibet, all other questions can be negotiated." Since we had already formulated our approach to seeking a solution to the Tibetan issue within the constitution of the PRC, we found ourselves well placed to respond to this new opportunity. My representatives met many times with officials of the PRC. Since renewing our contacts in 2002, we have had six rounds of talks. However, on the fundamental issue, there has been no concrete result at all. Nevertheless, as I have declared many times, I remain firmly committed to the Middle Way approach and reiterate here my willingness to continue to pursue the process of dialogue.

This year the Chinese people are proudly and eagerly awaiting the opening of the Olympic Games. I have, from the start, supported Beijing's being awarded the opportunity to host the Games. My position remains unchanged. China has the world's largest population, a long history and an extremely rich civilization. Today, due to her impressive economic progress, she is emerging as a great power. This is certainly to be welcomed. But China also needs to earn the respect and esteem of the global community through the establishment of an open and harmonious society based on the principles of transparency, freedom, and the rule of law. For example, to this day victims of the Tiananmen Square tragedy that adversely affected the lives of so many Chinese citizens have received neither just redress nor any official response. Similarly, when thousands of ordinary Chinese in rural areas suffer injustice at the hands of exploitative and corrupt local officials, their legitimate complaints are either ignored or met with aggression. I express these concerns both as a fellow human being and as someone who is prepared to consider himself a member of the large family that is the People's Republic of China. In this respect, I appreciate and support President Hu Jintao's policy of creating a "harmonious society", but this can only arise on the basis of mutual trust and an atmosphere of freedom, including freedom of speech and the rule of law. I strongly believe that if these values are embraced, many important problems relating to minority nationalities can be resolved, such as the issue of Tibet, as well as Eastern Turkistan, and Inner Mongolia, where the native people now constitute only 20% of a total population of 24 million.

I had hoped President Hu Jintao's recent statement that the stability and safety of Tibet concerns the stability and safety of the country might herald the dawning of a new era for the resolution of the problem of Tibet. It is unfortunate that despite my sincere efforts not to separate Tibet from China, the leaders of the PRC continue to accuse me of being a "separatist". Similarly, when Tibetans in Lhasa and many other areas spontaneously protested to express their deep-rooted resentment, the Chinese authorities immediately accused me of having orchestrated their demonstrations. I have called for a thorough investigation by a respected body to look into this allegation.

Chinese brothers and sisters - wherever you may be - with deep concern I appeal to you to help dispel the misunderstandings between our two communities. Moreover, I appeal to you to help us find a peaceful, lasting solution to the problem of Tibet through dialogue in the spirit of understanding and accommodation.

With my prayers,

Dalai Lama

March 28, 2008

http://www.tibetoffice.org/en/index.php?url_channel_id=1&url_publish_channel_id=2298&url_subchannel_id=2298&well_id=2

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